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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ALGORITHMS, MARKETS, AND SOCIETY
Hadi Stephen Elzayn
Michael Kearns
This thesis examines algorithmic markets - market mechanisms with algorithms as a
core component in their functioning – and markets with algorithms (that is, canon-
ical markets for algorithmic or data-based goods and services). Our primary focus
is on the analysis of these mechanisms and markets in terms of societal concerns
such as fairness, privacy, and e ciency (including welfare and revenue). For algo-
rithmic markets, we consider automated ad auctions and call auctions; for markets
with algorithms, we examine both an abstract, general data-driven market from
a theoretical perspective, and a specific, important data-driven market: the U.S.
mortgage market. We apply a variety of theoretical tools from various subfields
of Computer Science and Economics, including worst-case asymptotic runtime and
sample complexity theory, the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) Learning
framework, no-regret learning algorithms, equilibrium analysis, smoothness, di↵er-
ential privacy, and quantitative fairness. In addition to theoretical analysis, we im-
plement various algorithms and mechanisms and perform empirical analysis on real
data in relation to the mortgage market. Our results include: new worst-case wel-
fare guarantees, novel equilibrium characterizations, and experimental evaluation
of various auction formats in the Ad Types setting; construction and analysis of a
di↵erentially private call auction mechanism with good performance and incentive
properties; a theoretical analysis elucidating the economic forces that encourage
error inequality in data-driven markets; and practical application of quantitative
fairness measures to a uniquely rich and exhaustive dataset covering the mortgage
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Algorithms are an omnipresent feature of modern life. Absent a major change in
society1, this trend will only increase. But how this trend will impact societal
concerns, like the functioning of markets and the prevalence of fairness and privacy,
remains unsettled. Both from an intellectual perspective as well as a practical one,
this area provides a fertile ground for research. This dissertation carves out a small
patch of this area, and considers several related but separate questions. Our focus
is on the interaction of algorithms and markets, and how this interaction a↵ects
societal concerns.
We split this dissertation into two parts. In the first part, we study algorithmic
markets : that is, markets that utilize algorithms in their core functioning. In the
first chapter, we study automated auctions for advertising placement, which has
become a many-billion dollar industry; in the second, we study double auctions,
which are widely used in financial markets, and how privacy can be achieved at
relatively low cost in e ciency. We dive into their details and structure to analyze
their properties with respect to welfare and privacy of the participants.
In the second part, we analyze how markets that are intertwined with algorithms
a↵ect society, with a particular focus on fairness. The first chapter in this part
1See Dune, Frank Herbert.
1
(and third chapter overall) is an analysis of how economic forces create predictive
inequality in machine-learning driven markets, and how competition does not, and
regulation can, mitigate this. The fourth and final chapter of the dissertation focuses
on one particularly important market – the U.S. mortgage market – and empirically
documents stylized facts about fairness using tools from the machine learning and
fairness literature.
We utilize and combine a variety of technical tools throughout this thesis. First,
since all of our settings contain an important market component and include strate-
gic actors, we draw on game theory and equilibrium analysis. More specialized game
theoretic tools we will apply include smoothness and price of anarchy analyses, as
well as classical supply and demand frameworks. Next, since we are generally con-
cerned with algorithmic processes and learning in particular, we use both general
algorithmic tools (like asymptotic runtime and sample complexity analysis) and
tools from the subfield of learning theory. Specialized tools from this subject in-
clude no-regret learning algorithms, which we apply to reason about equilibrium
using the connection to learning in games, and the Probably Approximately Cor-
rect (PAC)-learning framework to analyze how machine learning performance tends
with sample collected, and how this translates into economic incentives. Finally,
we directly apply tools from two subfields of computer science that put societal
concerns front and center: the di↵erential privacy literature, and the fairness lit-
erature. From di↵erential privacy, we use classical mechanisms as building blocks
for our own. From fairness, we leverage existing definitions and tests which we can
apply empirically.
1.0.1 Overview of Results
Chapter 2: Welfare and Revenue in the Ad Types Problem In Chapter
2, we study welfare and revenue in the Ad Types problem, following forthcoming
work. The Ad Types problem is a generalization of the standard position auction
2
setting, which models the interaction between a platform selling advertising slots
to bidders who su↵er identical decays in clickthrough rates (called discount curves)
and thus, diminishing value, as they are placed lower in the possible set of slots.
In the standard position auction setting, these discount curves are assumed to be
the same for all bidders; under this assumption, algorithms for this problem can
escape the complexity of a fully combinatorial auction. In the Ad Types setting,
we relax this assumption, and allow di↵erent types of ads have di↵erent decays in
clickthrough rates. However, the assumption that ads of the same type share the
same discount curves provides an intermediate degree of generality in which it is
still possible to provide guarantees.
We provide several results. First, we consider a range of auction possibilities cre-
ated by product of pairing two pricing and two allocation algorithms. The pricing
algorithms we consider are generalized second pricing and externality pricing, and
the allocation algorithms we consider are the greedy allocation and optimal alloca-
tion. Externality pricing paired with optimal allocation gives rise to the celebrated
Vickrey-Clarkes-Grove (VCG) mechanisms, which is well-known to have a weakly
dominant truthful equilibrium; for each of the other formats, we characterize upper
and lower bounds on welfare in the Ad Types setting. Then, we provide the first
Bayes-Nash equilibrium characterization of each auction format under a very simple
setting: two bidders with two slots, independent uniform valuations, and di↵erent
discount types, and prove a surprising revenue equivalence result. Finally, we show
that our calculated equilibria are reached experimentally when players bid in the
associated auction using a no-regret learning algorithm; we then use this algorithm
with simulated data to characterize the revenue of di↵erent formats in a realistic
setting.
Chapter 3: Di↵erentially Private Double Auctions In Chapter 3, we follow
Diana et. al., and consider the standard double auction with uniform pricing (”call
3
auction”) and propose a di↵erentially private version. Call auctions are used in
many financial markets and other settings for price discovery; in such settings, in-
formation about the willingness-to-pay of other market participants is very valuable,
as it can provide an additional edge. Various ad-hoc approaches have been applied
in the hope of protecting this information, but such approaches do not include any
formal guarantees. Di↵erential privacy is a mathematical notion of privacy that
uses randomness to mask information with exactly such formal guarantees.
We construct a di↵erentially private call auction by combining several mech-
anisms. We prove formally that our mechanism not only provides privacy but
also achieves good performance (in terms of total shares cleared relative to the
optimal non-private shares cleared), and show that our guarantee is tight with a
nearly-matching lower bound. These guarantees make no assumptions about the
particular valuations of the participants; however, we then consider agents who are
assumed to behave strategically with stochastically drawn valuations. We show
that our mechanism possesses good game-theoretic properties, including individual
rationality and approximate incentive compatibility. Finally, we take a learning
approach, and show that agents using variants of standard no-regret learning al-
gorithms in a repeated version of our mechanism will learn to bid in such a way
that the mechanism again clears nearly as many shares as the optimal. This re-
sult demonstrates that even if agents do not trust the mechanism’s guarantee of
incentive compatibility, natural approaches to attempt to profit will not a↵ect the
quality of the mechanism.
Chapter 4: Competition, Regulation, and Error Inequality in Data-
Driven Markets In Chapter 4, we follow the exposition of Elzayn and Fish 2020
and turn to high-level modeling of markets in which firms produce services based
on learning models from data. In particular, we investigate the economic incentives
that can give rise to what we call error inequality : the use of machine learned mod-
4
els that perform worse in terms of accuracy on some groups than others. To do
so, we apply core results from PAC-learning theory to take the learning side of the
firms’ problem seriously, and game theory and industrial organization to model the
behavior of firms in response to competition and regulation.
We begin with the case of a monopolistic firm, and show that a very simple
economic force – market size – drives di↵erential investment in purchasing data for
di↵erent groups. While this is not surprising from an economics-oriented point of
view, this indicates that the many algorithmic innovations proposed by the fairness
literature may be more band-aid than panacea. Next, we introduce a competing
firm, and examine whether competition drives firms to eliminate this error inequal-
ity; we find that while competition can push firms to improve their models, the in-
equality across groups is not mitigated and may even be exacerbated. We consider
various models of competition which correspond to various degrees of rationality,
and under all but the most extreme, this result holds. Finally, we model government
regulation as the imposition of additional constraints on the firm. We show that,
depending on the form of the constraint, the regulations may or may not impose
a Price of Fairness on the majority group relative to the unconstrained case, and
characterize the degree of this Price of Fairness when it occurs.
Chapter 5: Fairness in the Mortgage Market Our final chapter, based on
work conducted for the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, turns to an extremely
consequential market: the U.S. mortgage market. There has historically been a
great deal of racial discrimination in this market; consequently, there have also
been extremely influential activist movements and policy intervention aimed at
ameliorating the e↵ects of this discrimination. We thus aim to measure how fair
the market is today; in doing so, we apply quantitative fairness metrics developed
for Fair Machine Learning to loan application and performance data obtained from
public and proprietary data sets covering nearly all mortgage applications and half
5
of mortgages in the United States.
To obtain credible measurements in the face of potential omitted variable bias,
selection e↵ects, feedback loops, and other threats to identification, we combine a
simple structural model with a focus on predictions for marginal candidates under
various policy regimes. We find empirically that there appear to be elements of
both No Disparate Treatment and No Disparate Impact regimes in practice, and we
find evidence of significant disparities in approval rates, default rates, and threshold
rigidity by group. We then estimate the population wide FICO-score distribution
and use this to estimate a counterfactual Pareto frontier of possible policy regimes
and their trade-o↵s with respect to the fairness metrics in question. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, we find that with regard to fairness metrics, real-world measurements
appear to be near the Pareto-frontier of what is achievable in the short-term using






WELFARE AND REVENUE IN
THE AD TYPES PROBLEM
2.1 Introduction 1
In this chapter, we characterize equilibrium welfare and revenue properties of various
auction formats in the Ad Types setting, following forthcoming work of Elzayn et
al.. The Ad Types setting [37] is a generalization of the standard position auction
[48, 121], which has been a workhorse in online advertising for years. In the standard
position auction, there are multiple positions where the auctioneer can place ads.
Advertisers care about receiving clicks on their ads, and the classical model posits
a separable click-through-rate (CTR) model, where ad slots have an associated
discount 1    1    2   ..   0 that represents the advertiser-agnostic CTR of the
slot.
The Ad Types setting [37] is a semi-separable generalization of position auctions
where each ad has a publicly known type2—such as ‘video ad’, ‘link-click ad’ or
1The work in this Chapter was conducted while author was an intern at Facebook, and is
based on forthcoming work with Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Brian Lan, and Okke Schrijvers.
2Type in the economics literature often refers to private information. That is not the case
here: ad type refers to the conversion event that the advertiser cares about.
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  ..   0. All ads from the same type share the same discount curve; as
such, the model represents a generalization of the position auction, while containing
more structure than a general max-weight bipartite matching problem.
Colini-Baldeschi et al. [37] show that in the Ad Types setting, one can com-
pute the optimal allocation (with respect to reported bids) and associated VCG
prices using an adapted version of the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm in O(n2(k+log n))
(where n is the number of slots, and k the number of ad types). However, there are
two practical considerations that need to be taken into account: First, despite the
auction-theoretical benefits of VCG, in practice online advertising platforms often
use a Generalized Second-Price (GSP) payment rule [8], so it is desirable to under-
stand the impact of using GSP pricing instead of VCG. Second, in content feeds
there is often a large number of ads that are allocated, making the O(n2(k+log n))
running time prohibitive, necessitating simpler non-optimal allocation algorithms.
In this chapter, we investigate what happens in the Ad Types setting when we
perform the allocation using either the greedy or optimal algorithm, and run pricing
using either GSP or VCG semantics. In three of the four possible combinations
the resulting auction is not incentive compatible, so we investigate the revenue and
welfare in equilibrium.
2.1.1 Results
We provide three sorts of results:
• Price of Anarchy Bounds. In Section 2.3, we provide Price of Anarchy
upper and lower bounds in the Ad Types setting for all combinations of greedy
or optimal allocation paired with GSP and VCG pricing. In particular, greedy
allocation has an upper bound for Price of Anarchy of 4, regardless of the
choice of pricing; for optimal allocation and GSP pricing, we give upper bound
that depends on the bidder types and number of bidders, but not valuations.
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We give lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy of 2 for greedy allocation with
GSP pricing, 3/2 for greedy allocation with VCG pricing, and 4/3 for optimal
allocation with GSP pricing.
• Small Equilibrium Characterization. In Section 2.4, we analytically char-
acterize the existence of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a simple case: two bidders,
two slots, uniformly distributed valuations.3 In equilibrium, the greedy allo-
cation with GSP pricing produces and equivalent amount of revenue to the
optimal allocation with VCG pricing, and that this revenue is larger than the
revenue produced by either other possible mechanism (which are also equiva-
lent to each other).
• Evaluation on Realistic Data. The small-equilibrium characterizations
are interesting, but in order to understand if the results are representative
of larger instances, we learn equilibria for bidding data from a large online
advertiser in Section 2.5. We draw (normalized and anonymized) advertiser
bids in various settings and equip advertisers with no-regret learning algo-
rithms; when players use such algorithms, the empirical average of play is
known to converge to coarse correlated equilibria. We find that for the most
part equilibria on real data do not behave identically to the two bidder two
slot uniform valuations case, but rather show a steeper hierarchy of revenue
and welfare that conforms with intuition.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Position Auctions. Position auctions have long been the workhorse in online
advertising. The seminal works of Edelman et al. [48] and Varian [121] first pro-
3While this may appear a very special case, explicit equilibrium characterization in auctions is
notoriously complex. Most famously, in Vickrey’s original paper [123] he posed an open problem
to characterize the equilibrium of a two-player first-price auction with uniform valuations in [a1, b1]
and [a2, b2], a problem that wasn’t solved until nearly 50 years later [80]!
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posed the separable model of the position auction—and described the generalized
second-price (GSP) auction in this model—and showed that for GSP there exists
an ex-post Nash equilibrium that is equivalent to the VCG outcome. Gomes and
Sweeney [63] showed that GSP does not always admit a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
There is also a history of exploring alternative pricing rules for position auctions;
for example Chawla and Hartline [31] study generalized first-price (GFP) semantics
for position auction and show that for i.i.d. valuations the equilibrium is unique
and symmetric.
Price of Anarchy and Smoothness. Since explicit equilibrium computation
in auction is challenging, people have focused on Price of Anarchy bounds, i.e. using
the equilibrium conditions to give bounds on the welfare in any equilibrium. Paes
Leme and Tardos [88] were the first to give Price of Anarchy bounds for GSP. A
common approach to proving Price of Anarchy bounds is to use the smoothness
framework proposed by Roughgarden [111, 112], though GSP is not smooth in this
sense. Lucier and Paes Leme [90] and Caragiannis et al. [26] instead show that one
can use a semi-smoothness condition and they give almost tight Price of Anarchy
bounds for GSP. Smoothness has also been applied to other payment rules, such as
GFP by Syrgkanis and Tardos [117].
Complex Ad Auctions. There is a body of work that explores relaxing the
separability assumption in position auctions. Our work is based on the Ad Types
setting formalized by Colini-Baldeschi et al. [37]. When each ad is its own type, this
model is identical to the one with arbitrary action rates that are still independent
between ads, which has been studied before by Abrams et al. [2], Carvallo and
Wilkens [28] and Wilkens et al. [27]. To our knowledge, no equilibrium character-
izations or Price of Anarchy bounds are known in these settings. The closest is a
paper by Colini-Baldeschi et al. [36] that studies the relationship between envy, re-
gret and social welfare loss in the Ad Types setting for an alternative version of GSP
called “extended GSP” using the same semi-smoothness framework as proposed by
11
Caragiannis et al. [26].
2.2 Model
There are n advertisers (each associated with a single ad) competing form (ordered)
slots. Each ad has a publicly known type ⌧i, such as ‘video ad’, ‘link-click ad’ or
‘impression ad’. Ad i of type ⌧i has value-per-conversion vi. Ads of di↵erent types
have di↵erent conversion events, e.g. for a link-click ad the conversion event is a
link click and for a video ad the conversion event is the user watching a video ad.
Ads in lower slots see fewer conversions, and we consider a semi-separable
model4 to capture this e↵ect: for ads of type ⌧i, we can write Pr[conversion on ad i
(of type ⌧i) in slot s] =  s⌧i ·  i where  
s
⌧i
is the slot e↵ect for a particular ad type
⌧i (e.g., the probability that a user will watch a video ad if it is shown in the sth
slot) and  i is the advertiser e↵ect. Without loss of generality the advertiser e↵ect
has been included in the advertiser’s value, i.e., if the value-per-conversion of the
advertiser is v0
i
, then vi =  i · v0i. Discount curves are monotonically decreasing in




  ..   0. In some restricted settings, we consider
geometric discount curves that can be written as  s
⌧
= c ·  s for some fixed c,  ,
where s is an exponent on the right hand side.
Since we consider multiple allocation and pricing formats, we write ⇡A(s,b)
to indicate the player in slot s when b is the bid profile and A is the allocation
algorithm. We will suppress the A when it is clear from context. We use  A(i,b) to
indicate the slot that player i receives when the bid profile is b and the allocation
algorithm is A. We will sometimes overload notation to write ⌧(i) as function
returning player i’s ad type ⌧i; this will be useful when referring not to a specific
player but rather to an arbitrary occupant of a given slot. Finally, we will denote
4The model is semi-separable since ads of the same type share the same discount curve, but
ads of di↵erent types do not.
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where Sn is the set of all permutations of bidders. Slightly abusing notation, we
use ⌫(i) to denote the slot i is assigned to under ⌫.
Advertisers. Advertisers submit a single bid bi for a conversion, which may or
may not be their true valuation vi. They are charged price pi (calculated by the
auction) if a conversion happens, so in expectation they are charged  s
⌧(i)pi. Thus,
the payo↵ of an advertiser for a given slot at a given price is ui (s, pi) =  s⌧(i) (vi   pi) .
Auction Algorithms. Any auction must answer two questions: who gets what
(allocation), and much how do they pay (pricing). We use A : b ! s to designate
allocation algorithms, and P : A,b ! p to designate pricing algorithms. Here, b
is a vector of bids and s is a vector of slot assignments, soA maps bids to slots.
Pricing algorithm P takes both a vector of bids and an allocation algorithm A.
Thus the pricing algorithm is a meta-algorithm, rather than a particular algorithm.
We refer to a pair (A,PA) as an auction mechanism. In this Chapter we consider
all combinations of two allocation algorithms and two pricing meta-algorithms:
• Greedy (Allocation) The greedy allocation begins with the highest slot,
and among non-allocated bidders allocates the bidder whose discounted bid is
highest (that is, argmax
i2Us  
s
⌧(i)bi, where Us is the set of unallocated bidders as
of the time slot s is reached). For the Ad Types setting, the greedy algorithm
generally does not yield the optimal allocation (see e.g. Example 1.1 in [37]).
• Optimal (Allocation) The optimal allocation computes the max-weight bi-
partite matching between ads and slot (where edge weights are discounted
bids  s
⌧(i)bi), e.g. using the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm [87, 96].
• GSP (Pricing) The Generalized Second Price pricing rule executes the prin-
ciple that a bidder pays the minimum bid under which they retain the slot
13
they were assigned to, i.e. for allocation algorithm A and bids b: [PA(b)]i :=
argmin
b:A(b,b i)i=A(b)ib. Computing this bid is straightforward for the greedy
allocation algorithm, while for the optimal algorithm we use the method of
Carvallo et al [27].
• VCG (Pricing) The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing rule [123, 35, 65] exe-
cutes the principle that a bidder should pay their externality, i.e. for a alloca-











A is the optimal allocation algorithm this yields the standard VCG algorithm.
When A is the greedy allocation algorithm, the resulting mechanism is not
incentive compatible.









2.2.1 Solution Concepts and Learning
In this Chapter we present equilibrium results for both full-information and Bayes-
Nash equilibria:
Definition 2.2.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A bid profile b is pure strategy Nash equi-
librium if for each player i: ui(b)   ui(b0,b i) for all pure strategies b0.
Definition 2.2.2 (Bayes-Nash Equilibrium). For known value distribution V , a
mapping bi(vi) for i 2 I is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for player and every valuation
realization vi:
Ev i⇠V i [ui(bi(vi),b i(v i))]   Ev i⇠V i [ui(b
0,b i(v i))]
for any other mappings b0i(vi) .
For an equilibrium concept, there may be multiple equilibria with di↵erent wel-
fare. The Price of Anarchy captures the worst-case welfare compared to the optimal
welfare knowing the valuations.
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where E is the set of equilibria for (A,PA), and recall that ⌫(i) is the assignment
of bidder i in the optimal allocation.
2.3 Price of Anarchy
In this section, we provide characterizations of upper and lower bounds on the Price
of Anarchy for (Greedy, GSP), (Greedy, VCG), and (Opt,GSP)5. For upper bounds
on the Price of Anarchy, we leverage the semi-smoothness framework of [26], itself a
generalization of the smoothness framework of [111]. For lower bounds, we construct
examples of equilibria that achieve less welfare than the optimal. For results that
are primarily ancillary or require involved proofs, we provide proof sketches, and
defer full proofs to an expanded online version of the paper.
For Greedy GSP and Greedy VCG, we give a universal result - that is, with no
requirements besides being in the Ad Types setting, and this result matches known
upper and lower bounds for the position auction (though our bounds are not yet as
tight). For Opt GSP, we provide instance-optimal bounds, where instance-optimal
is with respect to the discount curves and number of slots but universal over bidder
valuations. It is very likely that our upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy in this
setting are too pessimistic; we leave improvement of these bounds to future work.
Our technique in each case will be to show that the game induced by the auction
format and any valuation profile is semismooth, in the following sense:
Definition 2.3.1 (Semismooth [26]). We say that a game is ( , µ)-semismooth if
there exists some (possibly randomized) strategy (depending only on the valuation
5We omit (Opt, VCG) since the fact that bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy suggests





Table 2.1: Lower bounds on PoA.
GSP VCG
Greedy 4 4





Table 2.2: Upper bounds on PoA. ⇤ denotes instance-optimal bounds.















for all bid profiles b.










since if it holds, summing over players gives exactly the defining condition of semis-
moothness. And semismoothness directly yields Price of Anarchy bounds using the
following theorem, from [26]:
Theorem 2.3.1. Suppose a game is ( , µ)-semismooth, and social welfare is at least
the sum of player utilities. Then its Price of Anarchy is upper bounded by µ+1
 
.
2.3.1 Greedy Allocation Proof Recipe
A common proof structure applies to both (Greedy, GSP) and (Greedy, VCG), be-
cause of their shared allocation algorithm and the fact that both pricing algorithms,
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when coupled with greedy allocation, guarantee that bidders are never overcharged.
It is similar to the proof found in [26], but with additional subtlety due to disagree-
ment in the discount factors.
To handle this subtlety, we will use the following Lemma:
Lemma 2.3.2 (Partial Monotonicity). Suppose that b,b0 are two bid profiles that
only di↵er in element i, and b0
i
> bi. Let   be the slot which i was assigned under







Proof. First consider player i. Since i increased his bid between b to b0, he achieves
some slot  0 at least as high as  .
Now, consider slots above  0. By definition, i has not placed an e↵ective bid
higher than bidders occupying those slots (or else he would have been placed in
that slot or above). So i’s deviation leaves unchanged the bidder allocation and so









or else i would not have been assigned to  0. So the desired inequality holds for this
slot.
Finally, consider each slot s0 between  0 and  . Notice that the set of bidders
unallocated when s0 is considered under b0 has only changed by losing i and possibly
gaining either ⇡( 0, b) or a displaced previous winners from slots between  0 and
  due to ⇡( 0, b) being displaced by i and any cascading e↵ects. But this means
that in particular ⇡(s0, b) remains unallocated when s0 is considered. Hence, if
⇡(s0, b0) 6= ⇡(s0, b), it can only be because the assigned bidder under b0 had higher
discounted value than the bidder assigned there under b. Since this holds for any s0
in the range, the claim holds.
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Now we are ready to state and prove our theorem.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Semi-Smoothness for Greedy Algorithms). Let (A,PA) be an auc-
tion mechanism. Suppose that
1. A is the greedy algorithm, and
2. For any bid profile b, for every bidder we have:
PA(b)i  i
Then (A,PA) is (1/2,1)-Semi Smooth.











then we will be done. So suppose b is a bid profile, and consider a deviation to
bidders bidding half their value. (Notice first o↵ that such a deviation guarantees
a deviating bidder non-negative utility by Property 2.) Now, fix bidder i. For the
first case, suppose that under this deviation, he receives A(bi, b i) =  0 ⌫ ⌫(i) (i.e.





































where the 1st inequality follows by no-overcharging and the others follow by as-
sumption or trivially.
Now suppose that instead, A(b0
i
,b i)i =  0   ⌫(i). We split this into two
subcases.
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In the first subcase, vi2   bi, i.e. b
0
i
is an upward deviation that results in i







To see that this also holds when we replace b0 with b, turn it around. That is,
we can view bi as a downward deviation from b0i, which cannot a↵ect the allocation
choices of any of the slots above its place before the deviation, including ⌫(i). But


















Now, suppose that vi2 < bi. We know that under b
0, the bidder who gets ⌫(i)
will have higher e↵ective value than i, but it is not yet clear that this holds under
b. To see that this does hold, however, notice that we can view bi as an upward
deviation from b0
i
. But since, by assumption,  0   ⌫(i), Lemma 2.3.2 implies that
in moving to b, the values of bidders in slots above  0, which include ⌫(i), must








and the desired inequality follows as before.
2.3.2 Greedy GSP
Theorem 2.3.3. Let (A,PA) = (Greedy, GSP). Then the Price of Anarchy is at most
2.
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Proof. First, by assumption, A is Greedy. Second, generalized second price will not
charge a bidder more than their bid since under the greedy algorithm, the winner
of a slot has a higher e↵ective bid than the second bidder’s bid, which is what they
are charged. Hence, the conditions of Theorem 2.3.2 are satisfied, and the bound
follows.
On the other hand, we can show that the Price of Anarchy is at least 2.
Theorem 2.3.4. Let (A,PA) =(Greedy, GSP). Then the Price of Anarchy is at least
2.
Proof. Consider the following example: there are 2 slots and 2 bidders, one of type
A and one of Type B. Let  A = (1, 0),  B = (1, 1), and let vA = (1   ")vB. Then
the allocation (A,B) gets payo↵ vA + vB = (2   ")vB, while the allocation (B,A)
gets welfare vB.
We claim that the following is an equilibrium: A bids 0 and B bids vB, giving
the allocation (B,A). To see that this is an equilibrium, notice that if these are the
bids, bB > bA, so B will be given the first slot at a price of bA = 0 for a total payo↵
of vB. Since price is bounded below by 0, B could not gain by deviating any lower.
On the other hand, in the second slot, A gets no value, but also is not charged, for a
payo↵ of 0. To change anything, A would have to change the allocation, and so bid
above bB = vA - but then she would get a payo↵ of vA   vB = (1  ")vB   vB  0;
hence she also would not like to switch. And note that since 0  bA and vB  vA,
neither bidder is overbidding.












which can be made arbitrarily close to 1/2, and so the Price of Anarchy := OPT/EQ
can be made arbitrarily close to 2.
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Note the equilibrium described is not unique - for instance, bA = (1   ")vB,
bB = vB would also be an equilibrium that achieves the same allocation.
For some intuition as why such a simple example can get a bad price of anarchy,
notice that two slot case can be mapped to a standard second price auction for the
first slot, where one bidder has a good outside option and the other doesn’t. By
including the outside options, a socially-minded auctioneer could do significantly
better than just considering the bid and valuations of the item in question.
2.3.3 Greedy Allocation and VCG Pricing
In this section, we consider the Price of Anarchy when (A,PA) is (Greedy, VCG).
Again, using greedy allocation guarantees the first condition of Theorem 2.3.2. It
is not obvious that bidders will not be overcharged. It is, however, true, as we show
in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2.3.3. Let (A,PA) be the greedy algorithm with VCG pricing. We claim
that for every bidder, their charge will not exceed their e↵ective bid.
Proof. We will prove this by strong induction. First, we relabel the bidders so that
Bidder i is in Slot i post-allocation. Now, consider the removal of bidder i. First
notice that this will not a↵ect the assignment to any i0 above i. So any price that i
must pay will come from the externalities he imposes on i0 > i.
Now, we claim that the following is true:









where j is the bidder that is assigned to Slot i in the absence of Bidder i. (In
keeping with our formal notation, j⇤ := ⇡(i, (b i)).)
To see that this is true, imagine re-running the auction without i included. Slots
1...i   1 will be allocated the same way, and then at Slot i some bidder j⇤ will be
allocated that would have been allocated further down had i been included. Now,
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j⇤ moves up to i, he has not a↵ected the winning bid calculations of all slots between
i and j⇤ relative to what they were when i was included.
But that means that the only externalities that i imposes are those on j⇤ and
below. Note that when we consider j⇤ taking the slot of i, the arrangement of the
bidders below j⇤ will be exactly the same as if j⇤ were the removed bidder instead
of i⇤ - but this is exactly the price that j⇤ pays. Hence, i’s total payment is the




this is exactly what is claimed in Equality 2.3.1. Then we can write:











Now we invoke strong induction. Suppose that all bidders below i are not
overcharged, i.e. 8j assigned to a slot below i’s, pj   
j
j





j⇤bj⇤  0, so that we conclude:










where the last inequality follows by the fact that i was chosen over j for Slot i.
Finally, note that Bidder n pays 0, since there are no bidders below him to exert
an externality on; thus, applying strong induction starting from the bottom yields
the claim.
Lemma 2.3.4 allows us to conclude that (Greedy, VCG) satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 2.3.2, yielding the following Theorem:
Theorem 2.3.5. Let (A,PA) = (Greedy,GSP). Then the Price of Anarchy is at most
2.
Now we consider lower bounds.
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Theorem 2.3.6. Let (A,PA) = (Greedy,VCG). Then there exists a conservative 3-
bidder, 3-slot example with an equilibrium competitive ratio arbitrarily close to
2/3.
Proof. Let vA = 1 + ", vB = 1, vC = 1   ". Let  A = (1, 1, 1   2"),  B = (1, 1, 0),
 C = 1, ", "2.
The welfare of (C,B,A) is 3  2"  2"2, while the welfare of (A,B,C) is 2+ "+
"2   "3.
Suppose that each player bids their value, ie:
b⇤ = (bA, bB, bC) = (vA, vB, vC) = (1 + ", 1, 1  ").
We claim this is an equilibrium and results in (A,B,C). The allocation follows
since the allocation algorithm is greedy in bids. To see that this is an equilibrium,
first consider what values each player is getting: A gets 1 + ", B gets 1, C gets
(1  ") "2 = "2  "3. With these, we can calculate what prices each player is paying:
Player C pays nothing, since he is imposing no externality on A or B. B is imposing
an externality on C - without B, C would get the second slot for a valuation of
"  "2 and B imposes no externality on A. So B will be charged "  "2. Finally, A
imposes the same externality on C (because without A, B would get the first slot,
so C would get the second slot) and imposes no externality on B.
So the payo↵s are:
⇡A(b
⇤) = 1 + "  "+ "2 = 1 + "2
⇡B(b
⇤) = 1  "+ "2
⇡C(b
⇤) = "2
Notice that these are always positive. (The only one that could possibly be negative
would be ⇡B, but if " < 1, then 1   " > 0 =) ⇡B > 0; if " > 1, then "2   " >
0 =) ⇡B > 0.)
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Now we consider possible deviations. Start with A. While there are an uncount-
able number of deviations in bid space, they are all equivalent but for their e↵ects
on A’s position and price. So notice that if A were to move to second position by
bidding b0
A
less than bB but more than bC , it would receive the same payo↵, because
its discount rate is 1 and it imposes the same externality as before, so no such bid
could improve A’s payo↵. If A were to bid b0
A
less than bC , it could get the third
slot at a price of 0, but it would only get 1   2" < 1 + "2 = ⇡A(b⇤). So A has
no profitable deviations. For B, improving his position cannot improve his payo↵
or change his externality, and moving to slot 3 would result in 0 payo↵, while he
currently makes positive profit. For Player C, notice that first of all, if we rule
out overbidding, Player C cannot improve his position; but suppose we do not rule
this out. By moving to Slot 2 (by bidding, say, bC = 1 + "/2) C would exert an
externality of 1 on Player B and so get negative payo↵ (1 " 1 =  "). By moving
to Slot 1 (by bidding bC   1 + ") C would exert the same externality on B and so
again receive negative payo↵.




2 + "+ "2   "3
3  2"  2"2
which comes arbitrarily close to 2/3 for small enough ".
The intuition with this example is that bidders with a high discount rate (high
 ) push out the bidder with low discount rate into the tail; for either of those high-
discount bidders, their unilateral externality is small even though, taken together,
they exert a large externality. So this example is related to the fact that Nash
equilibrium is about unilateral deviation, not joint deviation - there may be a bet-
ter equilibrium, but the bidder losing the most cannot force a better equilibrium
selection on his own.
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2.3.4 Optimal Allocation and GSP Pricing
In the case of Optimal Allocation and GSP pricing, we will obtain a smoothness
result that depends on the largest and smallest discounts and the number of bidders,
but not on the valuation profile. The result is as follows:
Theorem 2.3.7. Suppose (A,PA) is optimal allocation and GSP pricing. Then the





To prove this result, we begin by observing that GSP pricing will never charge
a bidder more than his e↵ective bid. Formally:
Lemma 2.3.4. If bidders are conservative, then in (Opt, GSP), bid upper bounds
price.
Proof. By definition, the GSP price is the minimum the bidder could pay and earn
the slot, and in particular, they could have bid exactly their bid and received their
slot (because they did). Hence, the minimum they could have bid to receive the
slot can never be more than whatever they actually bid.
Now, we proceed to the proof.
Corollary 1. The game has an instance-specific PoA of:




If we assume that there are m slots and all discount curves are geometric and strictly
ordered (e.g. c⌧ = c⌧ 0 and  ⌧1    ⌧2   ...    ⌧k for some k, then this PoA is given
by:





We remark that this bound is potentially exponential in the number of bidders
in the case of geometric discount curves, but linear in the case of linear discount
curves (assuming there is a fixed set of discount curves). And while this bound is
likely too pessimistic, we can give a lower bound as well:
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Theorem 2.3.8. Let (A,PA) = (Opt,GSP). Then there exists a conservative 3-bidder
3-slot example that gets competitive ratio arbitrarily close to 3/4.
Now let’s try a full information case. To do this, first we characterize what must
hold in equilibrium. Then we provide examples that meet this. Again, for this we
will have two bidders, two slots, two types. We will assume that in the case of a
tie, A wins.
Claim 1. Let A have discount curve (1,  A), and B have discount curve (1,  B), with
 A <  B (so   :=
1  B
1  A < 1). Now suppose that  




Then the following strategy profile is an equilibrium:
b⇤ = ( (1   B)vB + ", (1   B)vB)
for any " > 0, and for small enough " neither bidder is overbidding. The auctioneer
then selects (A,B), but (B,A) would be optimal.
Before we prove that this claim, we first show that we are not reasoning about an
empty set. Consider vB = 1, vA =
1
2 ,   =
2
























the third inequality holds, and vA  =
3
4 < 1 = vB so the final inequality holds.
Notice that under this particular example, if the auctioneer selects (A,B) as
















So we will proceed to prove the claim, and then optimize the ratio.
Proof of Claim 1. The auctioneer selects (A,B) whenever
bA +  BbB   bB +  AbA () bA    bB.
6As is always nice to check, we are not reasoning about an empty set. Consider vB = 1,
vA =
1
2 ,  A =
1





ba =  (1   B)vB + "    
2(1   B)vB =  bB
where the inequality follows from the fact that  A <  B =)   < 1. So the
outcome is that A gets the top slot; since A will win as long as bA    bB, A will be
charged  bB. B will receive the second slot, and be charged nothing. On the other
hand, we note that (B,A) is optimal i↵:
vA +  BvB  vB +  AvA () vA    vB.
This holds by assumption, so (B,A) is in fact the optimal allocation.
Now we consider possible deviations from the bid profile. For A, bidding higher
does not change the allocation nor the payment, and bidding lower than its bid
but more than bB also does not a↵ect the allocation or the payment, so the only
deviation to consider is bidding less than bB. If it does this, it will change the
allocation to (B,A) and get  AvA while paying nothing, but:
vA   bB = vA   
2(1   B)vB   vA   vA(1   B)
= vA(1  (1   B)) =  BvA >  AvA
where the first equality follows by the pricing rule and strategy profile, the first
inequality follows from the fact that vA    2vB =)   2vB    vA), and the final
inequality by assumption. So deviating to be assigned the second slot would not be
profitable for A.
Now consider B. Again, the only deviations that we must consider are those
which change the allocation to (B,A). But if B were to deviate to such a bid, he




 (1   B)vB + "
 














so this deviation would not be profitable for B.
Now, note that B is trivially not overbidding since  , 1   B < 1. To show that
there exists a small enough " so that A is not overbidding, note that we need:
vA   (1   B)vB   "   0




> 1   B =)      (1   B)
=)   2 <   (1   B)
=)  vB 
2 <  vB (1   B)
But then
vA   vB (1   B) > vA   
2vB   0
as desired, where the last inequality follows by assumption. Thus, we have shown
that this bid profile is an equilibrium that achieves suboptimal welfare.
Now we turn to optimizing this bound.
Theorem 2.3.9. There exists a choice vA, vB,  A <  B, such that the bid profile
above is an equilibrium and obtains welfare arbitrarily close7 to 3/4 of the optimal
welfare. This implies that the Price of Anarchy is at least 4/3.
Proof. First, we will assume that we can find a vA, vB, r, with vA = r ·vB for some r,
such that the hypothesis of Claim 1 holds and optimize the competitive ratio over
r. Then we will show that for any r, there exists a vA, vB such that said equilibrium
holds.
Recall the hypothesis of Claim 1:




7We leave it here to avoid tie-breaking issues.
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Now, letting vA = rvB with r < 1, we can rewrite this as:




This will be the condition we will need to satisfy.









Notice that this function is increasing in r. So we would like to make r as small
as possible while still satisfying all the hypothesis. This occurs when r =  2; note
that Inequality 2.3.2 still holds since




















1 + 0 (1  B)
2
(1 0)2
=  B + (1   B)
2 = 1   B +  
2
B
This quantity is minimized at  B =
1
2 for a value of
3





The above was heuristic. More rigorously: Let vB = 1, and let  B =
1
2 . We
won’t fix  A, but rather we will assume that  A <  B =
1
2 let it approach 0. We also
set vA as a function of  A: vA =
1
4(1  A)2 .












Hence, the hypothesis of Claim 1 are satisfied, so the equilibrium described is an










2(1   A)2 + 1
 A + 4(1   A)2
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Notice that at  A = 0, this quantity is
3
4 , and is 1 at
1
2 . But notice also that
the denominator, viewed independently, is a quadratic function with only complex
roots, and the fraction is otherwise just a simple function of algebraic quantities.
Thus, the fraction is continuous. Since it varies continuously from 1 to 3/4, it must
pass through every point arbitrarily close to 3/4 from the right.
Hence, we can achieve competitive ratio arbitrarily close 3/4, so the PoA is at
least 4/3.
2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we provide the first analytical characterization of Bayes-Nash equi-
librium in the two-slot, two-bidder case with ad types and under the assumption
that bidder values are drawn independently and from identical uniform distributions
over the interval [0, 1]. In particular, we show the existence of simple equilibria that
are symmetric in form and mostly natural. To find these equilibria, one may assume
as a heuristic that an equilibrium exists, and derive first-order conditions; while this
is a natural way to do so, ultimately, the proof is easiest when positing the existence
of a linear equilibrium and verifying that the prescribed strategies are, in fact, best
responses to one another. That is the approach we will take here.
For each auction type, we assume there are two slots, two discount types A and
B, and one bidder of each type. We assume that the discount types have the form
(1,  A) for type A and (1,  B) for type B; i.e., geometric discount curves that both
have a constant factor of 1. (This assumption can be easily relaxed at the cost of
carrying around some extra notation.) Throughout, we will assume without loss of
generality that  A <  B, and define   :=
1  B
1  A < 1. For the sake of e ciency, we
say a bidder ‘wins’ if they win the first slot.
Table 2.3 displays the simple linear equilibria we discover. Notice that in each
setting, player strategies are symmetric up to relabeling. In other words, the form
of the strategy is symmetric, despite the fact that the particular strategy will di↵er
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GSP VCG





Opt (1   A)vA, (1   B)vB (vA, vB)
Table 2.3: 2 bidder, 2 type case, simple equilibrium strategies
due to di↵erent discount rates. Also, other than the VCG mechanism, each auction
involves some shading. For GSP pricing, the downward shading coincides with each
bidder’s marginal benefit of the first slot relative to the second. But when VCG




2 + 1  B6 (3  2 )
1  A
6  
3 + 1  B6   (3  2 
2)
Opt 1  A6  
3 + 1  B6   (3  2 
2) 1  A6  
2 + 1  B6 (3  2 )
Table 2.4: 2 bidder, 2 type case, equilibrium revenue
Table 2.4 gives the expected revenue for each of the equilibria described in Table
2.3. As with Table 2.3, several features are noteworthy. First, immediately we can
see that both the two standard formats, as well as the two nonstandard formats,
are (expected) revenue equivalent. This may be surprising, given the variation
in payment rules and strategies; however, we will see that the strategies are such
that the win condition and payment conditional on winning work out to be the
same. Second, we note that as expected, if we allow  A =  B =  , we recover
the equivalent revenue to the VCG mechanism for all four auction formats. This
is because when discounts are the same and there are only two slots, the greedy
8While this may be counterintuitive, note that with greedy allocation, bidding higher increases
the win probability, and under GSP pricing, bidding higher does not (directly) increase the price
paid. However, overbidding results in the possibility of winning at a price higher than one’s
valuation.
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allocation is equivalent to the optimal allocation, and GSP pricing coincides with
externality pricing, so the matrix of auction formats collapses to a single row and
column. Moreover, if we set   = 0, we recover the revenue of the standard second
price auction with two uniform bidders (which is sensible, as if   = 0, the auction is
e↵ectively simply a second price auction for the only slot with any value). Finally,
we note that it is not immediately obvious whether revenue increases or decreases
with discount values (since   is a function of  A,  B); again, it is easy enough, if
uninspiring, to take the derivative and find that revenue decreases as either discount
factor increases. It may be surprising that revenue decreases when bidders can
derive more total welfare, but the principle is easy to see in the extreme: if there is
no di↵erence in clickthrough rates, bidders need not bid high at all9, as they may
as well take the second slot.
These revenue results let us make equilibrium, rather than fixed bid10, compar-
isons of revenue. In particular, simple, if involved, algebra lets us proclaim the
following relationship between revenue:
Theorem 2.4.1 (Equilibrium Revenue). Consider a two-bidder, two-type, two-slot











Importantly, these results only apply to our simple setting; it is unclear whether
the revenue, welfare, or other predictions carry over into a general setting. And
indeed, in Section 2.4.6, we show that one of the least extensive generalizations does
not admit such an analytically tractable characterization. While it is possible that
9We assume there is no reserve here; we leave as an open problem questions around designing
optimal auctions with ad types.
10For instance, it is known in the standard position setting that GSP prices are lower bounded
by VCG prices for any fixed set of bids, but such a statement makes no prediction when bidders
adjust their strategies to equilibrium.
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more complicated analytic equilibrium may exist and be found by clever inspection
or some other method, it is di cult to foresee how such an equilibrium might
be found. Moreover, it is possible that equilibrium strategies, even if they do
exist, are complicated to calculate and implement. Thus, in Section 2.5, we turn
our attention to empirical study of revenue under realistic bid distributions, where
(coarse correlated) equilibria are learned via no-regret learning techniques.
2.4.1 Greedy GSP
In this setting, the higher bidder gets the top slot at a price of the lower bid, and the
lower bidder gets the bottom slot at a price of 0. We obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4.2. Suppose that (A,PA) are (Greedy, GSP). Then in the two slot, two
bidder, uniform case, the strategy profile
( A,  B) = ((1   A)vA, (1   B)vB)
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The easiest way to proceed is to take an ex-interim perspective; that is,
consider Bidder A’s perspective after she learns her valuation vA. If A wins, she
pays bB and gets value vA; if she loses, she gets  AvA and pays nothing. Then:
EvB⇠U [0,1] [uA|bA] = (vA   E[bB|bB < bA])Pr[bB < bA] +  AvA(1   Pr[bB < bA])
(2.4.1)
Since we are attempting to show that (1   A)vA is a best-response to (1   B)vB,
we can assume that bB = (1  B)vB. Hence, A wins if and only if vB < bA/(1  B).
Under the uniform distribution, Pr[x < c] = c and E[x|x < c] = c2 . Thus we can
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apply these to Equation 2.4.1 to write:
EvB⇠U [0,1] [uA|bA] =
✓































= 0 () bA = vA(1   A)
For completeness, note that the second derivative is  11  B < 0, so the critical point
is a maximum. Since bidding less than 0 is not a allowed and bidding more than
1 can only result in negative or zero profits, we can limit the search to the [0,1]
interval. Since the payo↵ is continuous, the global maximum must occur at either
0, 1, or the critical point. As argued, 1 cannot be profitable, and 0 cannot give
positive utility (so will always be dominated by some positive bid if vA > 0). Thus,
the critical point is a maximum, and so A bidding (1    A)vA is best-response to
the B bidding (1   B)vB.
Reversing roles and considering B’s perspective gives exactly the same logic.
Hence, the pair of strategies form an equilibrium.
Claim 2. Under the linear equilibrium described above, with  A <  B, we have that








Before we prove this claim, note that if we let  A =  B = 0, we immediately
recover 13 , which is the revenue of the standard second price auction with two bidders











This has the nice interpretation that, again, with   = 0 we achieve the revenue of
the standard second price auction, but as   ! 1, our revenue decays linearly.
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Proof. A wins if bA   bB, which happens when:
bA   bB () (1   A)vA   (1   B)vB () vA    vB
If A wins, she pays bB, and so the revenue is bB = (1    B)vB; otherwise, it is













































































In this setting, the auctioneer chooses between the allocation (A,B) and (B,A).
Note that:
(A,B) ⌫ (B,A) () bA + (1   B)bB   bB + (1   A)vA
() bA    bB
Suppose bidder A is the winner. Then A is charged the smallest bid b such that
b    bB, which is just  bB. Similarly, if B wins, he will be charged bA/ .
Theorem 2.4.3. Suppose that (A,PA) are (Opt, GSP). Then in the two slot, two
bidder, uniform case, the strategy profile
( A,  B) = ((1   A)vA, (1   B)vB)
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is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We follow the same structure as the proof of Theorem 2.4.2. Consider the
problem from A’s perspective, and suppose that B is using a linear strategy  vB.
(In the theorem statement,   = 1    B, and this is in fact the only constant that
will satisfy equilibrium conditions.) Now, note that the winning condition is that:
(A,B) ⌫ (B,A) () bA    bB =   vB
If A wins the top slot with a bid bA, then the expected payment is:













where the second inequality follows from the properties of the uniform distribution.









































= 0 () bA = (1   A)vA
as suggested. As before, it is easy to see that the payo↵ is concave, and that 0 and 1
are dominated strategies, so the first order condition represents a global maximum.
Again, viewing this from B’s perspective will give the same set of computations,
mutatis mutandum, so we conclude that ((1   A)vA, (1   B)vB) is an equilibrium.
Notice that since the optimal bA has no dependence on  , we can conclude
that the optimal strategy responding to any linear strategy on the part of B is to
respond with (1    A)vA. This is also true for B in response to A choosing some
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linear strategy ↵vA. But that means that the equilibrium we find is the only linear
equilibrium.
Theorem 2.4.4 (Revenue). Under the linear equilibrium described above, with  A <
















Now, if A wins, she pays the minimum price p such that p    bB, which is vB
(1  B)2
1  A .
Similarly, if B wins, he pays the minimum price p such that p   bA  =
(1  A)2
1  B vA.





(1   B) vB vA    2vB
(1  A)
  vA vA   
2vB































































































Now suppose that the allocation algorithm is greedy – A wins whenever bA   bB –
but the pricing is VCG; that is, if A wins, she pays (1   B)bB.














Proof. Suppose B bids with bB =  vB. Then since bB   , any bid A makes above
  will be equivalent in that she will certainly win and pay the same price. Thus
we can write A’s win probability and expected payment given winning as:





  bA   
1 bA >  





2  bA   
1 bA >  





























  ) bA   
vA  
 (1  B)
2 bA >  
Notice that at bA =  , these values coincide; beyond  , any value that A bids
results in the same payo↵. So, this payo↵ function is a sort of capped quadratic in
bA with the kink at  . Thus, to find the optimal bid, A need only compare any
inner critical point with the end point (which it would even in the absence of such
a kink given it were maximizing over a closed set).









= 0 =) (1   B)bA = vA(1   A)








As usual, concavity gives that this is a local maximum.
But now notice that ui(bA) is continuous up until bA =  , where it coincides
with the next piece. Moreover, it is concave (strictly, on [0, ]); hence, if a local
maximum is reached, it must be a maximum over the interval [0, ], including the
point at  .
So, whenever vA     () vA   
2, it is immediate that A can do no better
than bidding bA = vA/ . On the other hand, if vA    2, then
vA
     . But
above  , increasing the bid does not improve A’s payo↵, and so the choice of vA/ 
prescribes a bid higher than necessary - bidding   would su ce. However, it also
does not hurt A’s payo↵.
Thus, bidding bA =
vA
  is always a best-response to B bidding bB =  vB (though
it is not a unique best-response).
Now we do a similar calculation from B’s perspective, supposing that bA =
vA
  .
B wins if bA  bB and pays (1  A)bA. Again, we shall consider for the possibility of
overbidding, and write the win probability and expected payo↵ that B will receive
for any bid as:

























































Again, notice that they coincide at bB =
1
  , and increasing bB beyond
1
  does
not improve B’s payo↵. The first order condition on the interior part of the curve
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is:
 vB   (1   A )bB    BvB = 0 =)  bB(1   A) =  vB    BvB
=) bB =  vB.
Again, uB(bB) is strictly concave over [0,
1
  ], so this is a maximizer, and like uA,
uB is continuous with two pieces, and the strict concavity and cap guarantees that
bidding  vB gives at least as high payo↵ of bidding
1
  or more. (Notice also that




Thus, bB =  vB is a best response to bA = vA/ , and hence the pair is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Now, we examine revenue in this equilibrium above.












Notice that this is the same revenue as OPT + GSP. Why should this be? It
turns out that the structure of the linear equilibrium is just so, so that the chosen
allocation is the same given any two valuations despite the allocation rules being
di↵erent, and the pricing is also the same despite the pricing rules being di↵erent.
Proof. In the equilibrium above, we have that






() vA   vB 
2.
If A wins, she pays (1    B)bB = (1    B) vB. If B wins, he pays (1    A)bA =
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(1  A)
































































































Finally, recall that in the VCG mechanism, the natural equilibrium is bidders bid-
ding truthfully. In that case, we have the following lemma:





Notice that this is, perhaps surprisingly, the same revenue as the Greedy + GSP
auction. As before, this is because the winning events and conditional payments
are exactly the same in this format (in this setting) as under the linear equilibrium
under Greedy + GSP.
Proof. By the optimal allocation rule, A wins i↵ vA    vB, and pays (1    B)vB.
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Under the same framework, let’s compare the revenue of the di↵erent auction forms.
Again, this is using the revenues calculated above and provided in table 2; that is,
the simple linear equilibria and assuming that  A <  B. Notice that we have shown
that the VCG mechanism and Greedy Allocation + GSP pricing achieve the same
revenue in this case. Ultimately this is because in both auctions, given the strategies,
A wins whenever vA    vB and pays (1    B)vB; similarly, in both auctions, B
wins whenever va   vB and pays (1   A)vA.
Recall Theorem 2.4.1:
Theorem 2.4.1 (Equilibrium Revenue). Consider a two-bidder, two-type, two-slot












Proof of Theorem 2.4.1. The two equalities follow by inspection, so we only need










































































 2(1   A) + 3(3   A   2 B)  5 (1   B) + 3(1   B)
6
Using  A   B =)   A     B, we have:
 2(1   A) + 3(3   A   2 B)  5 (1   B) + 3(1   B)
6
 






 2 + 3 3   5 + 3
⇤
On the range   2 [0, 1], the inner function is positive. To see this, one can either
graph the function using a computer algebra system, or prove this analytically. For
completeness: Note that 3+ 2+3 3 5  is bounded below by 3+ 2+ 3 5 .
So it su ces to show that the latter is positive on   2 [0, 1]. So let f( ) =
 2 +  3   5 . Then notice that f(0) = 0, f(1) =  3, and f 0( ) is given by
3 2 + 2    5. Since   < 1, f 0 is always negative on [0, 1]. But that means that,
given that f(0) = 0 and f(1) =  3, f cannot go below  3 on the interval (otherwise
it would have to have a positive derivative at some point to come back up to  3).
Hence, we conclude that f( )    3 8  2 [0, 1], and so 3 + f( )   0. Tracing
back through the inequalities, this gives R⇤gspgreedy   R
⇤vcg
greedy, and the claim follows.
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2.4.6 More complicated settings
Unfortunately, though the two bidder case admits elegant linear equilibria, compli-
cating the setup (even to as simply as two slots, two bidders of one type and one
bidder of another) immediately eliminates hope of finding a simple linear equilib-
rium in general. To see this, one can posit a linear equilibrium again symmetric up
to discount types. Then beginning with the rare player, one can attempt to solve
for this linear equilibrium, and one way to attack this is to split the outcome of
the game into two stages: first, there is a preliminary elimination from contention
based on player bids, and then the bids of the remaining players are applied in an
auction. Using this compound game structure, one can easily write the payo↵ of a
bid, and then it is straightforward to show that if the common type is playing any
linear strategy, the best-response for the rare player is not linear. Hence, there is
no equilibrium where players of the same type play symmetrically and all strategies
are linear.
2.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we run two experiments. Both leverage the Exponential Weights
algorithm, described in 1. In the first experiment, we use no-regret learning algo-
rithms in the two-slot, two-bidder setting (following a technique described in [68])
to learn equilibria; we find that these learned equilibria closely match our predicted
Bayes-Nash equilibria. In the second, we evaluate equilibrium revenue and welfare
in a 10-bidder, 5-slot setting with valuations drawn from simulated distributions,
where again we use no-regret learning to learn the equilibria (which would be far
too complicated to recover analytically). We find that in practice, revenue seems to
exhibit a strong hierarchy across auction types, but welfare does not. We also note
that the strength of the revenue hierarchy and absolute level of revenues are larger
when valuations are independent rather than correlated.
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ALGORITHM 1: Generic Exponential Weights algorithm.





for b = b1, . . . , bk . Initialize uniform weights.
for t 2 1...T do
bt ⇠ wt . Draw bid from distribution






·wt(bj) for k = 1, . . . ,vbj . Update the weights.
end
2.5.1 Validating Theoretical Equilibria
In our first experiment, we modify the technique described in [68] to learn equi-
libria in the two-bidder two-slot uniform distribution setting – that is, the setting
for which we obtain analytical results in Section 2.4. The purpose of this, be-
sides curiosity, is twofold. Narrowly, the fact that it agrees so precisely with our
theoretical results both validates the theory and heartens our confidence11 in our
implementation12 of the mechanisms described. But more broadly, it suggests that
the approach of learning equilibrium, which may be the only feasible approach given
the computational intractability, may in fact also be the “right” approach in terms
of producing reasonable results in more general settings.
The idea of this approach is simple. It is well-known that if agents in a repeated
game use no-regret learning algorithms to decide their actions, then the empirical
time average of play converges to coarse correlated equilibrium. What [68] shows is
that we can use the population interpretation of a Bayesian game to extend these
11The code performs as expected on a reasonably wide variety of unit tests. But more validation
is always nice.
12As of this writing, our implementation has not been open-sourced due to it being written as
part of a summer internship; we hope to obtain approval for public release at some point in the
near future.
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results analogously for games of incomplete information.
The population interpretation views a game of incomplete information between
n players with t types as instead a game between nt players, n of which are selected
to play each round (where the selection is of one type from each original player).
[68] suggests that each type be equipped with its own no-regret learning algorithm;
then, results on learning coarse correlated equilibria can be extended to learning
Bayesian coarse correlated equilibria. Of course, this approach assumes finite types
and actions; we will approximate this by discretizing both the space of bids and
space of valuations.
We use this method as our basis. However, we modify it by introducing an
exploration period. This is inspired by [55], which shows that if a long enough
period of pure exploration is given, then contextual no-regret learning algorithms
in repeated auctions will converge to the specific natural equilibria that one might
hope to find, e.g. truthful bidding in the second price auction or the standard
shading in a first-price Bayesian auction. This is in stark contrast to what can be
proven without an exploration period. (See, e.g. [54].)
Our protocol is thus given in Algorithm 2. In words, we simply discretize the
value space into values and discretize the bid space13. We instantiate a copy of the
Exponential Weights algorithm for bidders for each valuation and each type.
For specific parameter values, we pick  A = 0.37 and  B = 0.55; these are
(rounded) discounts such that  2 = 12 . As in the theoretical section, we assume
that discounts for the first slot are 1, and we approximate uniformly distributed
valuations over [0, 1] with valuations in increments of 0.1 and uniform weight. Our
bid space is discretized separately for each player (i.e. for each valuation) to span 21
equally spaced increments between 0 to twice the valuation14. We run for 500,000
13We include bids above 1 to allow players to overbid, which is prescribed in the VCG-Greedy
equilibrium.
14I.e. for a bidder with valuation 1, the bid choices are 0,0.1,0.2,...1.1,1.2...2, but for bidder
with valuation 0.5 they are 0, 0.05, ...0.5, ...1.
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rounds of learning after a pure exploration period of 10,736 rounds15. Then we
calculate the mean bid for each valuation over the period after exploration. The
results are visible in Figure 2.1.
ALGORITHM 2: Experiment 1 Protocol
Input: Value Discrization dv, Bid Discretization db, Number of exploration rounds
T 0, Number of rounds T ,  A,  B,
Output:
for (A,PA) 2 {[Greedy,Opt]⇥ ([GSP, V CG])} do




, ...., 1} do
Initialize bidder of type A with value v, discount factor  A, and exponential




, ...1, 1 + 1
db
, ...2}
Initialize bidder of type B with value v, discount factor  B and exponential
weights with action space {0, 1/db, 2/db, ...1, 1 + 1/db, ...2}
end
for t 2 1, 2..., T do
Select random bidder of type A bidders and random bidder from type B
bidders. if t > T ’ then




Run auction with (A,PA) and the given bidders but bid randomly.
end
Update ExpWeights for selected players.
end
end
Qualitatively, the figures match our theoretical predictions quite well, with de-
viations explainable by error due to discretization and incomplete learning. In
particular, for this choice of  A and  B, we should expect the strategies to be
(0.63vA, 0.45vB) in GSP-Greedy and GSP-Opt, (vA, vB) in VCG-Opt, and (1.4vA, 0.7vB)
15These are calculated to be in line with the requirements of [55], but because of di↵erences in
our setting relative to theirs, this calculation should be considered very rough.
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in VCG-Greedy. (The latter may be particularly surprising as it calls for overbidding
on A’s part.) Each of these equilibria are apparent in the figures. The discrepancy
between predicted and observed results is more apparent at higher valuations. This
is likely due to our method of discretization: in using a constant number of ac-
tions across valuations, the gap between potential actions is varying, and thus the
approximation to a continuous actionspace is less precise for higher valuations.
(a) GSP-Greedy (b) VCG-Greedy
(c) GSP-Opt (d) VCG-Opt
Figure 2.1: Average bids by value after exploration period. Dotted lines indicate
theoretical predictions.
2.5.2 Experiment 2
In our second experiment, we evaluate welfare and revenue obtained by the various
mechanisms in simulated data. We consider a 10-bidder, 5-slot setting, which is
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rather large among empirical studies of these mechanisms (but still small relative
to the auctions seen in practice). We generate two synthetic datasets. In our first
dataset, we fix independent lognormal distributions (with the underlying normal
distributions having standard unit variance but varying means) for each bidder and
draw values independently to use as undiscounted bidder click valuations. In our
second, we similarly draw values from lognormal distributions, but induce correla-
tion of click valuations across bidders by drawing common component drawn from
a uniform distribution, and using a simple average of the independent and common
components for each bidders click valuation. We give parameters for valuations in
Table 2.5.
Bidder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantity
Underlying Mean -2 -1 -0.5 -1.2 -3 -1.7 -0.9 -0.5 -1.2 -3.5
Constant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Factor 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Table 2.5: Simulated data parameters for Experiment 2, including means of under-
lying normal distribution and constant and factor for geometric discount curves.
A protocol for a single round is as follows. We draw a number to indicate the
row of the dataset to use and set bidder click valuations according to that row.
(Choosing the same row ensures that the bidders will have a common component
in the correlated dataset, and does not a↵ect independence in the independent
dataset.) Then, for 1000 rounds, bidders play a repeated auction game where their
valuations are all fixed as of the initial draw, and players use exponential weights
to play. That is, each round bidders maintain a current distribution over actions,
draw an action, and then, based on the outcome of the round and what they would
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have received had they played every other action16, they update their weights17.
We then sample a strategy profile from the time-averaged joint distribution by
uniformly selecting a time period and drawing bidders’ bids from the exponential
weights distributions of that given round; we take 100 such samples and run the
auctions with these bids. Then we average these together to obtain an estimate of
the revenue of each mechanism for the initial valuation draw. And for each each
auction format, we repeat this entire process for 100 total bidder valuation draws.
We plot revenue in Figure 2.2a and welfare in Figure 2.3a.
Results Our experimental results highlight several important qualitative conclu-
sions. First, the average revenues achieved in Figure 2.2 suggest a clear revenue
hierarchy: GSP pricing obtains significantly higher revenue than VCG pricing, and
greedy allocation seems to obtain, at least in the correlated case, somewhat more
revenue than optimal allocation. Notice that this hierarchy is quite di↵erent than
Theorem 2.4.1, and matches the intuition that GSP generally prioritizes revenue
rather than incentive compatibility as in VCG. Second, revenue obtained under
independent valuations is significantly higher than under correlated valuations; in-
terestingly, this di↵erence appears larger for GSP pricing than VCG. Finally, note
that in Figure 2.3, we see that welfare too is much higher under independent valua-
tions than correlated ones, and that there does not appear to be much di↵erence in
welfare across auction formats. One potential explanation may be that the bulk of
welfare is being contributed by high-value but steep-discount bidders, and greedy
and optimal allocations will treat such bidders similarly, at least in the extreme
case.
16We evaluate every unplayed bid choice by re-running the auction with all other players’ bids
fixed and calculating the counterfactual payo↵s.
17Before they update, we store each round’s distribution separately for later use.
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ALGORITHM 3: Experiment 2 Protocol
Input:
Output:
for (A,PA) 2 {[Greedy,Opt]⇥ ([GSP, V CG])} do
for s 2 1, 2..., 100 do
Draw 10 valuations. Initialize bidders with values and fresh Exp. Weights.
for t 2 1, 2, ..., 1000 do
Initialize and run a 5 slot auction using (A,PA) Draw bids and fix them.
for i 2 I do




, ..., 1} do
Re-run auction with all other players’ bids fixed, but player i





for t0 2 1, 2, ...100 do
Draw number uniformly at random from the total number of learning
steps to become round number. Draw bid for each bidder from time






(a) Revenue by auction format for
10 independent bidders and 5 slots. (b) Revenue by auction format for
10 correlated bidders and 5 slots.
Figure 2.2: Revenue by Auction
(a) Welfare by auction format for 10
independent bidders and 5 slots.
(b) Welfare by auction format for 10
correlated bidders and 5 slots.






In modern financial markets, massive resources are directed towards what can be
considered ad-hoc privacy mechanisms, intended to allow participants to cloak their
trading activity and intentions. Such e↵orts occur both in the exchanges themselves
and in the algorithmic trading services o↵ered by large brokerages. In this work, we
provide a di↵erentially private (DP) version of classical one-shot double auctions
(also known as “call auctions”). Frequent instances of DP call auctions could poten-
tially simplify the convoluted e↵orts at providing trading secrecy that are rampant
in today’s markets while still permitting dynamic price discovery.
Current electronic exchanges o↵er a staggering variety of order types and mech-
anisms meant to provide specific types of privacy. Dark pools were introduced to
allow large-volume counterparties to discover each other away from the so-called
“lit” markets where high-frequency traders (HFTs) are prevalent. Order types re-
1This Chapter is based on joint work [40] with Emily Diana, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth,
Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, and Juba Ziani.
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stricting execution with small-volume counterparties are meant to provide similar
protections. Hidden and “iceberg” orders in the lit exchanges provide secrecy at the
expense of time priority in the standard continuous limit order book. The relatively
new exchange IEX was created to foil the latency arbitrage of HFT by introducing a
“speed bump” for all incoming orders. On the brokerage side, algorithms executing
large client trades attempt to minimize visibility by breaking orders up over time
and across exchanges and employ randomization in both timing and sizing to avoid
detectable “heartbeats.”
These e↵orts are all ad-hoc in the sense that they each protect market partici-
pants from rather specific forms of detection or exploitation. While well-intentioned,
they have contributed significantly to the complexity of modern electronic markets.
At the same time, it is also widely understood that there are limits to the privacy
that can be provided for large trades executed in short periods, and there is a large
academic and practical literature on theories of market impact (see [61, 62] for an
overview) and algorithms for minimizing it. This literature identifies a trade’s par-
ticipation rate — the ratio of its volume to that of the overall market during the
trade’s execution — as the key determinant of market impact.
Our main conceptual contribution is the development of DP call auctions as a
mechanism providing privacy against all forms of attack or detection, up to the
participation rate of a trade. In this formulation, we provide a per-share privacy
guarantee determined by the sensitivity of the call auction, which in turn determines
the amount of noise added. Trades with higher participation rates will unavoidably
have less privacy than those with smaller ones, but the nature of the privacy will
now be as general as possible. Repeated DP call auctions also enjoy graceful degra-
dation of the privacy guarantee. Furthermore, we can (informally) relate our results
to standard market impact theories via the shared notion of participation rate and
show that, under natural conditions, DP call auctions clear a near-optimal number
of shares under the predictions of the “square root law” of market impact. We ana-
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lyze our DP mechanisms extensively, including its incentive properties and behavior
under natural no-regret learning dynamics by market participants.
We note that (non-private) call auctions are already common in modern markets.
In particular, both NYSE and NASDAQ hold call auctions (also sometimes called
“crosses”) to establish opening and closing prices in U.S. equities [99, 98]; in the
Tokyo Stock Exchange there are additional intraday call auctions, which are also
the subject of academic study (e.g. [30, 29]). The influential paper [24] (discussed
at greater length in Related Work below) proposes and analyzes frequent intraday
(again non-private) call auctions specifically as a defense against latency arbitrage;
see also [124]. Our work can be seen as a continuation of this line of thinking, in
which frequent intraday DP call auctions could provide even more general privacy
guarantees to all market participants.
Outline and Summary of Results: At a high level, our results fall into three
broad categories:
1. The development and analysis of (jointly) di↵erentially private call
auctions. We carry this out in Section 3.3. We initially present this purely
as an algorithm design task, abstracting away incentive properties. We prove
bounds relating the privacy properties of the mechanism, the number of shares
it is guaranteed to clear compared to the optimal benchmark, and the net in-
ventory that the mechanisms may have to take on. (Unavoidably, jointly
di↵erentially private call auctions cannot exactly match the number of buyers
and sellers and so will have to take on a net position of shares itself to clear
the market — we prove that this net position is small.). We also prove a lower
bound showing that our mechanisms are near optimal amongst all di↵eren-
tially private mechanisms. We explore the connection between our guarantees
and theories of market impact in Section 3.3.5.
2. The analysis of incentive properties and learning dynamics. Having
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developed our algorithms, we turn our attention to how buyers and sellers
should interact with them. First, in Section 3.4, we show that our algorithm
is ex-post individually rational and approximately dominant strategy truthful
for agents who wish to trade only a small number of shares, with a guarantee
that degrades gracefully in the size of the desired trade. (We note that this
is a stronger incentive guarantee than standard non-private call auctions.)
We then study the global behavior that results when agents interact with a
repeated version of one of our mechanisms using learning dynamics : we show
that although an abstract guarantee of no-regret learning is not enough to
guarantee convergence to the optimal number of trades, a small modification
of the exponential weights learning algorithm (informally, a modification that
still guarantees the no-regret property, but breaks ties in favor of trading
whenever such ties exist) does converge to the optimal number of trades.
3. Simulation Results. Finally, in Section 3.5, we conduct simulations in both
one-shot and repeated settings, showing that in the settings considered, the
realized outcomes of our mechanisms tend to be significantly better than the
worst-case guarantees of our theorems.
Related Work: Our work relates to several large strands of literature. Promi-
nently, the study of double auctions dates back to the early days of mathematical
economics. [101] provides an introduction to double auctions, and a useful survey
from a computer science perspective can be found in [102]. Our modeling of the
strategic framework in which agents participate in the double auction is broadly
consistent with this literature.
Of particular note are [24] and [124], which both propose frequent call auctions
to eliminate latency arbitrage.2 The work of [24] first establishes the empirical
2
Latency arbitrage is the opportunity for traders to simultaneously buy and sell nearly or
exactly identical securities on di↵erent exchanges (e.g. Chicago’s Mercantile Exchange and the
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availability of latency arbitrage opportunities for even highly traded securities, and
shows moreover that competition between traders has not eliminated this opportu-
nity over time. Instead, it has resulted in an “arms race” for speed, with arbitrage
windows becoming shorter over time, but arbitrage profit per unit remaining essen-
tially constant. The authors then propose a solution to mitigate latency arbitrage:
repeated high-frequency call auctions. Using a game theoretic approach, they model
how the “sniping” process results in arbitrage opportunities in the continuous limit
order book; in their model, the profit opportunity (along with arms race) is an
equilibrium constant, even despite improving technology. Then, using the same
underlying model of firm behavior, the authors show that repeated call auctions
eliminate these arbitrage opportunities and cause firms not to choose to invest in
speed, ending the arms race. We follow in the spirit of [24], but note that their
solution does not mitigate the problem of privacy, and in particular does not solve
the issue of the proliferation of ad-hoc and increasingly complex trading algorithms.
(The earlier work of [124] performs extensive simulation studies that establish the
salutary e↵ects of frequent call auctions on latency arbitrage.)
Our work is connected to, and leverages tools from, the broad literature on
di↵erential privacy introduced by [45]; for an overview, see, e.g. [46]. The most
related strand of this literature is the connection between di↵erential privacy and
mechanism design, first made by [94]. In particular, they observed that di↵erentially
private mechanisms inherit strong incentive properties. For many mechanism design
tasks that involve the allocation of a resource to individuals, it is not possible
to satisfy di↵erential privacy in the standard sense over allocations: in cases like
this, the relevant solution concept is joint di↵erential privacy [83]. This solution
concept has been used in a number of mechanism design settings, including max-
welfare matchings and other allocation problems [72, 73], stable matchings [79],
New York Stock Exchange) in the instant where price has changed on one exchange but remains
“stale” on the other; it is described in the popular book Flash Boys [89].
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equilibrium selection problems [109, 39], and tolling problems [108]. In particular,
although joint di↵erential privacy can be used as a tool to achieve truthfulness,
not all jointly private mechanisms are approximately truthful, and more specialized
arguments are needed. Finally, while [33] have shown how to privately compute
near-optimal prices in double auctions, their process does not guarantee end-to-end
joint di↵erentially privacy when taking trade allocations into account, unlike this
work.
3.2 Model and Preliminaries
3.2.1 Model
We consider a call auction setting with ns sellers and nb buyers; we let S be the
set of sellers, B be the set of buyers, and n = ns + nb. Each seller i 2 S has one
unit of a security for which it has a value vs
i
; each buyer j 2 B wishes to purchase
one unit of the security for which it has a value of vb
j




the vector of all sellers’ valuations and vb = (vb1, . . . ,v
b
nb
) the vector of all buyers’
valuations. We assume valuations are drawn from a discrete set P ; without loss of
generality, we let P = {1, 2, . . . , V } for some integer V .
Agents report their valuations in P directly to a mechanism M.3 Based on the
agents’ reports, the mechanism selects a clearing price p 2 P and an allocation




) is equal to 1 if seller i (resp. buyer j) is
selected to participate in a trade and 0 otherwise. The mechanism concludes by
buying a share at price p from every seller i with as
i
= 1 and selling a share at price
p to every buyer with ab
j
= 1.4
3We will argue in Section 3.4 that it is in every agent’s best interest to report his valuation
to the mechanism truthfully, hence our mechanisms can work with the agents’ valuations without
loss of generality.
4In principle, mechanisms can choose non-uniform pricing; that is, di↵erent agents could be
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Privacy Constraints The outcomes of the mechanisms we consider are functions
of the agents’ reports, which themselves depend on their valuations. In turn, these
outcomes may leak information about the participants’ valuations. This provides
motivation for designing call auctions that protect the privacy of the participants.
In this Chapter, we do so using di↵erential privacy ([45]). We will design our mech-
anisms to release the clearing price p in a di↵erentially private fashion, and the
allocation vector a = (as, ab) in a jointly di↵erentially private manner [83]. Di↵er-
ential privacy and joint di↵erential privacy are formally defined in Section 3.2.2.
Mechanism Designer’s Objective The main objective of our mechanisms for
call auctions is to maximize the volume of trades between buyers and sellers. How-
ever, because of the randomization that we will need to add to achieve di↵erential
privacy, our mechanism will inevitably incur several kinds of cost. First, the payo↵
of the mechanism, given by the number of shares cleared, will generally be lower
than the optimal payo↵ that could have been reached absent di↵erential privacy.
Second, we will have to deal with situations in which the number of sellers and the
number of buyers who are selected to trade di↵er because of the noise added to
the allocation rule for privacy concerns; this creates an inventory in which some of
the trades must be fulfilled by the mechanism itself (when there are more sellers
selected than buyers, the mechanism buys surplus shares from the sellers; when
there are more buyers selected than sellers, the mechanism sells to the buyers from
its own reserve of shares). We will aim to keep the inventory of our private auc-
tion mechanisms as small as possible. Formally, the payo↵ and the inventory of a
mechanism M are defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1 (Payo↵ and Inventory of a Mechanism M). For any mechanism
M outputting a price p and an allocation vector a, the payo↵ is the number of
charged di↵erent prices based on their reports. Here, we only consider uniform pricing mechanisms,
as is commonplace in the double auction literature.
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shares cleared by M:



























The main benchmark we use to measure the performance of our mechanisms is
the maximum number of trades that can be obtained (absent di↵erential privacy)
while setting a uniform price p and guaranteeing every agent non-negative utility.5





















Let D be a data universe from which a data set D of size n is drawn. In the
setting considered in this Chapter, D = (vs,vb) contains the reported valuations
of sellers and buyers in the market. The algorithms we consider in this Chapter
have output that can naturally be partitioned across the n users who provide the
inputs — namely for each agent, whether they get to participate in a trade, and at
what price. Let M be an algorithm that takes the data set D as input and outputs
M(D) 2 Rn, which is a vector whose ith coordinate corresponds to the output sent
to agent i. Here R is the output range of the algorithm for a single agent, which
we will take to be {0, 1}⇥ P (whether someone is chosen to participate in a trade,
and a price for the trade). Informally speaking, di↵erential privacy requires that a
change in a single data entry should have little (distributional) e↵ect on the output
5i.e., we only allocate agents willing to trade at price p. Agents not willing to participate at
price p will opt out from the trade, thus are not taken into account by our benchmark.
61[A], here and throughout the paper, represents the indicator function of event A.
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of the mechanism. In other words, for every pair of data sets D,D0 2 Dn that di↵er
in at most one entry, di↵erential privacy requires that the distribution of M(D)
and M(D0) are “close” to each other where closeness is measured by the privacy
parameters " and  .
Definition 3.2.2. Let D,D0 2 Dn be two data sets of size n. We say D and D0
are neighboring and write D ⇠ D0 if they di↵er in at most one data entry. D and
D0 are called i-neighbors (D ⇠i D0) if D i = D0 i.




n is (",  )-di↵erentially private if for every pair of neighboring data sets
D ⇠ D0 2 Dn, and for every subset of outputs S ✓ Rn,
Pr [M(D) 2 S]  e" · Pr [M(D0) 2 S] +  
where the probability is taken with respect to the randomness of M. if   = 0, M
is said to be "-DP.
We now define joint di↵erential privacy. Joint di↵erential privacy is defined
in settings in which not only the inputs but also the outputs of the mechanism
can be partitioned amongst the n users of the mechanism. In our setting, as in
many mechanism design settings, this is the case: users report their valuations
(which constitute the data) and then each receives an individual allocation. Joint
di↵erential privacy requires that an individual’s input to the mechanism has little
(distributional) e↵ect on the outputs given to others — but allows one’s own input
to have a large e↵ect on one’s own output. Informally, it protects the privacy of
each individual from arbitrary coalitions of other individuals using the system.
Definition 3.2.4 (Joint Di↵erential Privacy [83]). An algorithm M : Dn ! Rn
is (",  )-joint di↵erentially private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors D ⇠i
D0 2 Dn, and for every S ✓ Rn 1,
Pr [M(D) i 2 S]  e
"
· Pr [M(D0) i 2 S] +  
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where the probability is taken with respect to M’s randomness. If   = 0, M is said
to be "-joint DP.
We will use the Laplace and exponential mechanisms of di↵erential privacy in
our proposed algorithms. See Appendix 3.7 for their formal definitions, their privacy
and accuracy guarantees, and a few properties of di↵erential privacy including post-
processing and composition.
3.3 Private Call Auction Mechanisms
In this section, we outline our jointly di↵erentially private mechanisms for the call
auction problem and analyze their performance guarantees. Each mechanism’s per-
formance is measured in terms of its payo↵ — that is, the total number of shares
cleared — as well as its inventory — the net position that the mechanism must
itself take on. We measure our mechanisms’ payo↵s against the maximal number
of shares that could be cleared with a uniform price, given the agents’ reports.
Throughout this section, we assume reports are truthful; we will show in Section
3.4 that our mechanisms are approximately dominant strategy truthful. We also
highlight that taking on some inventory is unavoidable – if the mechanism took
no net position, a coalition of agents could use the constraint that the number of
buyers and sellers must be equal to circumvent joint di↵erential privacy – but our
guarantees ensure that this net position remains small with high probability.
We propose three mechanisms. The first mechanism, described in Subsection
3.3.1, uses the exponential mechanism (see Appendix 3.7) to select a clearing price
and then uses binomial randomization to determine who participates in a trade.
In Subsection 3.3.2, we provide a second mechanism that again uses the exponen-
tial mechanism to select a price, but uses lottery numbers which are assigned to
agents ex-ante to determine market participants. In Subsection 3.3.3, we describe
a meta-algorithm that privately picks the mechanism with the better performance
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guarantee,7 and achieves performance as good as that of the best of the first two
mechanisms.
Finally, in Subsection 3.3.4, we show matching lower bounds (up to log factors)
for the payo↵ of any (",  )-joint di↵erentially private mechanism for the call auction.
3.3.1 A Private Call Auction Mechanism via Coin Flipping
In this subsection, we introduce our first jointly di↵erentially private algorithm for
selecting a price and allocating buyers and sellers to trades. The algorithm uses
the exponential mechanism to di↵erentially privately select a clearing price. With



























is the utility function used by the exponential
mechanism. After choosing the price, the mechanism randomly selects buyers and
sellers willing to transact at the chosen price by flipping a coin with some par-
ticular bias for every agent in the market. The exchange then transacts with all
selected transactors, possibly taking a net position in the asset. We formalize this
mechanism in Algorithm 4. The mechanism takes data set (vs,vb), privacy param-
eter ", and confidence parameter ↵ as inputs and outputs a price p and allocation
vectors a = (as, ab). In the algorithm description, exp(·) is the exponential func-
tion, Lap( ) represents a mean-zero Laplace random variable with scale parameter
 , (x)+ := max(x, 0), and Bern(q) represents a Bernoulli random variable with
success probability q.
We start the analysis by providing the privacy guarantees obtained by Algo-
rithm 4:
7Which guarantee is best depends on the specific instance at hand.
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ALGORITHM 4: Private Call Auction with Allocation via Coin Flipping (M1)
Input: Agents’ valuations (vs,vb), privacy level ", confidence level ↵.
Output: Market price p, allocations a = (as,ab).





. Exponential mechanism chooses a price p privately
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for all j 2 B. . Buyers’
allocations
Claim 5. The allocation mechanism described in Algorithm 4 satisfies 3" joint
di↵erential privacy.
The full proof of this claim can be found in Appendix 3.8. We also provide
bounds on the payo↵ and the inventory of Mechanism 4 below:
Theorem 3.3.1 (Payo↵ and Inventory of Mechanism 4). Suppose opt   5 ln(V/↵)/".
1. Payo↵: with probability 1  8↵,






























Remark 1. Note that we constraint opt = ⌦ (ln (V/↵) /"). When opt = O (ln (V/↵) /"),
the inaccuracy introduced by releasing a di↵erentially private price via the exponen-
tial mechanism is on the order of opt = ⌦ (ln (V/↵) /"), and we cannot hope to
recover non-trivial utility guarantees.
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The proof of Theorem 3.3.1 is given in Appendix 3.9.1. We note that our
bound does not follow directly from the classical guarantees of the Laplace and
exponential mechanisms; it requires a more involved analysis of the concentration
of the distribution of buyers and sellers selected to trade in Algorithm 4.
3.3.2 A Private Call Auction Mechanism via Lottery Num-
bers
Here, we present a second mechanism that, rather than using independent ran-
domization to decide who participates in a trade, uses correlated randomization to
improve the payo↵ and reduce the inventory requirements of the mechanism. In the
second mechanism, participants are given data-independent “lottery numbers”, and
thresholds on these lottery numbers (selected using the exponential mechanism) are
used to select among willing traders on both sides of the market. This correlation
allows us to remove the
p
opt term in the bounds of the previous mechanism, at
the cost of introducing a logarithmic dependence on the number of agents n.




be defined as in Equation
3.3.1. Assume seller i is assigned a lottery number ls
i
2 [ns] and buyer j is given
lb
j
2 [nb] where we require that these lottery numbers are di↵erent for di↵erent
agents. Without loss of generality, we assume ls
i
= i and lb
j
= j. For a given price
p, and profiles (vs,vb), the loss of thresholds ⌧ s and ⌧ b on lottery numbers (one for
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For a price p, these loss functions measure how far o↵ the number of agents chosen
to trade on each side of the market would be from our target number of trades,
⇧(p,vs,vb), if we used thresholds ⌧ s and ⌧ b as a tie-breaking rule to select sellers
65
and buyers who are willing to trade at price p, respectively. In Algorithm 5, just
as before, we first use the exponential mechanism to select a price and then use
the exponential mechanism with loss functions Ls and Lb (or utility functions:  Ls
and  Lb, based on the terminology used to describe the exponential mechanism in
Appendix 3.7) to select the thresholds on lottery numbers.
ALGORITHM 5: Private Call Auction with Allocation via Lottery Numbers (M2)
Input: Agents’ valuations (vs,vb), privacy level ".
Output: Market price p, allocations a = (as,ab).
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, ⌧ b  j
i
for all j 2 B. . Buyers’ allocations
Claim 6. The allocation mechanism described in Algorithm 5 satisfies 3" joint
di↵erential privacy.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Payo↵ and Inventory of Mechanism 5). For any ↵ > 0,
1. Payo↵: with probability 1  3↵,











The proof of Claim 6 is provided in Appendix 3.8, and that of Theorem 3.3.2 in
Appendix 3.9.2.
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3.3.3 A Meta Algorithm: Selecting the Best Mechanism
Privately
Notice that the first term in the payo↵ bounds of both Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2
are identical (as they both correspond to choosing a price using the exponential
mechanism) but the remaining terms di↵er (M1 relies on binomial coin flips for
tie-breaking whereas M2 tie-breaks via thresholds on lottery numbers). These two
bounds are in general not comparable, as one depends on the maximum number of
shares opt that can be cleared, whereas the other one depends on the total number n
of agents in the market. The first bound provides better guarantees (up to constants
and ln (1/↵) terms) when
p
opt < ln (n) /", i.e. when the number of possible trades
is significantly smaller than the total number of agents in the market,8 whereas the
second bound provides better guarantees when
p
opt > ln (n) /".
We can achieve the better of the two bounds by comparing the bounds of Theo-
rems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 in a di↵erentially-private manner and then running the mech-
anism with the better bound according to this private computation. To do so we
compute the di↵erence of payo↵ bounds of Mechanisms 4 and 5













in a di↵erentially privately manner.9 Then, based on the sign of f , the mechanism
decides whether to run M1 or M2. The private computation of f will unavoidably
add an extra term of order O(1/") to the final payo↵ bound. This mechanism is
described in Algorithm 6. We provide guarantees on privacy, payo↵, and inventory
of this mechanism below.
8This models practical situations in repeated financial markets where sellers price a security
higher than most buyers are willing to pay. In such situations, buyers may elect to wait until a
new seller comes and o↵ers a better price, while sellers may wait for a new buyer willing to buy
at the current price.
9opt is a function of the input data set, hence a direct comparison of the bounds without
addition of noise may leak information about the reported bids.
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ALGORITHM 6: Private Call Auction with Allocation: A Meta Algorithm (M3)
Input: Agents’ valuations (vs,vb), privacy level ", confidence level ↵.
Output: Market price p, allocations a = (as,ab).









ln (1/↵)  4 ln(n/↵)
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. Private estimate of f











(Algorithm 5) and get p,a.
end
Claim 7. The allocation mechanism described in Algorithm 6 satisfies 7" joint
di↵erential privacy.
The proof of Claim 7 is provided in Appendix 3.8.
Theorem 3.3.3 (Payo↵ and Inventory of Mechanism 6). Suppose opt   5 ln(V/↵)/".
1. Payo↵: with probability 1  18↵,
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2. Inventory: with probability 1  14↵,



































6 ln1.5( 1↵ )
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+
10 ln( 1↵ )
"
+
4 ln( 2↵ )
3
This theorem follows from Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, as well as the accuracy
guarantee of the Laplace mechanism used in Algorithm 6 to compute f . We defer
the full proof to Appendix 3.9.3.
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3.3.4 A Lower Bound
We now provide a lower bound showing that any algorithm which computes a price
in an (",  )-di↵erentially private manner and allocates among willing participants at
this price must, for some instance, su↵er a loss of ⌦ (1/") (compared to the optimal
number of shares that could be cleared on that instance). Because this bound applies
to a broader set of mechanisms that reveal only the price privately (but may select
the optimal allocation absent privacy), it also applies to the mechanisms considered
in Section 3.3. We will compare the performance of any given di↵erentially private
algorithm on several input data sets. To do so, we will define an instance-dependent
benchmark below, that we call opt(D). Formally, given an input data set D =
(vs,vb), our benchmark is:



















Definition 3.3.1 (Loss of an algorithm). For any (possibly randomized) algorithm
A : Dn ! P that takes a data set D = (vs,vb) as an input and outputs a price
p, the loss of A on input data set D = (vs,vb) of agents valuations is defined as
follows:



















I.e., this loss compares the number of trades that could be cleared in expectation at
the price selected by A to the maximum number of trades when the trading price
is optimally chosen. We define the worst-case expected loss of A as the worst-case
loss over all data sets, i.e. L (A) = sup
D
[L(A, D)].
Our lower bound will hold so long as   is not too large in comparison with ".10 We
note that our lower bound on the expected loss matches the eO (1/") dependencies11
10Typically, di↵erentially private algorithms use   << ".
11The instances we construct use V, n ⇠ 1/". The logarithmic dependencies of our upper
bounds in n and V translate into logarithmic dependencies in 1/", hence the eO notation.
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of our high probability upper bounds on the loss for Mechanisms 4, 5, 6 (and
consequently of any upper bound on the expected loss of these mechanisms). Finally,
it is worth remarking that our lower bound for (",  )-DP mechanisms matches the
upper bound obtained by restricting attention to (", 0)-DP mechanisms; this implies
that relaxing  -privacy requirements of Mechanisms 4, 5, 6 will not lead to any
significant improvements in terms of their accuracy guarantees.
Theorem 3.3.4. [Lower bound on the loss of private algorithms] Pick any ",   such
that 0  "  1 and   = O("). There exists a range of (integer) valuations P (") and
a number of agents n(") such that any (",  )-DP algorithm A : Dn(") ! P (") must
su↵er worst-case expected loss of ⌦ (1/").
The proof of Theorem 3.3.4 relies on constructing a family of data sets {Dl}l
such that no di↵erentially private algorithm A can simultaneously su↵er expected
loss of O (1/") on all of them. We do so by carefully calibrating the following trade-
o↵: on the one hand, we require any pair of data sets in {Dl}l be close enough
that the stability properties of di↵erential privacy guarantee any private algorithm
must pick a similar distribution of prices on both data sets. On the other hand, we
require that the data sets furthest from each other are di↵erent enough such that
no fixed distribution can incur a low loss on both.
3.3.5 Connections to the Market Impact Literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is possible to draw some informal but inter-
esting connections between this work and the finance literature on market impact.
Market impact models typically propose strong stochastic assumptions on price
formation (e.g. random walk and di↵usion models or martingale assumptions on
limit order dynamics) and then solve for the optimal strategy to minimize trading
costs and price impact. In particular, there is a large body of work on the so-called
“square root law” (see, eg. [61, 62]). which predicts that the change to price in-
flicted by a trade of k shares scales with
p
k/V , where V is the total volume of
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shares cleared during the trade; the ratio k/V is referred to as the trade’s partici-
pation rate. As we note below, V is typically closely related to other measures of
market activity such as the number of orders placed (as with our n) or the number
of quote changes in limit order dynamics.
Our results imply that the change in the expected clearing price in our DP call
auction resulting from an order of k shares is bounded by a multiplicative factor of
(ek"   1). Setting this equal to
p
k/n to match the square root law12 and solving
for " approximately yields " ⇡ 1/
p
kn for small participation rates. Plugging this
into our utility bound of Theorem 3.3.2, the shares we execute at this " scales like
opt(1 
p
kn/opt). Thus as long as k is o (n) and opt scales with n,13 asymptotically
we approach opt with the same price impact as that predicted by the square root
law but with two major advantages. First, we have made no assumptions, stochastic
or otherwise, on the orders placed by market participants. Second, we are not only
bounding the price impact, we are also bounding information leakage of any form,
as per the promises of di↵erential privacy.
3.4 Strategic Framework
In Section 3.3, we focused on the algorithmic form of our mechanism and provided
privacy guarantees and optimality guarantees with respect to the reported valua-
tions, without regard to whether those reports are truthful or not. In this section,
we embed our mechanisms into a game theoretic framework and examine its prop-
erties, including (approximate) truthfulness. More precisely, we now assume the
agents are strategic; they may decide to report a bid that di↵ers from their valu-
12Here we are assuming that the number of orders n in our model plays the role of V above;
see subsequent footnote.
13This scaling is broadly consistent with recent data from electronic exchanges. For instance,
the ratio of shares traded to quote changes (a common measure of market activity) across 3443
U.S. equities averaged 0.16 with standard deviation 0.09.
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ation, or even to not participate in the mechanism in the first place. Formally, all
sellers i and buyers j have quasi-linear utilities determined by their own valuations













where, with a slight abuse of notation, we omit the dependency of M on the agents’
reports.
Buyers and sellers aim to maximize their utility from participating (or not par-
ticipating) in the mechanism. In the face of strategic behavior, we will require our
mechanisms to be (approximately) truthful and individually rational; i.e., it should
never be in an agent’s best interest to misreport his valuation, and an agent should
always have a strategy that guarantees non-negative utility from participating in
the mechanism and so would rather participate than not. Individual rationality and
(approximate) truthfulness are formally defined below:
Definition 3.4.1 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality). We say a double-auction mech-
anism M satisfies ex-post individual rationality if, for every seller i 2 S, there
exists a bid rs
i
for agent i such that for every possible set of bids r i submitted





, r i))   0, and similarly for every buyer j, there exists a bid rbj for agent
j such that for every possible set of bids r j submitted by all agents but j, and










Definition 3.4.2 (Approximate Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness). We say a double-
auction mechanismM satisfies  -approximate dominant-strategy truthfulness if, for
every seller i 2 S, every possible bid rs
i
submitted by i, and every possible set of











, r i))] +  
and similarly for every buyer j, for every possible bid rb
j
submitted by j and every

























where expectations are taken with respect to the randomness of M.
In Section 3.4.1, we show that our mechanisms are individual rational and (unlike
in the standard call auction) approximately dominant-strategy truthful. While our
results assume that agents wish to trade a single share, we show how our per-
share guarantees translate into (gracefully degrading) per-player guarantees in more
general setting in which agents can trade multiple shares.
Then, in Sections 3.4.2-3.4.2, we consider learning dynamics under both the
standard call auction and our mechanism and show that a system in which agents
use a modified exponential weights algorithm (which we call “Social” Exponential
Weights) to learn to bid will eventually converge to the optimal number of shares
cleared. While it is true that truthfulness implies that agents cannot do better than
bidding their true values, one might consider learning dynamics for two reasons.
First, if agents do not trust the mechanism designer (or share their assumptions),
applying a no-regret learning algorithm is a plausible response to guarantee good
performance. Second, good outcomes obtained in the presence of decentralized,
distributed, and selfish algorithms are compelling evidence of the robustness and
quality of our mechanism. To our knowledge, the use of no-regret learning algo-
rithms by all agents in a call auction setting has not been studied before, and these
results may be of independent interest.
3.4.1 Individual Rationality and Truthfulness Properties of
Our Algorithms
In this section, we discuss the incentive properties of our proposed algorithms. To
do so, we note that (vs,vb) are the true valuations of sellers and buyers and denote
their revealed bids by (rs, rb), respectively. To study truthfulness, we assume seller








), and show that it is approximately never in agent i’s (resp. j’s) best interest
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to do so. We start by noting that our mechanisms are individually rational:
Claim 8 (Individual Rationality). The mechanisms described in Algorithms 4, 5,
and 6 are ex-post individually rational.
Proof. We prove the result for Mechanism 4; proofs for the other mechanisms are
similar. It su ces to show that there exists a strategy for any seller (resp. any




is a strategy that ensures that whenever i is allocated a trade (i.e. as
i
= 1), it




; this immediately guarantees i gets non-negative utility—
independently of how other agents bid and of the randomness of the mechanism. A
similar proof holds for buyers.
We also show that di↵erential privacy guarantees approximate truthfulness in
the dominant-strategy sense: i.e., it does not allow agents (sellers and buyers) to
gain too much profit by submitting a bid di↵erent than their true valuation, no
matter what the realized bids of the other agents are14.
Claim 9 (Approximate Truthfulness). The mechanisms described in Algorithms
4 and 5 satisfy  -approximate dominant-strategy truthfulness for   = (e3"   1)V ;
the mechanism described in Algorithm 6 satisfies  -approximate dominant-strategy
truthfulness for   = (e7"   1)V .
We defer the full proof to Appendix 3.11. In the proof, we first observe that since
the market price is chosen subject to di↵erential privacy, individual agents cannot
significantly change it by misreporting their valuations. However, this is not enough
to argue truthfulness, as under joint di↵erential privacy, an agent’s allocation may
heavily depend on his report. To complete the proof, we show that the function by
14Truthfulness is desirable not only because it makes computing equilibrium strategies and
predicting equilibrium behavior simpler, but also because knowing the true valuations allows the
mechanism designer to clear the most shares.
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which the mechanism determines transactors is a best-response for an agent with
the reported valuation given the output of the di↵erentially private mechanism.
Note that, in general, call auctions are not dominant-strategy truthful, since
even small bidders may impact the price selected by a mechanism acting on reported
bids. This is a consequence of the fact that in the simple call auction (as well as in
continuous order book mechanisms) the optimal price is, in general, not stable [53].
Importantly, we note that the truthfulness guarantees are a function of "; as opt
grows larger, " can be made smaller with less and less relative cost. Consequently,
the truthfulness guarantee can be made stronger for a given level of privacy as the
number of optimal trades cleared increases.
We highlight that because our strategic framework assumes each bidder controls
a single share, our guarantees are at the per-share level. Our privacy guarantees
generalize, however, to the case where bidders control at most k shares by expanding
" by a factor of k.15 Our truthfulness guarantees also follow by expanding " by a
factor of k.
3.4.2 Learning in Repeated Call Auctions
In this section, we consider a repeated call auction. Agents are initially unaware of
each other’s valuations and behavior and run simple learning algorithms to learn










), the mechanism computes and publicly releases a price pt and assigns
an allocation ai,t to each seller i (respectively aj,t to each buyer j). We will consider
two versions of this mechanism, one that is non-private and is inspired by standard
15An "-di↵erentially private mechanism with respect to a single share is k"-di↵erentially private
with respect to the data of a bidder who controls k shares; intuitively, this is because an agent
that misreports his valuation over k shares creates a dataset that is a k-neighbor of the dataset in
which they had bid truthfully. Such a bidder can a↵ect the distribution of prices by an amount
of at most ek", and so their own expected utility by (ek"   1)V .
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call auctions, in Section 3.4.2, and one that is private and is based on Mechanism 4,
in Section 3.4.2. The agents then update their bidding strategies based on the quan-
tities outputted by the mechanism, via a simple no-regret algorithm (Exponential
Weights).
We highlight that our agents are naive in that they do not compute a coun-
terfactual price pt and allocation vector at given alternative bids they could have
made. Instead, they only update their bidding strategies with respect to how much
better o↵ they could have been by bidding di↵erently, assuming they had no ef-
fect on the price. The motivation for this is two-fold: first, counterfactual reasoning
would require the agents to know the bids of other agents, which are not released by
the mechanism (and typically not available in many real-life call auctions). Second,
when agents are small relative to the total market, they may believe that their ac-
tions do not greatly a↵ect these quantities. We note that di↵erential privacy makes
this belief into a property of our mechanism rather than a naive assumption. Thus,
small bidders using naive updates will have a real regret guarantee when interacting
with a di↵erentially private call auction.
Learning in the Absence of Privacy
In this section, we focus on learning dynamics when the mechanism runs a standard
call auction, absent privacy; this non-private setting will serve as a natural point
of comparison for dynamics with respect to our private mechanism. At every time
step t, agents submit bids that may di↵er from their valuations. In response, the
mechanism computes a price and allocation, with the goal of maximizing traded




































which is the number of shares the mechanism will trade at price p, assuming that
sellers will only agree to trade when the price is above their reported bid and buyers




the mechanism must choose among these sellers and buyers it believes (based on the
reports) are willing to trade at the chosen price pt. When there are an equal number
of sellers and buyers willing to trade at price pt, the mechanism allocates a trade to





from the side with excess number of willing participants. Formally, the mechanism
computes qb
t



















pt]; these probabilities will be less than 1 on the excess side of the market and
exactly 1 on the short side. We assume the mechanism publicly releases pt, qst , and
qb
t






Agents learn via Exponential Weights: A natural no-regret (regret here is
the classic notion of performance in online learning) algorithm for updating bidding
strategies is the Exponential Weights mechanism. We describe the classical Expo-
nential Weights Update rule for buyers (buyer j) in Algorithm 7, and note that this
update is defined symmetrically for the sellers.
ALGORITHM 7: Exponential Weights






for k = 1, . . . ,vb
j
. Initialize uniform weights.


























(k) for k = 1, . . . ,vb
j
. Update the weights.
end
Informally, the updates work as follows. Initially, we assume every seller bids
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uniformly above their value and every buyer bids uniformly below their value.16
Then, in each round t, for every possible k 2 P , agents compute what their expected
payo↵ would have been had they reported k as their valuation, given the current
price pt and the allocation probabilities qst and q
b
t
. They use these expected payo↵s
to update their distribution of bids, in a way that puts exponentially more weight
on bids with higher expected utilities; the speed at which these updates happen
is controlled by the learning rate parameter ⌘, taken here to be constant. For
appropriate choices of learning rate ⌘, this algorithm is known to be no-regret.
One may hope these dynamics converge to clearing opt shares with probability
going to 1, where opt is defined as in Equation 3.2.1. However, this may not be
the case when agents update their weights according to Algorithm 7. This stems
from the fact that agents are indi↵erent between trading at their valuation, and
not trading at all, as both net a payo↵ of zero. This is reflected in the exponential
weight update, and buyers learn to put a significant amount of weight on bids that
are strictly less than their valuation (as trades for those bids are strictly profitable).
When clearing opt trades requires many agents to bid exactly at their valuation, the
number of shares cleared is bounded away from the benchmark. We show instead
that the dynamics will clear the following benchmark, which only considers trades
that are strictly profitable for both sides of the market:
Definition 3.4.3 (Optimal Jointly Profitable Trades). We let opt0 be the maximum
number of trades achievable for a given (vs,vb), such that all trading buyers and




















16A buyer j cannot improve his utility by bidding over his valuation (as increasing his bid
cannot decrease pt nor increase his probability of allocation), and risks obtaining negative utility
by doing so, if vbj,t < pt  r
b
j,t. Hence, bidding above his valuation is a dominated strategy for the
buyer. Similarly, bidding under his value is a dominated strategy for a seller. The assumption of
this prior knowledge can be relaxed at the price of slower convergence.
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We call this benchmark the “Optimal Jointly Profitable Trades with Uniform Pric-
ing” benchmark.
The statement showing that the mechanism will converge in probability to clear-
ing at least opt0 shares is formalized below:
Theorem 3.4.1 (Convergence to (at least) opt0). Suppose buyers and sellers update
their bid distributions according to Algorithm 7 (with any ⌘ > 0). Further, at any
time t, suppose pt is chosen uniformly at random among the set of optimal prices
















We also provide a variant of the Exponential Weights algorithm, that we will
show converges to opt shares cleared. This variant is described in Algorithm 8.
ALGORITHM 8: Social Exponential Weights





for k = 1, . . . ,vb
j
. Initialize with uniform weights.


















(k) qbt ⇠1[k = v
b
j
] for k = 1, . . . ,vb
j

















(k) for k = 1, . . . ,vb
j
. Update the weights.
end
Algorithm 8 is a modification of the classic Exponential Weights algorithm.
In particular, when the price is equal to agent’s valuation, the algorithm assigns a
nonzero utility qb
t
⇠ to reporting the agent’s valuation, for ⇠ arbitrarily small; this can
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be seen as agents updating their weights as if they strictly preferred trading to not
trading, even when their trade would make no profit. In other words, it implements
a preference to break ties (in utility) in favor of trading over not trading. We
call this “Social” Exponential Weights because incorporating this modified utility
allows the system as a whole to reach a better social outcome (one with more shares
traded) than otherwise. Crucially, despite this modification, Algorithm 8 remains
no-regret for a fixed horizon T with appropriate choices of learning rate, ⌘, and
“fake” utility, ⇠:












The proof is almost identical to that of the no-regret guarantees of traditional
exponential weights, and is deferred to Appendix 3.12.1. We highlight that we define
regret with respect to the single best action in hindsight given the fixed sequence of
prices observed; that is, we do not consider the notion of Stackelberg regret, which
is calculated with respect to the best fixed action given that the mechanism picks
a sequence of prices in response to the selected actions (see, e.g. [43]). If agents are
small enough that their actions do not greatly a↵ect the mechanism’s responses,
then the standard notion of regret and Stackelberg regret do not greatly di↵er; if,
moreover, a mechanism is di↵erentially private, then (for small enough agents) these
notions of regret coincide, because di↵erential privacy ensures that agents placing
small orders have little impact on the price.
Under Algorithm 8, the number of shares cleared converges to opt with proba-
bility that tends to 1 as t grows large. We make this statement formally below:
Theorem 3.4.2 (Convergence to opt). Suppose buyers and sellers that update their
bidding strategies according to Algorithm 8 (with any ⌘, ⇠ > 0). Further, suppose
pt is chosen uniformly at random among the set of optimal prices at time t. Then,
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To prove this result, we show that with a small, constant probability (in t) in
any given round, all agents bid their valuations. In such cases, the mechanism picks
an optimal price, and at least OPT buyers (resp. sellers) increase their probability
of bidding above (resp. below) this price. When the number of rounds goes to
infinity, this event is repeated infinitely often for some optimal price p?, and OPT
buyers (resp. sellers) bid above (resp. below) p? with probability that tends to 1.
The full proof is given in Appendix 3.12.3. A similar argument is used to prove
Theorem 3.4.1, in Appendix 3.12.2.
Learning in Repeated Call Auctions with Di↵erential Privacy
We now consider the same dynamic setting as before, with the di↵erence that the
centralized designer now computes the price pt and the allocation at at time t in a
joint-di↵erentially private fashion. For simplicity of exposition, we pick the private
mechanism used by the designer to be Mechanism 4, which picks a price via the
exponential mechanism and picks agents to allocate from the smaller side of the
market via binomial coin flips. We show that when agents play according to the
exponential weights (resp. Social EW) algorithm, the dynamics converge to clearing
at least opt (resp. opt0) shares minus inaccuracies introduced by privacy.
Theorem 3.4.3. Suppose buyers and sellers update their bidding strategies according
to Algorithm 8 (with any ⌘, ⇠ > 0). Further, suppose the market allocation mecha-
nism is Algorithm 4. There exists an integer N(↵) such that for any t   N(↵), the




























where this probability is taken with respect to the randomness of both Algorithms
4 and 8.
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The proof idea is the following: despite the price randomness due to privacy,
the event in which all agents bid their value and an optimal price is picked happens
infinitely often, as in the non-private case. In turn, (at least) OPT buyers (resp.
sellers) eventually learn to bid above (resp. below) an optimal price p?. However,
the mechanism will still pick sub-optimal prices to guarantee privacy, as per the
bound of Theorem 3.3.1. We refer the reader to Appendix 3.12.4 for a complete
proof. A similar statement holds, with respect to benchmark opt0 (see Definition
3.4.3), when agents update according to Algorithm 7.
Theorem 3.4.4. Suppose buyers and sellers use the Exponential Weights Algorithm
7 (with any ⌘ > 0) to update their bids. Further, suppose the market allocation
mechanism is Algorithm 4. There exists an integer N(↵) > 0 such that for all





























In previous sections, we designed our mechanism and obtained theoretical guaran-
tees of performance; these guarantees were given both in a one-shot setting and
relative to the optimal result that could be reached given agents’ bids and also in a
repeated setting using no-regret learning. In this section, we conduct experiments
on simulated data in both a one-shot and learning setting in order to explore how
tightly these guarantees bind in practice.
We perform all simulations in MATLAB using a similar starting configuration.
We have 5000 buyers and 5000 sellers, and valuations must be integer values between
1 and 100. Valuations are drawn from normal distributions centered at 45 for sellers
and 55 for buyers, with standard deviations of 15 for both. The draws are rounded
to the nearest integer, and draws below 1 or above 100 are replaced with 1 and 100
respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Realized payo↵ and inventory relative to theoretical optimal in one-shot
game for varying ".
The mechanism we implement is the first we defined (Algorithm 4), run once
or repeatedly for the one-shot game and learning settings, respectively. We vary "
over a range from " = 0.01 to " = 0.5.
Single-shot game For the single shot game, we perform 800 trials per value
of " with a fixed set of agent valuations. These valuations were drawn randomly
according to the procedure described above. We assume agents bid truthfully (and
all of our comparisons are to the truthful optimal).
In the first plot of Figure 3.1, we show the empirical 5% quantile (i.e. the value
for which only 5% of draws saw lower values) of the competitive ratio defined as the
shares cleared as a fraction of opt, the optimal number of shares that can be cleared
given the realized valuations. This competitive ratio quantile is plotted in blue. The
appropriate guarantee to compare to is the lower bound on this quantile given in
Theorem 3.3.1, with confidence parameter ↵ = 0.05/8; this bound is plotted in
orange. While the realized competitive ratio indicates, unsurprisingly, that privacy
is not costless for very small levels of ", it remains far above the worst-case guarantee
predicted, and rapidly increases to nearly 1 in the practical regime (i.e., even for
" = 0.1). This shows that, for a large enough number of agents and valuations drawn
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from well-behaved distributions, reasonable privacy can be achieved in practice with
very little loss in utility.
The second plot of Figure 3.1 shows the inventory taken on by the mechanism,
again plotting this quantile as a ratio of the optimal number of shares cleared
in blue (again, limited to the top 95% of runs) and the theoretical upper bound
for ↵ = 0.05/6 (as per the inventory bound of Theorem 3.3.1) in orange. Notice
that for very small ", the theoretical guarantee can be extremely large; yet, again,
the realized inventory is far below the guarantee and never exceeds 23% for even
" = 0.01 and is less than 5% for "   0.05.
Learning Setting In the learning setting, we plot the shares cleared over time
as agents learn to bid given their valuations. We repeat the auction for 1000 rounds
(1500 for the imbalance plot) with learning rate ⌘ = 0.1 and “fake” utility ⇠ = 0.1.
Agents draw fixed valuations and then use the Social Exponential Weights described
in Algorithm 8 to learn and bid each round. We repeat this process for several
di↵erent values of ".
The first three plots in Figure 3.2 tell similar stories: agents, and thus the
system, learn to bid over time in such a way as to clear the optimal number of shares
(were the mechanism privacy-free). The noisiness in the plots is due to privacy and
depends on the choice of ": the smaller the value of ", the more likely the mechanism
is to pick a sub-optimal price, even after agents learn to bid optimally. For " = 0.01,
the randomness of the mechanism induces enough noise as to occasionally forego a
large portion of utility; at larger values of ", the added randomness costs relatively
little.
The fourth plot displays the imbalance between number of buyers bidding above
vs. sellers bidding below the price chosen by the repeated standard (i.e., non-
private) call auction when buyers use Social Exponential Weights. We highlight an
interesting connection to real-world behavior: NYSE and NASDAQ perform pre-
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Figure 3.2: The first three plots show the shares cleared over time, in the repeated
setting of our mechanism, using Social Exponential Weights (8) for various choices
of ". The last plot shows the imbalance between buyers and sellers over time in a
repeated (non-private) auction. The agents’ updates use ⌘, ⇠ = 0.1.
opening or pre-closing repeated ”hypothetical” auctions aimed at price discovery. In
these hypothetical auctions, the exchanges accept bids, announce the current price
and imbalance, allow bidders to submit updated bids, and repeat. The pattern
in imbalances documented by [30] agrees broadly with that of Figure 3.2: that is,
the imbalance begins skewed to one side or another, but it repeatedly oscillates as
bidders adjust before converging to a settled state.
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3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.7 Di↵erential Privacy Tools
In this section, we remind the reader of mechanisms that are classically used to
guarantee di↵erential privacy. These mechanisms work by adding appropriately-
chosen noise to the choices and outputs of a mechanism, so as to ensure that a
change in a single individual’s data cannot have a large distributional e↵ect on the
mechanism’s output. The noise introduced by di↵erentially private mechanisms
depends not only on the level (",  ) of privacy one aims to guarantee, but also on
the sensitivity of the query of interest. This sensitivity measures how much the
real-valued function of interest is a↵ected by a change in a single entry of an input
data set, and will be formally defined in our introduced DP mechanisms.
A commonly used mechanism for releasing the answer to numerical queries while
guaranteeing (", 0)-di↵erential privacy is the Laplace mechanism. The Laplace
mechanism takes a numerical query f as an input, and perturbs the value of f
on the input data set with zero-mean Laplace noise that has scale proportional to
( f/") where  f is the `1-sensitivity of f .






a data set D 2 Dn, and a privacy parameter ", the Laplace mechanism outputs:
f" (D) = f (D) + (W1, . . . ,Wk)
where Wi’s are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap ( f/").
We provide the privacy and accuracy guarantees of the Laplace mechanism be-
low:
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Theorem 3.7.1 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Laplace Mechanism [45]). The Laplace
Mechanism guarantees (", 0)-di↵erential privacy and that with probability at least
1   ,










We remark that the Laplace mechanism can be used to privately output the
answer to numerical queries. However, suppose we want to privately output the
solution to a maximization problem defined on the input data. Then, directly
adding noise to the optimal solution could completely destroy the objective value of
the maximization problem in question (for example, in an auction, adding a small
amount of noise on the price of an item could significantly reduce revenue). In such
situations, the Laplace mechanism performs poorly, and a better choice of private
mechanism is the Exponential Mechanism, defined below:
Definition 3.7.2 (Exponential Mechanism [94]). Let U : Dn ⇥ P ! R be a utility
function that takes a data set D 2 Dn and a parameter p 2 P as inputs, and let






|U (D, p)  U (D0, p)| .
Given a data set D 2 Dn and a privacy parameter ", the exponential mechanism





where exp(·) is the
exponential function.
Theorem 3.7.2 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism [94]). The
Exponential Mechanism guarantees (", 0)-di↵erential privacy. Further, let p" 2 P
be the output of the Exponential mechanism, we have that with probability at least













An important property of di↵erential privacy is that it is robust to post-processing.
Applying any data-independent function to the output of an (",  )-DP algorithm
preserves (",  )-di↵erential privacy.
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Lemma 3.7.3 (Post-Processing [45]). Let M : Dn ! R be an (",  )-DP algorithm
and let f : R! R0 be any function. We have that the algorithm f oM : Dn ! R0
is (",  )-DP.
Another important property of di↵erential privacy is that DP algorithms can be
composed adaptively with a graceful degradation in their privacy parameters.
Theorem 3.7.3 ((Simple) Composition [47]). Let Mt be an ("t,  t)-DP algorithm for








To prove that our mechanisms satisfy (",  )-joint di↵erential privacy, we will
leverage the billboard lemma ([72]). The billboard lemma shows that for every
individual i in the data set, restricting i’s output to be a function of only the
output of a di↵erentially private mechanism (run on all agents’ data) and his own
input guarantees joint di↵erential privacy.
Lemma 3.7.4 (Billboard Lemma [72]). Suppose M : Dn ! R0 is (",  )-di↵erentially
private. Consider any set of functions fi : Di ⇥R0 ! R, where Di is the portion
of the data set containing i’s data. The composition {fi(⇧i(D),M(D))} is (",  )-
jointly di↵erentially private, where ⇧i : Dn ! Di is the projection to i’s data.
3.8 Proofs of Privacy guarantees of our mecha-
nisms
proof of Claim 5. We start the proof by noticing that the sensitivity of ⇧ (as per
Definition 3.7.2) is 1: indeed, changing one element in the data (vs,vb), i.e. the val-
uation of a single agent, will change the number of shares cleared by at most one, for
any fixed price p. We can therefore conclude that by Theorem 3.7.2 the mechanism





"-DP. One can similarly argue that given a fixed price p, quantities
P







j2B 1[p  v
b
j
] have sensitivity 1 (see Definition 3.7.1), and therefore by The-
orem 3.7.1, bs and bb both satisfy "-DP. We can now invoke the Composition The-
orem 3.7.3 to conclude that the triplet (p, bs,bb) computed in Algorithm 4 satisfies
3"-di↵erential privacy. The claim then follows by the Billboard Lemma 3.7.4 and
noticing that each agent’s allocation depends only on their own data and the triplet
(p, bs,bb).
Proof of Claim 6. Notice first that according to Definition 3.7.2, the sensitivity of
⇧ is 1 because for any p, changing one agent’s valuation can change ⇧ by at most
1. Now fixing the price p output by the first exponential mechanism, it similarly
follows that the sensitivity of loss functions Ls and Lb are 2. We therefore have
that the exponential mechanisms outputting p, ⌧ s, and ⌧ b are all "-DP by Theorem
3.7.2, and hence the triplet (p, ⌧ s, ⌧ b) satisfies 3"-DP by the Composition Theorem
3.7.3. The claim then follows by the Billboard Lemma 3.7.4 and noticing that each
agent’s allocation depends only on their own data and the triplet (p, ⌧ s, ⌧ b).
Proof of Claim 7. First, we note that the sensitivity of f is upper-bounded by
p
6 ln(1/↵). Indeed, we remind the reader that opt has sensitivity of 1, and note

























a+ b. Therefore, by Theorem 3.7.1, the
computation of ef is "-di↵erential private. In each of mechanisms M1 and M2, p1
the price output by M1, respectively p2 the price output by M2, are computed in
an "-di↵erentially private manner. Similarly, ŝ, b̂ (resp. ⌧ s, ⌧ b), the private counts
of the number of agents willing to trade in M1 at price p1 (resp. the thresholds
picked by mechanism M2 for price p2) are each the result of an "-di↵erentially
private conputation (conditional on p1, p2). In turn, our mechanism can be seen
as one that computes ( ef, p1, p2, ŝ, b̂, ⌧ s, ⌧ b) in a 7"-di↵erentially private manner (by
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the composition guarantee of Theorem 3.7.3), then outputs an allocation as
i
for
each given seller i (resp. ab
j





) and ( ef, p1, p2, ŝ, b̂, ⌧ s, ⌧ b). Hence, by Lemma 3.7.4, M is 7"-joint di↵erentially
private.
3.9 Proofs of Profit and Inventory of our Mech-
anisms
3.9.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3.1
Proof. We will be using the following concentration inequalities in our proof.
Fact 3.9.1 (Multiplicative Cherno↵ Bound). Let {Xi}ni=1 be a collection of inde-
pendent random variables whereXi 2 [0, 1] for all i. Let S =
P
n
i=1 Xi and µ = E[S].
We have that for any 0  t  1,




Fact 3.9.2 (Bernstein’s Inequality). Let {Xi}ni=1 be a collection of i.i.d random
variables where for each i, Xi 2 [0, 1], E[Xi] = µ, and V ar(Xi) =  2. Let S =
P
n
i=1 Xi. We have that for any t   0,






i2S 1 [p   v
s
i







be the number of sellers
and buyers available at price p, where p is the price chosen by the exponential
mechanism. Note that as p is a random variable, so are s(p) and b(p). From now
on, for simplicity of notations, we omit the dependency of s and b in p. We start
the proof by noting that by the accuracy guarantee of the Laplace mechanism (see









and by the accuracy guarantee of the Exponential mechanism (see Theorem 3.7.2),









By a union bound, Equations (3.9.1) and (3.9.2) hold simultaneously with prob-











be the number of sellers and buyers who participate
in a trade, output by the mechanism. First, let’s focus on es. Observe that
es |s, bs,bb ⇠ Binomial
0
















































































es   sbq  
p
2sbq ln(1/↵) (3.9.3)
with probability at least 1 ↵ when t  1. Note that the bound applies when t > 1
too, noting that then sbq  
p
2sbq ln(1/↵) < 0 but es   0. In what follows, we will
provide an upper bound and a lower bound for the term sbq so that we can further
lower bound es in Equation (3.9.3). Symmetrically, we can get a similar lower bound
for eb which completes the first part of the proof because ⇧(M) = min{es,eb}.
On the one hand, note that



































The first inequality follows from bs   ln(1/↵)
"







, bb   b  ln(1/↵)
"
by Equation (3.9.1). The third inequality is a direct application of Equation (3.9.2).
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On the other hand,

























































 bs  s+ ln(1/↵)
"
, bb  b+ ln(1/↵)
"
by Equation (3.9.1). The second-to-last inequality follows from the fact that















Combining Equations (3.9.3), (3.9.4), and (3.9.5), we obtain that with proba-
bility 1  4↵,














Symmetrically, we can get the same bound for eb: with probability 1  4↵,















Combining Equations (3.9.6) and (3.9.7) and noting that ⇧(M1) = min{es,eb} proves
the first part of the theorem. We conclude the proof by noting that the statements
hold with probability at least 1  8↵ by union bound.




     |es min {s, b}|+
   eb min {s, b}
    (3.9.8)
We will provide an upper bound for the first term, and by symmetry, an upper bound
on the second will follow immediately. We have that by the triangle inequality






















where the first inequality holds with probability 1  ↵ and follows from the Bern-





Notice that t  2 ln(2/↵)3 +
p
2n 2 ln(2/↵). The last inequality follows from the upper
bound developed in Equation (3.9.5). Second,
|sbq  min {s, b}|  9 ln(1/↵)
"
. (3.9.11)




 sbq  min {s, b} ,
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and as we showed in Equation (3.9.5),















































Because we showed in Equation (3.9.5) that s
s  2 ln(1/↵)
"
 3. Putting together Equa-
tions (3.9.9), (3.9.10), and (3.9.11) we get that with probability 1  3↵,















Swapping the roles of the buyers and a similar proof yields the same bound on   eb min {s, b}
   . A union bound completes the proof, by Equation (3.9.8).
3.9.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3.2










to be the number of sellers and
buyers who participate in a trade under output allocation a. We have that with










and that since min⌧s Ls(⌧ s, p,vs,vb) = min⌧b L
b(⌧ b, p,vs,vb) = 0,
  es  ⇧(p,vs,vb)
   = Ls(⌧ s, p,vs,vb)  4 ln (n
s/↵)
"




















We therefore have that






































where the second inequality holds with probability 1   2↵ by Equations (3.9.13)
and (3.9.14).
3.9.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3.3
Proof. This theorem follows from Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and conditioning on the
accuracy guarantee of the additional Laplace mechanism used in Algorithm 6:
w.p. 1  ↵,







Suppose ef < 0. Note that in this case,












































where the first inequality follows from Theorem 3.3.1, with probability 1  8↵. The
second inequality follows from Equation 3.9.16, with probability 1  ↵. Combining
the bounds given by the second and the last inequalities (specified by ? and ??), we
get that with probability 1  9↵,
























A similar analysis for ef   0 which uses Theorem 3.3.2 gives us the same bound and
proves the first part of the theorem.
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Now let’s look at the inventory. Suppose ef  0. We have that









































































where the first inequality follows from Theorem 3.3.1, with probability 1  6↵. The
second inequality follows because ↵ < 1/2 (note we need ↵ < 1/18 to give non-
trivial guarantee for the payo↵ of the mechanism). The third inequality follows
from Equation 3.9.16 with probability 1   ↵. Looking at the bounds given by the
third and the last lines of the above equation (specified by ? and ??), we get that
with probability 1  7↵,




























A similar analysis for ef   0 which uses Theorem 3.3.2 gives us the same bound and
proves the second part of the theorem.
3.10 Proof of Theorem 3.3.4
Consider the following family of data sets: first, we initialize D0 as the data set that
has n sellers with valuations {1, . . . , n}, and n buyers with valuations {n, . . . , 2n 1}.
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We then recursively constructDl for all l. To constructDl+1 fromDl, we increase all
valuations in Dl by 1, and assign buyers’ (resp. sellers) identities in Dl+1 such that
all buyers (resp. sellers) except one have the same valuation as in Dl. Equivalently,





vs = {l + 1, . . . , l + n} sellers’ valuations
vb = {l + n, . . . , l + 2n  1} buyers’ valuations,
up to re-ordering of the agents’ identities. The result will follow from the fact that a
di↵erentially private algorithm should output similar distributions of prices on data
sets D0 and Dl, but that at the same time, for l large enough, D0 and Dl are far
enough from each other that no distribution of prices can perform well over both of
them.
We first show the following lemma, which will be of use in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.3.4:
Lemma 3.10.1. Let {Dl} be the family of data sets described above. If A : Dn ! P
is an (",  )-DP algorithm, then for every price p 2 P and every k,m 2 N:
Pr [|A(Dk)  p| < m]   e
 2k"Pr [|A(D0)  p| < m]  2k .
Proof. By the definition of (",  )-DP, if D and D0 are neighboring data sets, we
must have that for any event E,
Pr[A(D) 2 E]  e"Pr[A(D0) 2 E] +  ,
or equivalently
Pr[A(D0) 2 E]   e " (Pr[A(D) 2 E]   ) (3.10.1)
Notice that for every k, by construction, Dk and Dk+1 di↵er by only two entries
(one buyer’s and one seller’s valuation). This immediately implies that Dk and D0
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di↵er by at most 2k entries, hence we can apply inequality (3.10.1) recursively 2k
times to obtain that for any event E,
Pr[A(Dk) 2 E]   e
 "  e " . . .
 
e "Pr[A(D0) 2 E]   
 
. . .   
 
   
= e 2k"Pr[A(D0) 2 E]   (e
 (2k 1)" + e (2k 2)" + ....+ e " + 1)
  e 2k"Pr[A(D0) 2 E]  2k 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that ex  1 for x  0. Fixing the
price p and k,m, and taking E to be the ball of radius m around p, i.e.
E = {p0 : |p0   p| < m}
concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.4. In this proof, for any given data set D = (vs,vb), we let















where p is drawn according to A(D).
First, we note that in data set D0, at most n trades (where every trading agent
gets non-negative utility) can occur, setting a price of n. Further, n is the unique
price that makes n trades possible, noting that decreasing (resp. increasing) the
price leads to strictly less than n sellers (resp. buyers) willing to trade at that price.
We let p⇤0 = n be this (unique) optimal price that clears n shares on data set D0.
For a given (",  )-DP algorithm A : Dn ! P that outputs a price p given an input




:= Pr [|A(D0)  p
⇤
0| < m] , q
k
m
:= Pr [|A(Dk)  p
⇤
0| < m] .
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Now, fix m = d1
"
e, k = 2d1
"
e, and take n   m. We have that the expected loss
of A on D0 is
EA [L(A, D0)] = opt(D0)  EA [u(A, D0)]





















The first inequality follows from a simple application of the law of total expectation
on event E = {p : |p  p⇤0| <
m




outputted price is outside E, which implies that it can only clear at most n m   0
shares (picking a price that is m away from n necessarily leads to either m fewer
buyers or m fewer sellers willing to trade); the rest of the time, with probability
q0
m
, algorithm A clears at most n shares. The second inequality is an immediate
consequence of the choice of m. Similarly, on data set Dk,
EA [L(A, Dk)] = optk   u(A, Dk)































where the first inequality follows from another use of the law of total expectation
on the event E and its complement (notice we choose our parameters so that k > m
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and n   k m): with probability qk
m
, the price is at most n+m, and there are k m
sellers that are willing to trade at price n+m but not at price n+ k, implying that
such a price clears at most n  (k  m) shares; the rest of the time, the number of
shares cleared is at most n always. The second follows from Equation (3.10.2) and
the last one follows from the choice of k and m and the fact that "d1
"
e  1 + "  2


























where the first inequality follows from Equations (3.10.3) and (3.10.4) and the
second is a simple observation that f(q0
m

















3.11 Proofs of Approximate Truthfulness
Our proof of truthfulness for Mechanism 4 will leverage the following lemma, which
shows the output of an (", 0)-DP mechanism does not change by much in expectation
when the input data set is changed by at most one element.
Lemma 3.11.1. Let Y = M(D) where M : D ! Y is an (", 0)-DP mechanism,
and let maxy2Y |y|  K. Then for any neighboring data sets D ⇠ D0,
|E [Y (D)]  E [Y (D0)] |  (e"   1)K
Proof. Y (D) and Y (D0) are random variables; we represent the possible values they
may take on as y 2 Y , and represent the probability distribution of Y under D, D0
as P , P 0, respectively. It follows that
E [Y (D)]  E [Y (D0)] = EY⇠P Y   EY⇠P 0 Y =
X
y2Y
(PrP [Y = y]  PrP 0 [Y = y]) y
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Therefore,
|E [Y (D)]  E [Y (D0)]| 
X
y2Y




(e"   1)max {PrP [Y = y], PrP 0 [Y = y]} |y|
 (e"   1)K,
where the second inequality follows from the definition of (", 0)-di↵erential privacy.
Proof of Claim 9. We prove the claim for any seller. A similar proof holds for










submits his bid truthfully as data set D, and (rs
i
, rs i, r
b) for some (other) report rs
i
as data set D0. Notice D and D0 are neighboring data sets. Writing EM for the
















= EM [1 [p   v
s
i





+ EM [1 [p < v
s
i





























where the first inequality follows because the second term appearing in the sum
is nonpositive and that 1 [p   vs
i
] · 1 [p   rs
i
]  1 [p   vs
i
]. The second inequality
follows from Lemma 3.11.1 and the fact that the computation of the pair of random
variables (p, qs) combined with any post-processing of the pair (p, qs) that is inde-
pendent of the reported data D0 = (rs, rb) satisfies (3", 0)-di↵erential privacy by the
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Post-processing Lemma 3.7.3 and the Composition Theorem 3.7.3. Also note that
the price/bids range is {1, 2, . . . , V }, so we can take K = V in Lemma 3.11.1.
The proofs of approximate truthfulness of Mechanisms 5 and 6 follow the exact
same argument that leverages the stability properties of di↵erential privacy. The
only di↵erence comes in the choice of tie-breaking rule and the level of di↵erential
privacy of Mechanisms 5 and 6. Rewriting the above proofs with the corresponding
tie-breaking rules yields the argument.
3.12 Proofs for Learning Dynamics
3.12.1 Proof of No-Regret Lemma 3.4.4
We first show the claim below:
Claim 10. Let Rj,t be the random variable representing the reward of buyer j in
Algorithm 8 at round t, and let R⇤
j
(T ) be the total reward of buyer j’s best fixed
action in hindsight, over T rounds. Moreover, let ⇠  V and ⌘  1
V
. Then, the













Proof. We can think of Algorithm 8 as Exponential Weights with a modified utility
function:










and pt = vbj
uj,t(k) otherwise
where uj,t(k) is the actual utility of buyer j at time t if he were to bid k. Importantly,
we show that using this modified utility function we can still achieve vanishing regret
(with respect to the original reward Rj,t which is the agent’s true/realized utility).
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First, notice that uj,t is always upper-bounded by µbj,t: uj,t  µ
b
j,t
; but also that
µb
j,t
 uj,t+ ⇠. Recall R⇤j (T ) is the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight, with




an adversary. Let r⇤
j

















Our goal will be to show that Equation (3.12.1) holds. Our proof technique will
mostly follow standard arguments. In this proof – and this proof only – we let
w denote the unnormalized weights that may not sum to 1, and note they induce
probability distributions ⇢ by normalizing each weight by the sum of the weights.
First, let Wj,t =
P
V




















We will write ⇢j,t(k) , wj,t(k)/
P
V
k=1 wj,t(k) as the probability distribution induced











For ⌘  1
V
and ⇠  1, we have ⌘µj,t(k)  1 for all k. Using the upper bound that



















































where we have used the fact that ln (1 + x)  x for x >  1 (which holds in this
case because payo↵s are nonnegative given buyers (sellers) never bid above (below)






. . . Wj,2
Wj,1





































On the other hand, since Wj,t+1   wj,t(k) for all k, including for the best action
in hindsight k = r⇤
j














































Now, using the fact that the weights can be initialized with wj,1(k) = 1 8k and







































































where the inequality follows from the fact that µb
j,t
is bounded by max(V, ⇠) = V










































































































We can now conclude the proof, noting that Lemma 10 gives that the total
regret of Algorithm 8 over T rounds for agent j is bounded by:








and ⇠ = 1p
T
. Then we have that
Regret 
p





































That is, average regret vanishes as T !1.
3.12.2 Proof of Theorem 3.4.1
To prove Theorem 3.4.1, we will examine how the opt0 sellers with the lowest values
and the opt0 buyers with the highest values update their weights. To do so, we will
need the following definition:







  v] be the number of buyers with value bigger than or equal to v, and let







 v] be the number
of sellers with value smaller than or equal to v, and let ⌫s = min{v : ns(v)   opt0}.
We note the following property of ⌫b, ⌫s:
Claim 11. Suppose opt0 > 0. Then,
⌫b   ⌫s + 2.
Proof. By definition of opt0, there exists a price p? such that at least opt0 buyers
have value above or equal to p? + 1 and opt0 sellers below or equal to p?   1. But
then, ⌫s  p?   1 and ⌫b   p? + 1, which concludes the proof.
First of all, we show that if a given price p is picked infinitely many times, every
agent j with vb
j
> p sees their probability of bidding more than p converge to 1.
This is the object of Corollary 2, whose proof relies on Lemmas 3.12.2 and 3.12.3
below. We state the Lemmas for a buyer j and note that similar results hold for a
seller i as well.
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(k) = 0, the result is immediate: it must be that for all k < p,
wb
j,t
(k) = 0, so by exponential update, wb




















(k) > 0. Remember that pt is the optimal





























































































































































































Lemma 3.12.3 (Update moves mass up by a constant amount). Suppose at time
t, at least one buyer and one seller can trade. There exists a constant C(") > 1





















Proof. Let Xt(p) be the probability that buyer j bids at least p on round t. For





























 pt) for all bids k above pt up to vbj, and
updates weights on bids k  pt with e⌘q
b
t
















 pt)   1) + 1





































































, as there are at most nb buyers and at least one possible
seller to trade with, and the fact that vb
j
















Letting C(") = 1
1 "(1 e ⌘/nb )
is enough to conclude the proof.
Corollary 2. Pick any buyer j, and let p < vb
j
. Let Nt(p) be the number of times
price p is picked by the mechanism so that at least one trade is possible at p, up




















  p] = 1
Proof. Fix " > 0. At time t, by applying Lemma 3.12.3 and Lemma 3.12.2 repeat-
edly, we have that
Pr[rb
j,t
  p]   min{1  ", C(")Nt(p)Pr[rb
j,0   p]}




where the last inequality follows because the initial weights are uniform over all






  p]   1  ".
Since this holds for every " > 0, the limit statement follows.
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We note that a similar Corollary exists for sellers as well. Now, we need to show
that there is a price that clears benchmark opt0 and is chosen by the mechanism
infinitely often. This is the object of Lemma 3.12.4, whose proof relies on Claim 12.
Once again, we state the Claim only for buyers and note that a similar result for
sellers as well.






)  12 .




is easy to see that the weight on vb
j
cannot decrease in the next round. Indeed, for























































































































Let us now prove the second inequality. Note that at any time step t, let pt be
the price chosen by the mechanism. When pt > vbj, j does not update his weight.












































  1) for all t.












  1)  1.
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At any time t, ⌫s < pt < ⌫b and at least one trade is possible with probability at
least  .











all buyers with value vb
j
> ⌫s bid their value, all buyers with value vb
j
 ⌫s bid
strictly below their value, all sellers with value vs
i
< ⌫b bid their value, and all
sellers with vs
i
  ⌫b bid strictly more than their value. In particular, since ⌫s < ⌫b,
all buyers with value vb
j
  ⌫b bid their value and all sellers with value vs
i
 ⌫s
bid their value. By definition of ⌫b and ⌫s, there are at least opt0 such buyers and
sellers, so setting any price p satisfying ⌫s  p  ⌫b clears opt0 shares at least. On
the other hand, any price p > ⌫b and any price p < ⌫s cannot clear opt0 shares.
Therefore, ⌫s  pt  ⌫b. Further, since all buyers with value vbj   ⌫
b and all sellers
with value vs
i
 ⌫s bid their values, and ⌫b   ⌫s, at least opt0   1 trades happen
at price pt.
When ⌫s < p < ⌫b for all optimal prices, this is enough to conclude the proof.
Now, suppose p = ⌫b is an optimal price at time t. By construction, no seller bids
⌫b. As such, the number of sellers with bids under p and the number of sellers with
bids under p   1 are the same, and p   1 = ⌫b   1 clears at least as many shares
as p, hence is optimal at time t. Because pt is chosen uniformely at random among
the set of optimal prices, and there are at most V optimal prices, p   1 is picked
with probability at least 1
V
, and satisfies ⌫s < p   1 < ⌫b by Claim 11. Similarly,
if p = ⌫s is optimal, then so is p + 1 < ⌫b, and it is picked by the mechanism with
probability at least 1
V
. This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to put everything together, and show Theorem 3.4.1.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4.1. The case when opt0 = 0 is immediate. So let us assume
opt0 > 0. Lemma 3.12.4 shows that at any given round, there is a constant proba-
bility   > 0 to pick pt 2 (⌫s, ⌫b) and realize at least one trade at that price. As such,
as t! +1, the number of times the mechanism picks a price in (⌫s, ⌫b) such that
a trade is realized also tends to infinity. In particular, by the pigeonhole principle,
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which concludes the proof.
3.12.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.2
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.4.1, and is given below. We start by
showing in Corollary 3 that if a price p is picked by the mechanism infinitely many
times, every buyer with value at least p learns to bid higher than p with probability
going to 1.













Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 3.12.2.
We then characterize by how much the weight allocated to bids above the chosen
price pt increase for a buyer j, at every time step t:
Lemma 3.12.6 (Update moves mass up by a constant amount). Suppose at time
t, at least one buyer and one seller can trade. There exists a constant C(") > 1
































































































is enough to conclude the proof.
Corollary 3. Pick any buyer j, and let p  vb
j
. Let Nt(p) be the number of times
price p is picked and at least one trade is possible at price p, up until time t. If





  p] = 1
Proof. This is identical to the proof of Corollary 2.
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Second, we need to show that there is a price that clears benchmark opt0 and is
chosen by the mechanism infinitely often.





, all agents bid
their valuation.







). This is enough to prove the lemma.
We are now ready to put everything together, and show Theorem 3.4.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.2. Suppose opt > 0 (otherwise the result is immediate). When
all agents bid their values, the mechanism selects a price that executes opt   1
trades. Lemma 3.12.7 shows this happens with constant probability at any given
round, and as such happens infinitely often when the number of rounds goes to
infinity. By the pigeonhole principle, there exists a price p? such that there are at
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3.12.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4.3
We start by noting that in the private case, the weights are still non-decreasing over
time.












One distinction compared to the non-private case arises with respect to the
amount by which the weights above pt are updated. This amount depends on
qb
t
, which is a random variable over the randomness of private computation of the
selection probability. We note that conditionally on qb
t
  1/nb, Lemma 3.12.3 carries
through, as formalized below:
Lemma 3.12.9 (Update moves mass up by a constant amount). Suppose at time
t, at least one buyer and one seller can trade and that qb
t
> 1/nb. There exists a





















We now fix a price p. We show that for one such p, if the event where p is
the price picked by the mechanism and qb
t
  1/n happens infinitely often, then all
bidders with valuation equal to or larger than p learn to bid higher than p with
probability that goes to 1.
Lemma 3.12.10. Pick any buyer j, and let p  vb
j
. Let Nt(p) be the number of
times price p is picked by the mechanism so that at least one trade is possible at p


















If limt!1 Nt(p) = +1, then limt!1 Pr[rbj,t   p] = 1.
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We note that the event in which all agents bid their valuation and the mechanism
(despite the randomness due to privacy) picks an optimal price p and releases qb  
1/nb, qs   1/ns happens with at least constant probability (independent of the time
dimension of the problem), hence infinitely many times when the time horizon goes
to infinity:











> 1/ns, and the chosen price pt is an optimal price that clears OPT
shares.
Proof. We have shown before in the proof of Lemma 3.12.7 that with probability
at least V  (n
b+ns) every agent bids their valuation.
In the rest of the proof, we condition on all agents bidding their valuations in
the current round t. Conditional on this, we show that with constant probability,
simultaneously: qb
t
> 1/nb, and qs
t
> 1/ns. Recall from Algorithm 4 that in each























By the accuracy guarantees of the Laplace mechanism and the fact that Laplace
noise has positive value with probability 1/2, we have that with constant probability









































 pt]   opt   1, noting that at least one trade is possible at
price pt.
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To finish the proof, we just need to show that, conditional on all agents bidding
their valuations in the current round t, with probability at least 1/V , pt – the
price selected when every agent bids their valuation – is an optimal price. Note
there exists a price p?
t
that is optimal for round t, i.e. such that ⇧t(p?t ,v
s,vb)  


























We are now ready to put everything together, and show Theorem 3.4.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3. Let us for simplicity call:














Suppose opt > 0 (otherwise the result is immediate). By Lemma 3.12.11 that
shows that with constant probability (independent of time) in every round, the
mechanism picks an optimal price and qb, qs   1
n
, this event must happen infinitely
many times. By the pigeonhole principle, there exists an optimal price p? such that
infinitely many times, p? is picked by the mechanism with qb, qs   1
n
. In turn, all
buyers j with vb
j
  p? and all sellers i with vs
i
 p? (there are at least OPT of them,
since p? is optimal) learn to bid above, respectively below price p? with probability
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  p?] = 1,
and similarly, for every seller i with vs
i






















 p?] = 1














 p?]   1  ↵.
When all buyers with value at least the price and sellers with value at most the
price bid between their valuation and p?, the optimal number of shares that can be
cleared is OPT. By the accuracy guarantee of Mechanism 4, it must then be the

























  (1  8↵)(1  ↵)
  1  9↵.
This concludes the proof.









AND ERROR INEQUALITY IN
DATA-DRIVEN MARKETS
4.1 Introduction1
As machine learning has become more integrated into products, markets, and
decision-making throughout society, researchers, practitioners, and activists have
identified many instances of unfairness in predictions or decisions made by machine-
learned models (or by humans influenced by said models). A large and develop-
ing body of work, which we briefly survey in Section 4.2, has empirically docu-
mented unfairness in practical machine learning settings, identified many theoretical
sources and mechanisms of unfairness, and constructed innovative fairness-aware al-
gorithms. Researchers have developed many innovative technical solutions to these
problems, yet the issue in practice remains far from solved. This Chapter highlights
a simple and important point: while technical solutions to unfairness are certainly
important, mitigating unfairness in practice may require tackling economic incen-
1This Chapter is based on joint work with Ben Fish [50].
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tives promoting unfairness.
Most of the existing literature assumes that a fixed dataset, possibly biased,
arrives in the hands of a data scientist, and solutions often revolve around clever
ways to mitigate this bias. In practice, however, economic incentives may create
disparities well before the data scientist enters the picture. Consider, for example,
the task of speech recognition: producing accurate models may require a large
amount of data, and data from speakers with accented or rarer dialects may be
more costly to collect. If the market size of a minority group is small relative to the
costs a firm would expend in developing accurate speech recognition software, it is
likely that the group will be served with lower quality products.
In this chapter, we model the unfairness that arises when data-driven, profit-
maximizing firms choose to di↵erentially invest in data collection across groups,
creating unequal error rates. In order to focus on this specific source of unfairness,
we use a simple framework that elides the many other sources of bias that can
seep into the machine learning pipeline. For instance, we assume that firms have
unlimited budgets to purchase data at a cost from group-specific data sources of
potentially infinite quantity. We also assume that both firms and users benefit from
more accurate models, so that incentives are aligned. Furthermore, we assume that
firms must build separate models for each group, to avoid unfairness that may come
from fitting to the majority.
In order to construct our models, we borrow from the tools of learning theory
and microeconomics to build simple, stylized models with crisp predictions of quan-
tifiable unfairness. We assume each profit-maximizing firm faces a known demand
curve as a function of the worst-case error rates for each group. Standard results
from learning theory allow us to model worst-case error rates as a function of the
amount of data the firm buys. We investigate three models of demand: linear de-
mand, demand proportional to error rates, and (approximately) rational demand.
For the precise description of our models and these assumptions, see Section 4.3.
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We show in Section 4.4 that a profit-maximizing monopolist will choose to serve
minorities (as defined by their market power) with lower quality models. Assuming
linear demand, an oft-used benchmark in the economics literature, we quantify the
di↵erence in relative model quality between groups as a function of their market
size, elasticity, and cost of data.
We then consider two classical remedies to the ills of monopolies: competition
and regulation. Under two natural models of competition – multilinear demand
(Section 4.5.1) and proportional demand (Section 4.5.2) – introducing competition
does not mitigate inequality, and proportional demand even exacerbates it. Only
a model in which all consumers choose the firm with (even infinitesimally) smaller
error until firms reach su cient accuracy suggests that competition will mitigate
inequality (Section 4.5.3); to do so, however, this model assumes a stringent notion
of rationality that may not be reflective of consumer behavior in the real world.
Given that our most plausible models suggest that competition does improve the
situation, we ask whether regulation could be used to mitigate error inequality by
design. In particular, in Section 4.6 we examine two simple kinds of constraints: a
‘relative equality’ constraint where error rates across groups must be multiplicatively
close to each other, and an ‘absolute equality’ constraint where error rates across
all groups must be su ciently small, but may be far apart from each other. We
then formally quantify the costs to profits (and when relevant, to the majority
group’s error rate) as a function of the threshold chosen. Finally, we conclude with
takeaways, limitations, and directions for future work in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work
Motivation for our work comes from the many documented instances of disparity
in learned model performance between groups. The existing literature has demon-
strated troubling disparities in a number of domains, including incentive-aligned
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domains (where both the firms and users receive benefit from more accurate mod-
els) that are the focus of this work. Wilson et al. [125] studies the performance
of state-of-the-art object recognition systems, intended for applications like au-
tonomous vehicles, and find that systems fail to recognize darker-skinned persons
at much higher rates than lighter ones. Sweeney shows that search engine queries
of black-associated names generated about four times the likelihood of ads for ar-
rest records [116]. Blodgett and O’Connor show that on both complicated tasks
like parsing and simple tasks like language identification, texts from speakers of
African American English see vastly higher error rates [20]. Buolamwini and Ge-
bru show that commercial facial recognition software systems misclassify race and
gender among dark-skinned females at orders of magnitude higher rates than light-
skinned males [25]. Mehrotra et al. [95] and Ekstrand et al. [49] identify di↵ering
satisfaction levels by age and gender in recommendation systems. The list goes on.
Researchers have engaged in many empirical and theoretical investigations to
understand why these instances of unfairness occur, with the hope of developing
solutions to mitigate them. Much of this work focuses on the learning algorithm
itself as the source of unfairness, and attempts to incorporate fairness notions into
the algorithm [82]; see e.g. Verma and Rubin [122] for a survey of fairness defini-
tions. Training data has also been identified as source of unfairness; for example,
Chen et al. identify sample size di↵erences as a crucial source of unfairness, and
decomposes induced unfairness into bias, variance, and noise [32]. Various feedback
loops stemming from historical bias have also been identified as sources of unfair-
ness [52, 51, 91]. There are a few others, including selection bias [78], using the
wrong metric [100], or using a single model across multiple underlying data gener-
ating processes [84]. However, to the best of our knowledge, market forces in data
investment have seen little attention as a source of unfairness. See the survey of
Cowgill and Tucker [38] for an in-depth survey of perspectives on the sources of
unfairness from computer science and economics.
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Our models are built on insights from two extensive, and historically separate,
literatures: the formalization of learning from data embodied in computational and
statistical learning theory, and models of strategic interactions from the theory
of industrial organization (see e.g. Tirole [119]). From learning theory, we apply
fundamental bounds on sample complexity derived from the Probably Approximately
Correct (PAC) framework (see e.g. Kearns and Vazirani [85]) to relate firms’ costs to
worst-case error rates; from industrial organization, we modify widely used models
of demand (such as linear demand, multilinear models of imperfect substitutes [17],
the Tullock contest [120], and Bertrand competition [114]) to link firms’ choices to
consumer behavior.
Recently, these two fields have drawn closer, as both computer scientists and
economists have begun to model markets for information and data. For example,
Aridor et al. [6] and Mansour et al. [93] consider the exploration-exploitation trade-
o↵s faced by firms competing to win users in a bandits setting, while Ben-Porat and
Tennenholtz formalize competition in the prediction space that can lead to models
very di↵erent than those produced by empirical risk minimization algorithms [14,
15]. To the best of our knowledge, however, this is the first work to apply learning
theory and industrial organization to explore di↵ering incentives in the context of
fairness. The work of Dong et al. [42] is the closest in form to ours, and uses
a similar high-level abstraction of learning theory, as well as a proportional-error
split in market share, but primarily explores questions of market concentration.
4.3 Consumer Behavior and Learning Theory
We begin by describing our framework at a high level. In our models, firms use
data to create a classifier (or other machine learning model) that is then used to
serve consumers. Consumers are split into non-overlapping groups, and choose a
firm based on how well the firm’s model is performing for their group. Firms receive
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revenue based on how many consumers they attract, but must pay for the amount
of the data they buy. The more data, the better their model. The firms aim to
maximize their profits. In the case where there are multiple firms, the goal of each
firm is to maximize their profit at equilibrium, as other firm’s choices a↵ect the
number of consumers that they get, and hence their choices. Here, the firm’s only
(strategically relevant) choice is how much data to buy.
We start with the monopoly case, where there is only one firm. The firm chooses
a number of data points Mg to buy for each group, where we write M for the vector
of these choices; we write "g(Mg) for the worst-case error the firm can guarantee for
group g, and assume this error is known to consumers. The groups then respond by
entering the market according to a demand functionDg("g), whereDg("g) represents
the proportion of g that uses the firm’s model. Each group has µg total people, so the
firm’s revenue is
P
g2G µgDg("g(Mg)). The firm also pays for the data, represented
by a cost function C(M).
We will discuss our choices for ", D, and C in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. But for
now, the firm’s profit is just the revenue the firm makes minus the cost it spends
to acquire that data, leading to the following optimization problem:
Definition 4.3.1 (The Monopolist’s Problem). The firm chooses M to maximize








Because we will assume in Section 4.3.1 that "g is a deterministic function of








where " is the vector of "g. We define ⇡(") =
P
g
µgDg("g)   C(") as the total
profit the monopolist makes. We will have an additively separable cost function in
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g, i.e. C(") =
P




On the other hand, when there are multiple firms F , maximizing profit is not
longer just an optimization problem, because each firm’s optimal choice will depend
on its opponent’s choice. So instead, we search for a Nash equilibrium, which is the
workhorse solution concept in classical game theory. Under such a Nash equilibrium,
each firm plays their best response, given all the choices of the other firms. For a
more thorough background, see [59].
Extending our notation, we have the same components as in the monopolist
case, except now we write Mgi for the number of data points the ith firm buys for
group g, "gi is the error rate of the ith firm on group g, and Dgi("g) = Dgi("gi, "g, i)
is the demand for the ith firm from group g, given the vector "g = ("gi)i2F of error
rates.
Definition 4.3.2 (The Competitor’s Problem). Firms simultaneously announce
their choices, resulting in a matrix M = (Mgi) of data points purchased. Each
group in the market responds according to "g(Mg).
Then a (pure) equilibrium under profit-maximizing firms is a set of vectors M⇤
i














We will only consider pure strategy Nash equilibria in this work.
















is the vector of error rates given by the associated equilibrium choice
M⇤
i
. We also use ⇡gi("gi, "⇤g, i) = µgDgi("gi, "
⇤
g, i)   Cg("i) to refer to the profit i
makes on group g.
Note that a firm i only enters a market in the first place if ⇡i("⇤) > 0. In this
work, we do not consider the case when ⇡i("⇤)  0, as our goal is to show that even
when firms do enter the market for each group, market forces may still create a
disparity between groups.
Finally, in Section 4.6, we discuss imposing regulation on a monopolist to ensure
some kind of ‘fairness’ across groups. We consider two di↵erent kinds of constraints
a regulator could impose on a firm. The first is what we refer to as relative error
equality, which roughly corresponds to group fairness in binary classification [16]
For all g, g0 2 G, we require
"g
"g0
 (1 +  ),
for parameter     0. On the other hand, we could ask for an absolute error
guarantee, requiring that the error rates for both firms are low, regardless of how
close to each other they are: For all g 2 G, we require instead
"g   .
This roughly corresponds with maximin notions of fairness, e.g. [16, 19, 56].
We investigate what happens when a monopolist satisfies one of these two con-
straints. Because error is the relevant quantity from the regulator’s perspective, and
error and data investment are so tightly linked, we write the regulated monopolist’s
problem in terms of the choice of error:
Definition 4.3.3 (Regulated Monopolist’s Problem). The firm chooses M to max-







µgDg("g)  C(") s.t. fr(")  0 8r 2 R,
where either R = G⇥G and fg,g0(") = "g  (1+ )"g0 , or R = G and fg(") = "g  .
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Just as is the case in binary classification, where di↵erent settings may call for
di↵erent notions of fairness, which version of fairness regulator should impose will
depend on the context and the ethical assumptions she maintains.
4.3.1 Data, Costs, and Learning Theory
A key component to our model is how choices in data investment drive error rates.
We assume that firms build a model to provide a product to consumers, and that this
model is learned from data. The firms have access to independent and identically
distributed data from fixed data sources that reflect the same distribution that
consumers care about.
In the PAC model of learning [85], there is a class of hypotheses H, and each
hypothesis h 2 H has an associated risk R(h), typically representing the error rate
of h. For example, in binary classification, R(h) = Ex,y⇠D[h(x) 6= y], though our
model will be applicable to other settings as well. With only access to data drawn
from D, rather than D itself, the learner cannot guarantee its risk, but can achieve
high probability upper bounds on its risk. In the agnostic PAC setting, there is a
learning algorithm that upon seeing a sample of size M , except with probability  ,








where minh02H R(h0) is the Bayes error, dH is the VC dimension of H, and K is
a universal constant. (See [113] for more on PAC learning, VC dimension, and the
various kinds of PAC learning.)
To model the fact that getting appropriate data can have group-dependent
sources and thus costs, we assume data for each group is drawn separately from
distributions Dg. The firms choose Mg, the number of data points to draw, and
will use a learning algorithm with a PAC guarantee for each data set and give to a
consumer of group g the output of the corresponding hypothesis.
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Achieving such bounds would not be useful to the firm unless consumers make
decisions based on these bounds. Here, we assume that the consumers have no more
access than the firms: they do not have access to the distribution, so they cannot
make decisions based on the true group-level error rates. Given this, we assume that
the consumers use firms’ bound on the excess error R(h)   minh02H R(h0), which
we refer to as the worst-case excess error rate. Of course, in reality, consumer
decisions are not necessarily based on the worst-case error rate. However, given
that consumers often do in practice have to make choices using relatively little
information about firms, and have trouble predicting how well exactly a firm will
treat them, we believe this is a natural place to start. In particular, bounds on the
the excess error rates represent the minimal amount of information consumers need







for constants  g > 0 and q > 0. For example, in agnostic PAC learning, q = 2
and  g =
p
K(dH + log(1/ )). Note that we are assuming   is fixed ahead of time,
but we allow in general for  g to be group-dependent. Agnostic PAC learning is far
from the only type of learning to have this form; the realizable PAC setting, the
multi-class setting, and many regression settings all have this form [113].
This set-up does ignore the possibility of transfer learning, i.e. using the data
from Dg to help with learning for another group g0. We avoid this scenario so as
to concentrate on the ‘unfairness’ generated via the market incentives instead of
the unfairness generated, for example, when an assumption about the similarity
between Dg and Dg0 fails to hold.
The choice of Mg determines not only the worst-case error rates, but the cost to
the firm of generating that data, either by collecting it in the wild or buying it from
another source. As mentioned above, we permit the costs to be group-dependent.
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We assume the cost is additively separable and linear in Mg:




for constants  gi, cgi, where  gi represents the fixed cost of entering the market.
Since we can rewrite Mgi = ( g/"gi)q, this model is equivalent to first choosing
a worst-case error rate "gi and then paying a cost













This version is the one we will use for the remainder of the paper. Note that the
cost function is convex, which means that whenever the demand is concave, so is
the profit function.
4.3.2 Models of Consumer Choice
The firm’s revenue is driven by how demand for its product reacts to its choice
of worst-case error guarantees. We consider several models of this demand, each
inspired by well-studied models in microeconomics. While firms are primarily con-
cerned only with aggregate changes in demand, rather than the decisions of individ-
ual consumers, each of our models can be founded on natural models of individual
consumer behavior, and we provide such models in several cases.
In the monopoly case, we use a simple model of linear demand; while an ideal-
ization, linear demand is often used even in econometric estimation (see e.g. [70]).
In the competitive case, there are a variety of natural demand models, each em-
bedding di↵erent assumptions about how consumers choose between firms and how
stringently they react to di↵ering error levels. We study three models along a
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spectrum of rationality: a multilinear demand, generalizing the monopoly case; a
parameterized proportional demand; and an approximately rational demand, where
consumers exclusively use the firm with lowest error (up to some tolerance).
We give the details of these models of demand in each appropriate subsection
in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Under each model, there are parameter regimes where
firms choose not to invest in data collection for some groups at all ; while this
may reflect some real-world scenarios, the purpose is of this Chapter is to highlight
economic incentives that create inequality even aside from such extreme scenarios.
As such, we will focus on interior optima or equilibria. In an interior optimum,
the monopolist must make positive profit (so that it enters the market) and choose
error rates strictly smaller than 1 for each group (so that it is investing in data
collection for each group). Similarly, interior equilibria require that profits for both
firms must be positive and each error rate strictly smaller than 1. Our theorems
statements will highlight this focus.
4.4 Monopoly
We start with the case where there is one firm in the market and demand is linear:
Definition 4.4.1 (Linear Demand). A linear demand function for each group g is
given by:
Dg("g) = ↵g    g"g,
where 0 <    ↵  1.
A linear demand curve can arise from a simple model of consumer behavior:
suppose utility-maximizing consumers consider whether or not to use the product,
and only use it if it is above some threshold (equivalent to being better than some
‘outside option’). If these thresholds are uniformly distributed over some interval,
then demand will be linearly decreasing over an interval. Strictly speaking, this
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is a piecewise linear demand, but this does not greatly a↵ect optimal behavior of
the firm - it merely means that it will never choose outside the linearly decreasing
range unless they are choosing not to invest in providing quality products at all.
For simplicity of our theorem statements, we will assume that parameters are such
that the firm’s achievable errors are a subset of the linear portion of the demand
curve, here 0 <    ↵  1, but in Appendix 4.9, we generalize to arbitrarily large
↵,   to ensure that our results still qualitatively hold.
Our main result here is the following:
Theorem 4.4.1 (Monopoly Inequality). Suppose a monopolist with learning rate q
faces linear demand. Then in any interior optimum, for every pair of groups g and












Again, we focus on an interior optimum. Three factors a↵ect the error gap
between the minority and the majority: the size of the minority as a share of
the total market; the marginal cost of gathering data on the minority vs. on the
majority; and the elasticities of the populations with respect to the error. It is also
worth noting that the fundamental nature of the learning problem, via the learning
rate q, a↵ects the magnitude of error inequality.
Theorem 4.4.1 is a consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4.2. Suppose a monopolist with learning rate q faces linear demand.
























Now, we notice that this profit function is separable into the sum of profits from
each market. Di↵erentiating with respect to "g separately and setting to zero,we















. This is indeed a maximum because
profit is concave, so the only alternative is an exterior optimum.










> ⇡g(1), and "⇤g < 1, then the
interior optimum exists and is unique.
4.5 Competition
In this section, we show that under most reasonable models of competition, the
introduction of competition does not mitigate error-inequality compared to the
monopoly equilibrium, and may, in fact, increase it. Only under Bertrand-like com-
petition, which assumes consumers are strictly rational, is inequality significantly
mitigated. In particular, we show that under both the Tullock and the multi-linear
models of demand, the inequality between groups as measured by the error rates
does not improve relative to the monopoly case. In the case of the Tullock model,
as a function of the relative size of the groups, inequality is actually worse.
4.5.1 Multilinear Demand
Next, we consider a simple generalization of linear demand to the two-firm case.
This model can be interpreted as a model of competition in identical products with
di↵ering quality levels as in [9], but can also be interpreted (as well as microfounded,
and used to estimate structural parameters, as in [17]) as markets for imperfect
substitutes.
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Definition 4.5.1 (Multilinear Demand). The multilinear linear demand function
is, for firms i and j, and for each group g,
Dgi("gi, "gj) = ↵gi    g"gi +  g"gj,
where 0 <  g <  g  ↵gi and ↵gi +  g  1.
We require  g >  g so that demand reacts more strongly to a firm’s own error
rates than its opponents – this ensures that if both firms increase error, total demand
decreases. The other conditions on the parameters are to ensure that the demand
is truly (multi)-linear, as opposed to piece-wise linear.
Note it is not the case that all consumers choose the firm with lower error, as one
might expect if the products of the firms were perfect substitutes. Instead, users
switch between firms depending on their error rates, and even if firms achieved
perfect accuracy, the split of the total market might not be even, as captured by
di↵ering ↵gi. This could represent brand loyalty, for example, or perhaps that firms’
products are not perfectly identical.
Our main result for this case states that the gap between error rates is the same
as in the monopoly case:
Theorem 4.5.1. Suppose that two firms with learning rate q compete under multi-
linear demand. Then in any interior equilibrium, for every pair of groups g and g0,












Theorem 4.5.1 is a consequence of the fact that the firm’s optimal choice does
not depend on its opponent’s error rates; that is they have a dominant strategy.
This is formalized by the following lemma, which is enough to prove Theorem 4.5.1:
Lemma 4.5.2. Suppose that two firms with learning rate q compete under multi-











Proof. This proof will be very similar to that of Lemma 4.4.2, only now, the behavior











We can see that even though the behavior of the other firm will a↵ect profit,
firm i still has a dominant strategy. This is because the first-order conditions do

































> ⇡gi(1, "⇤gj), and "
⇤
gi
< 1, then an interior equilibrium exists.
4.5.2 Proportional Demand
In this section, we consider a model inspired by [42], and thus, indirectly, by the
Tullock contest [120]. In particular, firms split the market proportionally to the
other firms’ error:
Definition 4.5.3 (Proportional Demand). In a multi-firm market, we say that
















Here, we focus on the two-firm case, in which case we can write
















Now we can write our inequality theorem:
Theorem 4.5.2 (Inequality Under Proportional Demand). Suppose two firms with
learning rate q compete under proportional demand. Then in any interior equilib-































Recall that in the monopoly case, the exponent was 1/(q + 1) instead of 1/q,
meaning that introducing competition under this model has actually exacerbated
the e↵ect of minority status on inequality. Note also that the relative inequality
between two groups based on the results from a particular firm depends not only on
that firm’s cost structure for the two groups, but also on the opposing firm’s cost
structure for the two groups.
Proving Theorem 4.5.2 requires finding the equilibrium:
Lemma 4.5.4. Suppose two firms with learning rate q face proportional demand













































is the unique equilibrium.
For brevity, we relegate the full proof and the characterization of when these
conditions hold, to Section 4.11. Below, we detail the instructive portion of the
proof for the special case in which q = ⇢ = 1.
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Lemma 4.5.5. Suppose two firms with learning rate 1 face proportional demand





















< 1. If, moreover, mink  gk   (maxk  gk)2, then ("⇤gi, "
⇤
gj
) is the unique
equilibrium.
The conditions of Lemma 4.5.5 are stated in terms of  gi; recall, though, that
 gi is not a primitive of our model, but rather the product of the per-datapoint cost
and learning theory constants. These conditions thus imply conditions on these








which merely requires that the per-datapoint cost is not too large relative to the
desired hypothesis class and success probability. In the asymmetric case, we require
that firms do not face ratios of data cost to learning constant that are too di↵erent
from each other. If either of these conditions is violated, then one or both firms
may have an incentive to stop investing completely in data acquired for a group.
Such non-interior equilibria can obviously lead to severe error inequality, but again,
Theorem 4.5.2 demonstrates the existence of incentives to unfairness even ruling
out these extreme cases.
Proof of Lemma 4.11.1. We can write Firm i’s profit from each group as:







The strategy space of the firm is to select an "gi for each group in (0, 1]; we search for
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. At a high level, our strategy to do so is as follows:
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first, we fix the opposing firm’s action "gj. Optimizing Firm i’s profit gives a best-
response to the fixed action "gj. An equilibrium pair must simultaneously satisfy
both firms’ first order conditions, given the other, so we obtain two simultaneous
equations that yield the equilibrium relationship between the two firms’ actions.
Solving this yields a candidate solution. Then, we can show that the candidate
solution is indeed a maximum via the concavity of the profit function. Finally,
we need but check that there are no solutions at the endpoints, and we provide
conditions when this is ruled out.









We set this equal to zero. Since satisfying this condition is required for "gi to be a
best-response we can plug in "⇤
gj










and in particular, this must apply to the best-response "⇤
gi
. We can apply similar




) to be best-responses to each other – that is, to


















































Now, to show that this candidate solution is indeed an equilibrium, we must show






can view ⇡gi("gi, "⇤gj) as a continuous function on (0, 1]. By construction, evaluating
@
@"gi
⇡gi("gi, "⇤gj) at "
⇤
gi
must give zero. (It is also easy to verify that this is indeed
the case.) If ⇡i,"⇤
gj

































































But notice that this quantity is always negative if costs are positive; hence, "⇤
gi
is indeed a local maximum of ⇡i,"⇤
gj
.
To ensure that this point is a global maximum, we must compare it with the
profit at the endpoint. For brevity, we defer this calculation to the Appendix in
Section 4.11
Finally, note that equilibrium profits are positive if ⇡gi("⇤gi, "
⇤
gj






i.e. fixed costs are not extremely large. Positive profits and the fact that "⇤
gi
globally maximizes profit given  ⇤
gj
ensures that the putative equilibrium pair forms
an equilibrium.
To identify conditions in which this equilibrium is unique, we need to eliminate
the only other possible equilibrium (both firms choosing " = 1). Again, for brevity,
we defer this calculation to the appendix.
Again, we pause to highlight several intuitive properties of the equilibrium.
First, Firm i’s choice of error for group g is decreasing with the market size of
Group g as well as the ferocity of competition in Group g. These results are similar
to those of Lemma 4.4.2, with a di↵erent functional form and the competition
exponent of the Tullock game replacing the error elasticity of demand. It is also,
intuitively, increasing in  gi and decreasing in  gj, though this is harder to see due
to the functional form of f .
4.5.3 Approximately Rational Demand
Now we consider markets where consumers behave rationally. If we allow con-
sumers to behave fully rationally, in the sense of always picking the firm with (even
infinitesimally) smaller error, we obtain a model similar to the Bertrand model of
competition [77]; accordingly, no equilibrium exists, as we show in Section 4.10.3.
Hence, we instead consider a slight relaxation of the fully rational model: Suppose
consumers behave rationally, except that they do not care about excess error up to
⇣g over the optimal error. That is, the lower firm will capture the whole market for
errors that are not too small, but for "gi, "gj 2 [0, ⇣g], firms again split the market.
We formally define this demand function below:
Definition 4.5.6 (Bertrand-like Tolerant Demand). In a multi-firm market, we say
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mink "gk > ⇣g and "gi = min
j 6=i
"gj





1["gj⇣g ] mink "gk  ⇣g
.
We will show that there exists a unique equilibrium here (for appropriate pa-
rameters) in which groups’ error levels are determined not by their sizes, but by
their optimal errors and their tolerances.
Theorem 4.5.3 (Approximately Rational Inequality). Suppose that two firms com-







where ⇣g, ⇣g0 is users’ tolerance threshold (assumed to be strictly positive). More-
over, if  gi <
⇣gµg
2 for all g, i, the unique equilibrium is interior.
In particular, Theorem 4.5.3 shows that under this approximate Bertrand-like
model of competition, the dependence on group size in the error inequality is elim-
inated. Instead, inequality depends merely on the optimal error achievable under
the hypothesis class used by firms and groups’ tolerances.










As before, we can interpret this as a condition that the per-datapoint cost is not
too large relative to the total market size and the learning theory constants.
Theorem 4.5.3 follows from the following lemma:
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Lemma 4.5.7 (Approximate Rational Equilibrium). Suppose that two firms com-
pete under ⇣-tolerant demand, and  gi <
⇣gµg
2 for all g, i. Then an interior pure




and this equilibrium is unique.
Proof. We posit that the profile (⇣g, ⇣g) is an equilibrium. To see this, note that a
firm deviating to some " > ⇣g would lose its entire market share, and so would end








so deviating to a higher error, with negative profit, cannot be a profitable deviation.
On the other hand, deviating to " 2 [0, ⇣g) would result in the same market share,
but with increased costs. Hence, deviating to decreased error is also not a profitable
deviation.
To see that there can be no other equilibria, notice that if both firms were setting
error in 2 [0, ⇣g), they would have an incentive to deviate to ⇣g; if one firm’s error
were in that range and the other’s were above, then the firm with higher error would
have an incentive to deviate to ⇣g; and finally, if both firms were above ⇣g, either
firm could profitably deviate to slightly lower error.
Unfortunately, even this relaxation of full rationality may not be a realistic
model of competition in many cases; it still requires that outside of the range of
[0, ⇣g], all consumers are perfectly discerning. This is unlikely to be true in practice.
Without such an assumption, the conclusions of this model do not hold. Models
like the proportional split and multilinear demand are more likely to capture salient
market features in practice.
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4.6 Regulation
In this section, we consider the perspective of a regulator with the power to require
one of two kinds of error equality, and analyze the response of the monopolistic
firm to each. These constraints that the regulator may impose are relative error
equality and absolute error equality. We quantify the direct cost associated with
imposing these constraints, in terms of increased error to the majority group under
the first kind and lost profit to the monopolist in both. This serves to give a
sense of the direct trade-o↵s involved in regulating machine-learning driven markets.
We highlight, though, that there may be non-quantifiable benefits to equity across
groups, and only societal deliberation can evaluate these trade-o↵s.
Which of these two types of regulation is preferred will depend on the context.
Requiring errors across groups to all be similar – relative error equality – may not be
su ciently strong if large error is harmful regardless of another group’s error rate,
but also may be too strict when small absolute errors are perceived as approximately
equivalent. On the other hand, absolute error equality – where we require all errors
to be below a threshold – treats all small absolute errors as equivalent, but still
allows a large relative gap in error rates across groups. An absolute error bound
shifts the ‘burden’ of fairness entirely to the firm, which may be preferable from
a consumer standpoint; at the same time, decreasing profits for monopolies may
reduce the incentive to innovate, which may also be undesirable.
We make the following assumption for the rest of the section for ease of exposi-
tion:





< 1 (i.e. the unconstrained monopoly enters the market), and B has lesser
market power and higher data costs, i.e.
µB B  µA A and  B    A.










) to be the monopolist’s and regulated monopolist’s
optimal choices, respectively.





. Finally, we defer omitted proofs from this section to Sections 4.12 and
4.13.
4.6.1 Relative Error Equality
In this section, we imagine that a regulator requires the monopolist to achieve
error rates within a bounded ratio. We will show that a monopoly responds by
investing less in majority data collection and more in minority data collection than
it otherwise would, resulting in worse error rates for the majority, better error rates
for the minority, approximate equality between groups, and lower profits for the
firm. In particular we quantify by how much error rates worsen for the majority
and by how much profits are lowered for the monopolist, which we refer to as the
‘price’ of fairness.
We formalize the regulator’s constraint as follows:
Definition 4.6.1 (Relative error equality). The regulator forces the firm to achieve
error guarantees of bounded ratio:
"A
"B
 1 +   and
"B
"A
 1 +  
where   is a positive constant.
As in Section 4.4, we consider a profit-maximizing monopolist. As before, each
group has linear demand with market sizes µA and µB.
Now, if the regulation has ‘bite’ – that is, if it changes the outcome – the





(1 +  ). Formally:
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The proof follows from concavity and Jensen’s inequality; we provide details in
4.12.
Lemma 4.6.2 allows us to characterize the regulated monopolist’s optimal choice
of errors under this regulation:











 A +  B/(1 +  )q





= (1 +  )"R
A
.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6.2, "R
B
= (1 +  )"R
A
. Thus, the profit maximization problem
can be written solely as a function of "A:

















Then, the first order condition is
µA A + µB B(1 +  ) =










q ( A +  B/(1 +  )q)




Concavity guarantees that this is a global optimum.
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These together provide insight into to what the regulation is doing. The mo-





µA↵A + µB↵B   (µA A + µB B(1 +  ))"
  ( A +  B) 
1
"q
( A +  B/(1 +  )
q).
This is equivalent to facing a single population of with demand function µA↵A +
µB↵B   (µA A + µB B(1 +  ))", fixed cost  A +  B, and marginal cost ( A +
 B/(1 +  )q). We later use this interpretation to quickly calculate the constrained
monopolist’s profits.
One might worry that imposing fairness requires making both groups worse o↵
in an absolute sense. It turns out that this is not the case; if the regulation has
bite, then it necessarily increases the error of the majority group, and necessarily
decreases the error of the minority group. That is, equality comes at a price for the
majority group, but does not require a Pareto deterioration.












At this point, members of the majority group may be concerned because their
error rate increases. We refer to the gap between their error rates under the con-
strained and unconstrained monopolies as a price of fairness for this reason, even








Fortunately, we can show this price is relatively small:













Unsurprisingly, this bound is increasing in the ratio of minority cost to majority





and increasing the ratio  B
 A
all increase the price of fairness for
the majority.
If regulation changes the monopolist’s behavior, it must weakly decrease profits.
This loss is quantifiable as another price of fairness:
Definition 4.6.3 (Monopolist Price of Fairness, Relative Error). We define the
price of fairness as the ratio between the unconstrained monopoly profit and con-




























We can write down this price of fairness as a function of the parameters of the
model:
Theorem 4.6.2. The Monopolist’s price of fairness is given by
MonPoF1+  =












µA↵A + µB↵B  Q(µA A + µB B(1 +  ))
q











Proof. The optimal solution to the monopolist’s problem with parameters µg,↵g,  g,  g










(See Appendix 4.12.) Using this form and plugging in the market parameters, we
obtain the optimal profit of the unconstrained monopolist for the numerator. The
denominator is derived using the interpretation of the constrained monopolist’s
problem as optimizing its profits against a single market with parameters modified
by regulation, and plugging these parameters into the same form.
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Theorem 4.6.2 provides a quantitative price of fairness in terms of monopoly
profits. However, it is somewhat unwieldy; Proposition 13 provides some clarity on
the limiting behavior of this price of fairness as a function of the minority group’s
size in absolute terms.






















where Q is as above.
4.6.2 Absolute Error Equality
In this section, we suppose instead that the regulator imposes an absolute upper
bound on error rates for each group. We show that the monopolist responds by
purchasing just enough data to meet the constraint using the profits from the ma-
jority to subsidize the minority. In this case, minority error rates can be improved
without increasing error for the majority; the regulator can even improve error rates
for the majority as well, up to a point. We characterize the price of fairness for the
monopolist and the minimum error the regulator can guarantee. We formalize this
constraint as follows:
Definition 4.6.4 (Absolute error equality). For   < 1, the regulator forces the
firm to achieve error of:
"A    and "B   .
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We have another saturation lemma for this kind of constraint too: either the
unconstrained error was already less than  , or the profit maximizing error subject
to regulation is exactly  . Formally:







Lemma 4.6.5 lets us reason very simply about the behavior of the regulated
monopolist: for any group in which imposing regulation requires the firm to improve
error rates, the firm will use up the entirety of this ‘error budget.’ Profit will
decrease, of course, because imposing constraints can only decrease its objective.
In this scenario, if the firm enters the market at all, it must enter the market for
both groups so as to achieve the constrained error rates. A regulator then has to
choose   so as to still induce the firm to enter the market at all if they want to
ensure the constrained error rate for the minority group. Of course, a regulator may
also wish to choose the smallest such error rate, which we refer to as the minimum
achievable error. Lemma 4.6.5 let us characterize the minimum achievable error:




 K3 = 0, (4.6.1)
where K1 =  (µA A+µB B), K2 = µA↵A+µB↵B  A  B, and K3 =  A+ B.  0
exists and is the minimum achievable error, i.e. the minimum   2 [0, 1] for which
the monopolist still enters the market.
Equation 4.6.1 can be solved via the quadratic or cubic formulae in the realizable
and agnostic cases, respectively, and learning rates in between can be accommodated
numerically. This leads us to the monopoly’s optimal error rates as a function of  :
Theorem 4.6.3 (Absolute Outcomes). Outcomes fall into one of the following pos-
sibilities:





























4. If   <  0 then the firm exits the market.
Proof. Case 1 is trivial. Case 2 and 3 follow from Lemma 4.6.5. Case 4 follows by
the definition of  0.
Theorem 4.6.3 contrasts starkly with Theorem 4: as long as the constraint is not
so strict the monopolist exits the market, outcomes either improve for the minority
and remain just as good for the majority, or improve for both groups. In other
words, this style of regulation does not impose a price of fairness on the majority.
Note that unless "0 <   < "MA , the regulator is not guaranteeing relative equality.
Which type of equality is preferable will depend on the context. Of course, this
regulation does still impact profit:
Definition 4.6.6 (Monopolist Price of Fairness). We define the monopolist’s price




















max"A,"B :"A ,"B  ⇡("A, "B)
.
Notice that given the market parameters, Theorem 4.6.3 allows the regulator to
evaluate the monopolist’s price of fairness for each potential choice of error threshold
via straightforward calculation. Proposition 15 characterizes the limiting behavior
of the monopolist’s price of fairness as a function of absolute size of the minority
group under absolute error guarantees, and these are qualitatively similar to limiting
behavior under relative error guarantees.
Claim 15 (MonPoF Limit - Absolute Error Guarantees). For fixed  , and for





On the other hand, let  0 be the minimal achievable error when µB = 0 (i.e. when
the firm faces group A alone). Then if   >  0, then MonPoF  converges to a
parameter-specific constant as µB ! 0.
4.7 Discussion
In this work, we identify economic incentives leading to unfairness in data-driven
markets. At a high level, we show that monopolists are incentivized to invest less
in minority groups (as measured by market size, elasticity, and data costs) because
they are less profitable; that competition does not mitigate this incentive towards
inequality, under reasonable models; and that judicious regulation can improve
outcomes, potentially at a cost in terms of profits or, depending on the regulation,
error rates for the majority group.
We view this Chapter as highlighting an important and understudied point of
view, but certainly not as the last word. We made many choices that situate
our models in particular contexts; for example, the assumption that firms and users
benefit from improved accuracy does not capture many settings that currently are or
will soon be urgent domains of adjudicating fairness concerns - machine learning in
loans, insurance, and facial recognition systems are obvious cases, but the potential,
and consequent scope for unfairness, is vast. We hope that future work will further
clarify the possibility - and perhaps necessity- of leveraging policy tools in addition
to algorithmic solutions to combat unfairness in machine learning.
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4.8 Appendix
4.9 Piece-wise linear demand
In this section, we consider the possibility of a piece-wise linear demand function.
Such a demand has the same spirit of the linear demand function, in that market
share declines linearly with worst-case error rate, but allows for a more general
parameter range. In particular, a firm with piece-wise linear demand may capture
less than the full market (but, logically, not more) with perfect accuracy, and may
lose the entire market even at relatively high accuracy. Imposing a cap and floor
on a linear demand function whose parameters fall outside the restricted range
described in Section 4.4 allows us to accomplish this.





0 if "g   ↵g/ g
↵g    g"g if
↵g 1
 g
 "g  ↵g/ g








Finding the optimal choice of the monopolist under this demand requires slightly
more care than linear demand but is substantively similar. We provide an outline
below.



















A monopolist, under linear demand enters the market for group g if and only if
⇡g ("̃g) > 0,







Proof outline. Since the profit is additively separable over g, we consider each ⇡g




is increasing as "g increases, which can be seen by checking the derivative. Then if




 ↵g/ g. Thus either "⇤ is one of those end points,









Moreover, if the maximum profit is positive, it must be attained with "⇤
g
 ↵g/ g,
so it must be the case that the profit obtained at "̃g is positive, and vice versa.
4.10 Consumer Models
In this section, we show how natural models of consumer behavior give rise to the
demand functions we assumed for our analysis.
4.10.1 Linear Demand
First, consider the following interaction between one firm and a representative user:
The firm sets its error levels; the user uses the service if they will receive an accurate
answer with probability higher than some threshold corresponding to their outside
option (i.e. the payo↵ they would get if they decide not to use the service). While
the user knows her outside option, the firm does not; a standard approach is to
assume the firm makes decisions as if the user’s outside option were drawn from a
distribution. If this distribution is uniform over some interval, then there is a linear
relationship between choice of error and probability (from the firm’s perspective)
of the user choosing to use the service (and thus the firm’s expected revenue). If
the firm interacts with many users, and these threshold are uniform throughout the
population, then this representative interaction captures the aggregate interaction
the firm faces.
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We formalize the interaction as follows: A firm provides a service to a user
wishing to answer some query. If the response is accurate, the user receives a payo↵
of 1; otherwise, 0. The firm’s worst-case error rate " is known to the user, and the
user chooses whether or not to use the firm’s service based on their expected utility
under the worst-case error. The user has some parameter, ⌧ , describing their payo↵
from choosing not to use the service. This parameter is drawn from the uniform
distribution over [
¯
⌧, ⌧̄ ], that describes their outside option distribution.
To see the correspondence between this model and linear demand, we claim that
any linear demand function D(") := ↵   " can be mapped to the probability that
a user uses the service under some particular choice [
¯
⌧, ⌧̄ ]. Formally:
Claim 16. For any linear demand function D(") = ↵   ", there exists a uniform
outside option model with choice
¯
⌧ = 1  ↵
 
, ⌧̄ = 1 + 1 ↵
 
that justifies it.
Proof. To see this, first note that the user will use the service if and only if the
expected payo↵ is less than his outside option. Since the user receives a payo↵ of 1
if the service answers correctly and 0 if it answers incorrectly, the expected payo↵
is merely 1 ⇤ Pr[correct] + 0 ⇤ Pr[incorrect] = 1   ". Hence, the user will use the
service if and only if 1   "   ⌧ . Now, since the user’s outside option is, from the
Firm’s perspective, a uniform random variable, the probability that the user will
use the service, as a function of ", can be written as:
Pr[user uses](") = Pr⌧⇠U [↵, ][" < 1  ⌧ ]





























and solving for ⌧̄ and
¯
⌧ yields the claim.
Notice that the truth of the claim is a matter of algebra and holds even beyond
sensible choices for ↵ and  . That is, choosing ↵ > 1 would still map to a plausible
instance of linear demand, but ↵ > 1 would not be sensible as the intercept for
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a linear probability model. Finally, notice that the simple case of ↵ = 1,   = 1
corresponds to the uniform random variable over [0, 1].
4.10.2 Proportional Split
Consider the following Markov chain representing plausible user behavior in the
presence of competition: at any time t, a user who is currently using Firm i stays
with Firm i into time t + 1 if the firm does not make a mistake; otherwise, the
user switches to Firm j with probability ↵ and leaves the market with probability
1  ↵. A user outside the market re-enters it with probability  , and then chooses
uniformly from the firms.
The steady state distribution of this Markov chain solves the following equations:








µ3 = (1  ↵)"1µ1 + (1  ↵)"2µ2 + (1   )µ3.
Viewing the firm’s market share as the proportion of times the user chooses the
firm over a long enough horizon (or over many enough consumers) yields a corre-
spondence between the market share and the stationary distribution. The form of
this correspondence follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 4.10.1. Firm i’s market share under this Markov process is given by
µi =
"j
"i + "j + ⌧"i"j
.
where ⌧ = 21 ↵
 
.
























["1µ1 + "2µ2] .












µ1] =) "1µ1 = "2µ2.




















Now, we can reparameterize 21 ↵
 
as ⌧ , and apply the symmetric logic to the other
firm to obtain the general result:
µi =
"j
"i + "j + ⌧"i"j
.
Thus, viewing the market share of Firm i as its share of the stationary distribution
gives the result claimed.
Notice that the case of ↵ = 1 recovers the case in which firms split the complete
market, and we can again consider integral competition exponents as requiring ⇢
mistakes in a row before switching. In this Chapter, we only consider the case in
which ↵ = 1.
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4.10.3 Fully Rational Demand
The Bertrand model of competition considers firms competing on price with fully
rational consumers. These consumers will always pick the firm with (even infinites-
imally) lower price. It is known that a Nash equilibrium exists when firms have
identical constant marginal costs in quantity and can produce an unlimited quan-
tity. In that case, firms set equilibrium price equal to marginal cost (that is, the
lowest price that firms could charge without losing money). We modify the Bertrand
model to apply to our setting. Firms do not set prices in our model; instead, they
change error rates. This is not a perfect analogy – changing error rates is itself
costly – but captures the spirit of the Bertrand model. However, as we show in
this section, equilibrium need not exist in the fully rational model (just as a pure-
strategy equilibrium need not exist in canonical Bertrand competition when firms
face non-constant marginal costs).
Informally, we say that demand is fully rational, or Bertrand-like, if firms with
the minimum error capture the entire market (with ties broken by splitting the
market equally).
Definition 4.10.2 (Fully Rational Demand). In a multi-firm market, we say that




















A proposition we will show is that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies
when considering this fully-rational demand.
Claim 17. The game induced by fully rational demands as described in Definition
4.10.2 has no equilibrium in pure strategies whenever cgi <
µg
2 8i for some group g.
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) be the putative equilibrium error choices. Note that these correspond to




). We claim that a profitable deviation will
exist regardless of what these choices are. There are two cases: in the first, firms
have di↵erent errors, while in the second, firms have the same error. If firms have




. Then Firm i
receives µg    gi/"
q
gi
   gi, while Firm j attains zero revenue. But notice that Firm




) and capture the full market while paying
less, thus improving profits. Hence, we cannot have an equilibrium when firms are
choosing di↵erent error rates. On the other hand, suppose firms are choosing the





















In this case, each firm is earning µg2   cgM
⇤
gk
   gk. Consider Firm i buying an




+1.Then because worst-case error guarantees





, and thus the firm deviating to M 0
gi
would capture the whole market at a





















) cannot be an equilibrium.
A natural way to relax full rationality is to allow consumers to be rational up to
a point. That is, above some threshold ⇠, they can perfectly discriminate between
error rates, and always will choose the firm with (even infinitesimally) smaller error.
But below ⇠, increasing accuracy does not materially improve their utility of the
project, and rather than attempt to ferret out small di↵erences, they pick randomly
among firms with error below ⇠. This leads to our ⇠-tolerant rational demand as
discussed in Section 4.5.3.
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4.11 Omitted Proofs from Section 5
Remainder of Proof of Lemma 4.5.5. The profit of playing "⇤
gi




















 gi + ( gi +  gj)2
   gi.














 gi + ( gj +  gi)2
#
.
Thus, a su cient condition that ⇡gi("⇤gi, "
⇤
gj
)   ⇡gi(1, "⇤gj) is:
( gi +  gj)2















On the other hand, to ensure that "⇤
gj
is a best-response to "⇤
gi
, we carry out the




[ gj + ( gi +  gj)
2]. (4.11.2)
Both inequalities must be satisfied if our purported equilibrium is to be truly an
equilibrium. Characterizing possible simultaneous solutions to Inequalities 4.11.1
and 4.11.2 is tedious, so instead we note that it su ces to ensure mink  gk  
12(maxk  gk)2; to avoid encumbering the current argument, we defer the proof of
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this fact to Appendix 4.11. These are not the only solutions conditions that satisfy
Inequality 4.11.1, but they are su cient conditions convenient to write down.
Finally, note that equilibrium profits are positive if ⇡gi("⇤gi, "
⇤
gj










) satisfy these three conditions- Inequality, 4.11.1, Inequality 4.11.2,
and Inequality 4.11.3 - and "⇤
gi




) is truly an interior equilibrium.
Technical Lemma for Simple Tullock Case
We now supply the missing algebra from Lemma 4.11.1:













 gj + ( gi +  gj)
2
⇤
(inequalities 4.11.1 and 4.11.2) will be satisfied if mink  gk   12(maxk  gk)2. In
the symmetric case, then  g 
1
12 .
Proof. The set we are interested in is the intersection of two solution sets to polyno-
mial equations, and is hard to characterize precisely; however, we can give su cient
conditions on  gi,  gj so that both inequalities are simultaneously satisfied.
We begin with the symmetric case, where  gi =  gj =  , as it is easy to see: this
is asking that




If, instead,  gi 6=  gj, then we need to examine the algebra more carefully. We










To see this, note that Inequality 4.11.1 expanded out is:
0 <  2
gj
( gi + ( gj +  gi)




































































Now, notice that by replacing whichever of  gi or  gj with the larger of the two,
we make the negative terms larger. So a su cient (though again, not necessary)



























depending on whether  gj >  gj or vice versa. Since we can repeat the logic from
equilibrium from Firm j’s perspective, we will actually need both these conditions








which is simply asking that the firms are not too far apart in their marginal costs.
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Proof of General Tullock case
Our goal is to show the following:
Lemma 4.11.2. Suppose two firms compete for proportional demand with param-
eters q and ⇢. Suppose further that "⇤
gi
< 1 for all g and i. If the nondeviation










































If, furthermore, the investment condition (as defined below) holds, then this equi-
librium is unique.
Proof. Under the proportional split model of demand, each firm’s profit depends
not only on its own action, but also that of the other firm. Again, this calls for a
game theoretic notion of solution. We look for a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Recall that in an equilibrium, both firms must be best-responding and have no
incentive to deviate.
To find an equilibrium, we first find the best-response of Firm i, given the choices





































































Applying symmetric logic to Firm j and using the fact that the first order




























































































































































































































































































































































































for all other choices "0. Note that ⇡gi,"⇤
gj
(") is continuous away from 0. Moreover,
for small enough ", ⇡gi,"⇤
gj
(") < 0, since the market size is bounded by costs can be
come arbitrarily negative. Hence, we can consider maximizing this function on the
compact set ["0, 1], where "0 is the point at which profit becomes negative. Since
⇡gi,"⇤
gj
(") is continuous on this set, and "⇤
gi
satisfies the first-order condition, the only
possible maxima of this function are "0 or 1. At "0, the firm is making zero profits,
so any choice with positive profits eliminates it. At " = 1, the firm can also choose
to not invest anything in data (and receive the same revenue but no data costs), so






(1) will be su cient to make this an
equilibrium.
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◆2   ⇡gi(1, "gj⇤). (4.11.6)
























































































































) is a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies under proportionally
split demand with competition exponent ⇢g in each group and learning rate q. If
a further condition holds, namely that there exists a preferred strategy to non-
investment if the opponent invests, then the equilibrium is unique.









() "q    gi("
⇢g + 1)  
µg (("⇢g + 1)"q)
2
. (4.11.7)
Equivalently, we need to ensure that there is an " 2 (0, 1) such that:
() "q    gi("
⇢g + 1) 




has a solution in (0, 1). This will not always be the case, of course; when it is not,
then there is an equilibrium in which both firms prefer not to invest in collecting
data from one group at all, which certainly exacerbates inequality.
4.12 Omitted Proofs from Section 4.6.1
Omitted Algebra for Optimal Profit. Recall that we would like to show that the
optimal profit achievable by the monopolist facing parameters µg,↵g,  g,  g for g in










For clarity, write ⌘g for µg g. Then we can write the optimal profit for a group































































, substituting back µg g for ⌘g, and summing over
groups yields the claim.
Proof of Lemma 4.6.2. Fix a solution ("A, "B) to the constrained profit optimization
problem. We will show that unless "B = (1 +  )"A, ("A, "B) is not a constrained
profit maximizer.




(1+ ) but "A/(1+ )  "B  (1+ )"A, we can’t
have both "M
B





There are three cases. In the first case, "M
B
> (1 +  )"A. We can increase the
profit achieved by ("A, "B) by increasing "B, as in this case, "B < "MB . To see this,
let "↵ =
 
"A,↵"MB + (1  ↵)"B
 
for ↵ 2 [0, 1]. By Jensen’s inequality, there is an ↵
such that







The first inequality holds for any ↵ 2 [0, 1], so we set ↵ so that "↵ = ("A, (1+ )"A),
in which case this is still a feasible solution, and by the separability of the profit
function, the second inequality holds.
In the second case, "M
B
< "A/(1 +  ). Then by the same logic using Jensen’s in-
equality, we can increase the profit by decreasing "B to "A/(1+ ), i.e. ⇡(("A, "B)) <





/(1 +  ) < "A/(1 +  )2, so now we can decrease "A to see that profit is
maximized at ("A/(1 +  )2, "A/(1 +  )).
Otherwise, "A/(1 +  )  "MB  (1 +  )"A. This is very similar to the previous
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 A
=
µA A A + µA A B/(1 +  )q
















Now using the elementary fact that for positive x, y, z, (x + y)/(x + z)   1 ()
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q+1 , we can












which is exactly Assumption 1.
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So again using the elementary fact that y+x
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 A +  B/(1 +  )q
 A

 A +  B/(1 +  )q
 A
.
Taking the (q + 1)th-root yields the claim.
Proposition 13. We can write
MonPoF1+  =
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! 0 as µA !1 and its multipliers are constants.





















































4.13 Omitted Proofs from Section 4.6.2
Proof of Lemma 4.6.5. First, note that the absolute error constraints are separable,
so that the firm’s profit maximization problem is simply max"g ⇡g("g) subject to






>  , as otherwise the constraint would have already been met by "M
g
.
Now we show that for any feasible error rate "g   , ⇡g("g)  ⇡g( ) with equality
holding only at "g =  . So suppose that "g <  .




















choosing ↵ =   "g
"Mg  "g
su ces as then "g,↵ =  . (Notice that
  "g
"Mg  "g
2 (0, 1] since
"M
g
>   and   > "g.)
Proof of Proposition 14. First, by Lemma 4.6.5, when   < "M
A
, then the optimal




) = ( , ). In this case, the profit is











), and as the error rate goes
to zero, profit goes to negative infinity, there must be a minimum error rate  0 > 0
where the profit is zero. Since this error rate must be smaller than "M
A
, the above
formula for profit holds and this error rate is the solution to







Multiplying by  q and re-arranging gives the claim.
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 0 <   < "MA






! 0 as µB, µA !1, as the population grows, eventually "MB and "
M
A








. Thus limµB!1 MonPoF  = 1.
For µB ! 0, given our assumption on  , we will be be in either Case 1, Case 2,
or Case 3. Note that as µB ! 0, "MB will eventually be larger than  , so the limit
will be obtained at either Case 2 or Case 3. In Case 2, we can substitute in 0 for
µB; combining this with the fact that for small enough µB, the optimal choice for
the unconstrained monopolist eventually becomes to set "M
B
= 1, we can write the
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since    1 =)  B/ q    B.
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In the final chapter of this thesis, we apply notions of fairness from the Fair Ma-
chine Learning (Fair ML) literature to one of the most consequential markets for
individuals: the mortgage market of the United States. Our broad motivation can
be easily seen in a picture: Figure 5.1 displays the denial rates and ultimate default
rates of first lien mortgages for purchase of single family homes broken down by
racial group over time. It is clear that, despite clear macroeconomic influences and
fluctuations over time, there is a persistent gap in denial rates between majorities
and minorities, and this is particularly pronounced for Black Americans. Against
a backdrop of historical and present racial inequality, these figures on mortgages
– a channel that often provides for intergenerational wealth transition and wealth
1This Chapter is based on work conducted while the author was a part-time employee of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia with Simon Freyaldenhoven and Minchul Shin. The views
expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not represent those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. All models are strictly academic
and not for commercial use.
174
creation – represent a stark picture of a progress yet to be made.
Our goal in this work is twofold. First: this market historically harbored a
great deal of discrimination that resulted in significant inequity; as such, it has
been the subject of both activist movements and legislative intervention, and an
understanding of to what extent problems are continuing to be perpetuated (as
opposed to inherited) is an important input to policy. Thus, as a policy matter,
we would like to provide some measure of just how fair this market is as a way of
measuring the progress made. Furthermore, we would like to identify and quantify
various counterfactual policy choices and what their implications would be on the
fairness measures we evaluate; in doing so, we elucidate the policy trade-o↵s involved
in choosing a policy regime.
Second, we view this market as a particularly appealing laboratory in which to
apply these fairness measures in a new and much more complicated setting. Most
of Fair ML has developed in the setting of a single learner’s attempt to be fair
while training a model on their own data. We ask whether this literature can be
adapted for a broader perspective. This is, of course, a reductive portrayal, and the
field has certainly been expanding into new settings, notions, and directions; how-
ever, the complexity of the mortgage market, and the range of technical challenges
in analyzing this market in practice, appear to be unique to date in the fairness
literature.
Our goal is thus to empirically measure fairness in this market using quantitative
fairness notions. The mortgage market, like the abstract data-driven market we
studied in Chapter 4, is a market that depends on predictions gleaned from data, but
it is of course much more complicated: even the definition, let alone measurement,
of fairness in this setting is unclear, and can be fraught with pitfalls. In this chapter,
we present our approach and initial results to address this question using a unique,
large dataset of mortgage outcomes and applications.
We follow and expand on the content of ongoing work presented at [INFORMS
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(a) Denial rates by application year
and race.
(b) Defaults by origination year and
race.
Figure 5.1: Aggregates by Race. Source: HMDA.
presentation]. Our organization is as follows. The rest of this section provides some
background on mortgages and overviews related work with a focus on the economics
literature, while we overview fairness more broadly in Section 5.2. Section 5.3
describes our approach, including our modeling of fairness regime and predictions
and justification for our focus on marginal applicants. We give our results in Section
5.4.
5.1.1 Mortgages
A mortgage is commonly defined as a debt instrument secured by real estate, most
often used to purchase property with the collateral being the property itself. Today,
the thirty-year fixed loan is perhaps the most commonly used [92], though pre-great
depression, the most common structure was interest-only payments for five years
that ”ballooned” into the full balance of the loan at the end. The mortgage market
is consequential for several reasons, the most salient of which is that debt-financed
real estate investment has been an important channel for asset accumulation and
intergenerational wealth transfer among the middle and upper classes. It has thus
been seen as vehicle for social mobility and thus encouraged by government pol-
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icy. And symbolically, owning one’s home has been seen as the American dream.
Historically, the mortgage market has su↵ered from significant discrimination. Re-
strictive covenants, eventually declared legally unenforceable, restricted the sale of
some homes to minorities. Redlining, the practice of using geographic character-
istics to deny loans in largely minority areas, ostensibly to avoid property value
risk, greatly limited minority home ownership. Other practices, including exclu-
sionary zoning, promoted racial segregation. See [110] for a fuller accounting. As
a consequence, fair housing was a significant component of activist demands in
the Civil Rights movement, culminating in the Fair Housing Act (as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968) and later legislative actions which similarly intended to
mitigate housing discrimination (including the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and
Equal Opportunity Credit Act).
Since the great depression, the government has taken an active role in the
mortgage market, including via insuring mortgages or guaranteeing mortgages via
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (FNMA or Fannie Mae) [cite]. The purposes of these interventions and the
relationship to racial equality has depended on the historical period; [110] argues
that federal loan insurance in the first half of the 20th century had discriminatory
intent built-in by design via redlining2, and [118] argues that even after discrimi-
nation in the housing market was formally ended various government-encouraged
practices continued to promote discrimination; more recently, on the other hand,
the federal government has applied policies designed to promote home ownership
among minorities, including pressure on GSEs to relax credit and down-payment
standards; [3] argues that this may be one of the factors3 that ultimately led to the
financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008.
2Others have argued that redlining reflected existing discrimination rather than intentionally
promoting it [57]; regardless, the e↵ect seems to have been to exacerbate segregation.
3This argument is controversial, however. [5] argues that the Community Reinvestment Act,
one particular policy, led to riskier lending, while [18] rebuts this claim.
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There are many types of mortgages with various details, but an important high-
level division is between conventional and unconventional mortgages. Conventional
loans are loans that are not directly guaranteed by government agencies, as opposed
to unconventional loans which are. The di↵erence may be less clear in practice,
as the majority of conventional loans are conforming loans (that is, conform to
GSEs’ requirements for sale eligibility) and subsequently sold o↵ to GSEs. However,
between non-conforming loans which cannot be sold o↵, and the risk of put-backs4
ensure that the conventional loans tend to have more stringent requirements.
A crucial outcome that we will look at is default. Mortgages have specified
payment schedules with interest rates that may be fixed or vary with marketwide
interest rates; if a payment is not made by the specified time or amount that it
is due, a loan becomes delinquent. Technically, the loan is in default, but because
recovering the full value from a loan in default is di cult, banks often would prefer
a delinquent loan to return to current status rather than engage in foreclosure and
recovery proceedings. Thus practically speaking, default is better defined as being
in delinquency for a period of time long enough that banks tend to begin recovery
proceedings; often, in the literature, this is taken to be 90 days, and that is the
standard we will use.
5.1.2 Related Work
In this subsection we briefly discuss empirical and theoretical work in social science
that addresses discrimination and the mortgage market; we explore work relating
to fairness more broadly in Section 5.2.
In economics, perhaps the first and certainly the most famous formal treatment
of discrimination was given by Becker in [13], grounded in the labor market, which
4Put-backs are when the the GSE discovers that the loan in question does not, in fact, conform,
due to an error or oversight; the GSE is then able to ”put back” the loan and the risk remains on
the originator’s books.
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modeled discrimination as an ”animus” on the part of some employers. In this
setting, employers or their employees su↵er a disutility from employing or working
with minorities, and so will only hire them at an e↵ectively lower wage given their
productivity. This form of animus would, in theory, be competed away in a compet-
itive enough market. An alternative notion, often taken as a starting point by much
of the discrimination research (in Economics), is called statistical discrimination,
pioneered by Arrow [7] and Phelps [104]. In statistical discrimination, decision-
makers are not motivated by any animus, but use group membership as a signal in
the face of incomplete information to maximize profits. This notion of discrimina-
tion, while perhaps less morally odious than animus-based discrimination, is little
fairer to those discriminated (and in general, equally illegal).
There are several recent works that are also interested in specifically the question
of discrimination in mortgages.[12], for instance, evaluates discrimination through
the channel of pricing (here, interest rates) by focusing on mortgages with no credit
risk (since they are immediately sold o↵ to GSEs) and examining pricing di↵erential
by race and ethnicity. They find that Latino and Black borrowers pay in aggregate
an extra $765MM in interest per year relative to Whites, but that discrimination is
40% lower in FinTech lenders (which rely heavily on algorithms). Another related
paper is [60], which focuses on how improved predictive technology will impact the
distribution of errors, and how they may disproportionately a↵ect minority groups.
The authors build an equilibrium model and then test the prediction in practice
on mortgage data, and find that machine learning improvements seem to increase
disparities across groups. Both [12] and [60] take a similar system-wide perspective
as we do in the chapter, and rely on similar datasets. On the other hand, [41] is
perhaps more similar to our work in the spirit of detecting discrimination in loan
decision-making; they apply what amounts to the outcome test (described in [13]
and relative to predictive parity in Section 5.2.1 to administrative data from a single
high-cost lender, and exploit quasi experimental variation in loan o cer assignment
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to find bias in lending to immigrants and older applicants.
5.2 Measuring Fairness: Definitions and Impos-
sibilities
The immediate question that occurs is: what does it mean to be fair? This is, of
course, a philosophical question, not a mathematical one, and indeed, a question
that dates back to the very beginnings of philosophy. In this work, we will ultimately
not take a position on what the “true” meaning of fairness is (and certainly not
hope to provide a complete survey on the various ideas that have been adopted)
but we must at least establish a framework for what we are to measure.
There have been many fairness settings studied – far too many to list here5 –
and notions of fairness explored, and algorithms created; at this point, the litera-
ture is quite rich and relatively mature. The study of fairness in machine learning
has been spurred by the empirical discovery of apparently unfair results in state of
the art systems of various levels of stakes (e.g., [126], [25], [21]), and has produced
new methods in a variety of settings including supervised learning [4], online and
reinforcement learning [76],[75], [51], and representation learning [127]. One im-
portant set of fairness notions that are widely used is the family of group fairness
definitions like statistical parity [44], equality of opportunity [67], equalized odds
[67], calibration [105], and so on.
As pointed out by [71], many of these definitions can be interpreted from a
perspective of (various notions of) equality of opportunity. In particular, many of
the common fairness notions can be viewed as an instantiation of the Rawlsian
“veil of ignorance” perspective: we view the model as apportioning a good or bad,
which may be the label itself (e.g the loan) or the quality of the label (e.g falsely
denying a loan), and so on; fundamentally, these should not depend on irrelevant
5See [10] for a comprehensive introduction to many aspects of fairness in machine learning.
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characteristics to the task at hand, like race or gender. Then, we ask how we
would like the model to act if we were behind a veil of ignorance – that is, without
knowing what member of society we will be or what group we will belong to. Behind
a veil of ignorance, models that are equally likely to bestow the good regardless of
group status seem preferable to those that do not. Possibly the most influential
philosopher in very recent times [22], Rawls’ version of ”justice as fairness” [106],
and his thoughts on justice and fairness have been very influential on the legal
system, which is where most fairness concerns will ultimately be decided.
Much of the legal foundations of anti-discrimination come from statutory law
like the Fair Housing Act, the American Disabilities Act, or other titles of the Civil
Rights Act; the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution is, of course, also foun-
dational. The two common legal theories used in anti-discrimination jurisprudence
are disparate treatment and disparate impact. Broadly, disparate treatment can be
thought of as the intent to discriminate, including explicitly using protected at-
tributes in decision-making; disparate impact occurs when decision-makers do not
explicitly use protected attributes, or intend to discriminate, but nonetheless their
decision-making causes outcomes that di↵er greatly by protected attribute.
The following from [11] describes clearly these two theories of discrimination:
Disparate treatment comprises two di↵erent strains of discrimination:
(1) formal disparate treatment of similarly situated people and (2) intent
to discriminate. Disparate impact refers to policies or practices that
are facially neutral but have a disproportionately adverse impact on
protected classes. [emphasis added]
Note that taking into account protected attributes is not always illegal, nor are
processes that result in di↵erential hiring rates. For example, taking into account
protected attributes in order to rectify historical inequities is permissible; indeed,
this is legally-recognized a rmative action. Some processes that result in adverse
impact can be justified by business necessity. The actual determination of the
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illegality of an action is governed in some cases by explicit statutory law, but often
requires litigation and interpretation of particular circumstances by courts.
In Section 5.3, we will conceptualize stylized policy regimes of No Disparate
Treatment and No Disparate Impact as constraints on the action space of a bank
that wishes to maximize its profits. For No Disparate treatment, we imagine that
banks must choose thresholds that are blind to race; for No Disparate Impact, we
imagine that banks must lend out at equal rates to di↵erent groups (and so, max-
imizing profit, will prefer to lend to the top part of the distribution). The models
we use are very simple, and of course these regimes are much more complicated in
real life. Still, we will see that the models do seem to serve as a useful conceptual
device, and make testable predictions about the various fairness quantities defined
in Section 5.2.1. Hence, these regimes and models will guide our analysis.
5.2.1 Specific Definitions
In discussing these definitions, we will ground them in our particular context - loans
and racial discrimination - and so use the following notation. The learner’s goal is to
predict whether an applicant will profitably repay a loan (y) using some features X.
We will assume the decision maker also has access to a protected class membership,
g, which they can use to evaluate their model for fairness purposes and which they
may or may not be able to use in making decisions (though often, in practice, this
would be illegal). Many treatments write ŷ for our prediction of y, but we will write
` to emphasize the fact that a loan is being allocated to those whom we predict
positively. We will write d for the complement of y - that is, d = 1 if the borrower
defaults and 0 otherwise. For each definition, we will treat all outcomes as binary.
The first definition is possibly the most natural:
Definition 5.2.1 (Demographic Parity). A binary classifier satisfies demographic
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parity (DP) if, for any G,G0:
Pr[` = 1|g = G] = Pr[` = 1|g = G0]
Note that we can also write DP in terms of expectations of `: E[`|g = G] =
E[`|g = G0]. Notice that if underlying base rates are not equal, a perfectly accurate
classifier would not satisfy demographic parity, and so satisfying DP even with
perfect information would require making mistakes in terms of prediction. In our
context, that would require the bank to make some loans it knows to be a loss.
A more satisfying definition (and arguably more in line with Rawlsian ideas) is
the following:
Definition 5.2.2 (Equality of Opportunity). A binary classifier satisfies equality
of opportunity (EO) if, for any G,G0:
Pr[` = 1|d = 0, g = G] = Pr[` = 1|d = 0, g = G0]
Unfortunately, EO cannot be easily measured in a setting such as ours because
of the selective labels problem. That is, whether an applicant was wrongly denied
a loan cannot be directly identified6 because there was no loan made on which to
default. To avoid this issue, measuring EO for a given decision policy requires a
period of making loans to all applicants (against the policy’s prescription) in order
to evaluate what the results of the policy would have been had it been followed. Of
course, one may approximate this by experiment, e.g. following the policy for the
most part but randomizing making a loan when denial is recommended.
An alternative is Conditional Demographic Parity (CDP):
Definition 5.2.3 (Conditional Demographic Parity).
CDP e↵ectively measures demographic parity given feature attributes. Why
should we consider it a conciliatory replacement for EO? An argument that can
6Unless they make multiple applications to di↵erent banks; we explore this in future work.
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be made formal is the following: suppose that risk is truly a function of some set
of features of the applicants. Then if one had that function and those features,
one could directly compute default probability, and then recover a measurement of
EO by evaluating decisions against calculated risk level. Of course, one does not
have that underlying function. But with a complicated enough model class and
enough data, then as more features7 are added into a learning process, the limit
will approximate the true risk model. In this work, however, we will not consider
EO or CDP in detail.
A third commonly used fairness notion is positive predictive value (PPV):
Definition 5.2.4 (Equal PPV). We say that a binary classifier satisfies equalized
positive predictive value if for any G,G0:
Pr[d = 1|` = 1, g = G] = Pr[d = 1|` = 1, g = G0]
Requiring a decision rule to satisfy equal PPV is tantamount to the outcome
test proposed in the statistical discrimination literature. The reasoning behind the
outcome test is as follows: suppose that some group is defaulting at a much lower
rate than others. Then it would appear that this group must be more creditworthy
to be approved, suggesting that the decision-maker is holding them to a higher
standard. There are problems with this as a be-all, end-all test: for instance,
the problem of inframarginality [115] can result in PPV appearing unequal in the
absence of discrimination if risk distributions are di↵erent above the threshold. (We
can, and do, mitigate this issue somewhat by focusing on candidates around the
margin, but this is not the only issue with PPV.)
These fairness measures, among others, have clear interpretations in terms of
the quantities they represent, and adopting any of them as an exclusive fairness
7Here, we again are subject to the specter of omitted variable bias. But importantly, one could
learn this model with a set of experiments or loans to all applicants and thus be able to get at EO
rather than not being able to measure EO at all.
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measure emphasizes some quantities over others. These also implicitly emphasize
di↵erent sorts of harms, goods, and actors, and choosing between them amounts
to making moral or philosophical choices. Unfortunately, any decision rule, except
in very special cases, cannot simultaneously satisfy all non-discrimination criteria,
as researchers discovered [34], [86] in responding to a significant and illustrative
controversy about algorithmic decision tools8. Hence, there should not be a hope
that we, as society, can avoid taking a stand on the these moral questions. Yet
to do so well, we should understand the trade-o↵s we face; that is what this work
hopes to elucidate.
5.3 Framework
5.3.1 Profit and policy
We consider three potential policy regimes. The first is an unconstrained regime
in which banks may do whatever they like, including discriminating based on race,
in an attempt to maximize profit (without any inherent racial animus). This is,
of course, against anti-discrimination law, but serves as a useful benchmark. The
other regimes are given by two extremes based on disparate treatment and disparate
impact law, interpreted literally. That is, in the second regime (No Disparate Treat-
ment), we suppose that banks are not allowed to treat applicants di↵erently based
on race - given whatever features they use, they must make the same decision re-
gardless of the race of the applicant. In the third regime (No Disparate Impact)
banks must make loans at equal rates to each group, which implicitly requires in-
corporating race into their decision-making except for special cases.9
8That is, the COMPAS Northpointe controversy. See [1] and [58] for the initial arguments;
[34] and [86] also provide summaries.
9For instance, if groups have identical feature distributions, then banks can lend at equal rates
without imposing disparate treatment. But important features, like credit score, do vary by group;
see, e.g., [107].
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Since the principles behind both No Disparate Treatment and No Disparate Im-
pact are desirable, law and policy tends to encourage both in various circumstances;
hence it may well be that the real world exhibits neither Regime 2 nor Regime 3
but rather some combination of the two. These regimes are framed in absolutes (we
have disparate treatment or not, we have disparate impact or not), but by viewing
the implications of these regimes for various fairness definitions, which can be mea-
sured as continuous quantities, we can begin to think about these regimes as not
all-or-nothing, but measurable shades of grey.
5.3.2 Theoretical Model
There is a representative bank. The bank will make a loan to a loan applicant
with a single feature which we imagine to incorporate all information the bank has
about an applicant’s risk; we will call this feature X. Most naturally, we can think
of X as a credit score10, so we will refer to X as such. Applicants have a group
membership G 2 G; for each group, the distribution of X is given by DG. We use d
to denote whether the applicant defaults; in our context, we will assume that d is
not deterministic in general, but rather a random variable, and that there is some
function of X and G that maps the feature to the probability of default ⌘. We will
write the probability that d = 1|X, g as ⌘(X,G), and we will write ⌘G(X) for short.
For every loan, if the loan is paid back, the bank earns return r, and if not, it loses
cost c. That is, we make the simplifying assumption for this work that returns and
costs do not depend on X or G. A policy, `, is a map from applicant information
(e.g. X,G) to a decision of approving or denying a loan, which we denote by 1 or
0 respectively. We will sometimes abuse notation to also write ` for the decision
variable.
10Banks of course do have and will use more information than a single credit score, but the
intent behind FICO and other credit scores is to serve as a summary measure capturing as many
relevant factors for risk determination as possible.
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Thus, for a given policy ` and realization d, the profit ⇡ of the bank is:




0 `(X,G) = 0
r `(X,G) = 1 and d = 0
 c `(X,G) = 1 and d = 1
We assume that the bank is an expected profit maximizer, so its general problem







Pr[g = G] · E[⇡(`, X, g)|g = G] (5.3.1)
We will make the following assumption to simplify our thinking (though relaxing
does not greatly a↵ect what results are achievable):
Assumption 2. ⌘g(X) is monotonically decreasing in X.
We restrict our attention to the class of threshold policies. In our setting, a
threshold policy is a policy that tracks some feature or function of features (e.g.
X or ⌘G(X)) and jumps from ` = 0 to ` = 1 at some point ⌧ . Why should we
limit ourselves to such policies? It is easy to see that among any deterministic11
policy (i.e. any policy where our only choices are to make or not make a loan), any
non-threshold policy cannot be optimal.
Regime 1: Unconstrained Profit Maximization Suppose that the bank has
no constraints on what it may do. Then it is free to optimize its decision for each











E[⇡(1, X, g)] · 1[`(X, g) = 1] · Pr[x|g = G]
11There is argument over whether randomized policies can be fair (see, e.g. [97]), and certainly
they are not currently employed in high-stakes settings in practice.
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And so we can simply consider the expected profit of making a loan conditional
on (X,G), which is given by:
E[⇡|` = 1, X, g)] = (1  ⌘g(X)) r   ⌘g(X)c
and the expected profit of not making a loan is, of course, 0. Thus, the profit-
maximizing policy will satisfy:
`(X, g) = 1 () (1  ⌘g(X)) r   ⌘g(X)c   0
Rearranging gives the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The optimal unconstrained policy for the bank is:
`(X, g) = 1 ()
1  ⌘g(X)
⌘g(X)
  0 () ⌘g(X) 
r
r + c
In other words, the bank sets a single threshold on default probability – that is,
two thresholds on credit score – that depends on the ratio of returns and costs and
accepts an applicant if and only if their default probability below that threshold. If
we define x⇤
g
as the minimum credit score for each group such that ⌘g(x)  ⌧ , then
we see that the bank’s policy will be to accept an applicant of group G if X > x⇤
g
.
Since groups have di↵erent functions ⌘g(X), this will result in a di↵erent threshold
on X for each group.
Corollary 6. Unconstrained, we have the following fairness properties in general:
1. Pr[` = 1|G] 6= Pr[` = 1|G0] (No Demographic Parity)
2. Pr[` = 1|X,G] 6= Pr[` = 1|X,G0] (No Conditional DP12 )
12One may also argue the equation given here is asking for No Disparate Treatment. We do
not present it that way for two reasons. First, Disparate Treatment is conceptually about how
decisions are made, i.e. starting at the beginning of the data generating process looking forward,
while Conditional Demographic Parity is measured beginning with some dataset which is the result
of a data generating process and attempting to infer whether that process was fair, and thus in a
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3. Pr[d = 1|X,G] 6= Pr[d = 1|X,G0] (No Predictive Parity on Average)
4. Pr[d = 1|X = x⇤
G
, G] = Pr[d = 1|X = x⇤
G0 , G
0] (Predictive Parity at the
Margin)
Regime 2: No Disparate Treatment In the No Disparate Treatment regime,
we assume that the bank is prohibited from treating individuals systematically dif-
ferently based on their group membership; in this simple setting, we operationalize
that constraint as requiring the bank to set a single threshold on X which it must
apply to all groups. As the bank still wishes to maximize its profit, its problem will
be to find the optimal single threshold on credit score which maximizes its profits.








Pr[g = G] E[⇡(` = 1, X, g)|X > x⇤, g = G]
where we have simply replaced the full policy space with the set of credit score
thresholds. Notice that the objective function must now incorporate not only each
default map ⌘g, but also the underlying population share of each group. Conse-
quently, the optimization problem is entangled in the sense that if we take the
first order condition, the function for which we would search for the optimum is a
weighted combination of the derivatives of each group, and so the optimal threshold
will depend on the the population shares as well as the default functions.
It is not necessary to solve for the optimal threshold, however, to make the
following pronouncement, which follows directly from the assumption that there is
sense looking backward. The latter better matches the situation of an outside observer analyzing
data. The second is that the apparent mathematical equivalence of these two concepts requires
that X be the full set of features under both conceptualizations. For instance, if a bank applies
No Disparate Treatment to a set of features X 0, and we observe only a subset of features X, then
we may observe a disparity in loan probability conditional on X that would disappear if we had
the full feature set X 0.
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a single fixed x⇤ for all groups and that feature and default distributions may di↵er:
Corollary 7. Under No Disparate Treatment, we have the following fairness prop-
erties in general:
1. Pr[` = 1|G] 6= Pr[` = 1|G0] (No Demographic Parity)
2. Pr[` = 1|X,G] = Pr[` = 1|X,G0] (Conditional Demographic Parity)
3. Pr[d = 1|X,G] 6= Pr[d = 1|X,G0] (No Predictive Parity on Average)
4. Pr[d = 1|X = x⇤
G
, G] 6= Pr[d = 1|X⇤
G0 , G
0] (No Predictive Parity at the Mar-
gin)
Regime 3: No Disparate Impact In the final regime, the bank must loan to
both groups at equal rates. To do this, it will (except in very special cases) neces-
sarily have to use di↵erent thresholds on credit scores. (As discussed above, it still
makes sense to use thresholds - there is no reason to accept worse applicants in lieu
of better ones - but now these credit thresholds will di↵er by group.) Equivalently,
the bank is picking the same top quantile of each group, whatever that quantile







Pr[g = G] E[⇡(` = 1, X, g)|Pr[X > x⇤] = r, g = G]
Corollary 8. Under No Disparate Impact, we have the following fairness properties
in general:
1. Pr[` = 1|G] = Pr[` = 1|G0] (Demographic Parity)
2. Pr[` = 1|X,G] 6= Pr[` = 1|X,G0] (No Conditional Demographic Parity)
13Arguably, one could view this as a form of equal treatment, conditioned on race. But this is
probably not in the spirit of the law, and has been made illegal in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
[64].
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Unconstrained No Disparate Treatment No Disparate Impact
Equality of:
Thresholds 7 3 7
Risk Thresholds 3 7 7
Approval Rates 7 7 3
Table 5.1: Theoretical predictions of fairness metrics
3. Pr[d = 1|X,G] 6= Pr[d = 1|X,G0] (No Predictive Parity on Average)
4. Pr[d = 1|X = x⇤
G
, G] 6= Pr[d = 1|X = x⇤
G0 , G
0] (No Predictive Parity at the
Margin)
5.3.3 Identification and Marginal applicants
Our models may seem overly reductive, as banks certainly use more than a single
feature.14 However, credit score is certainly a dominant feature [23], so this reductive
model likely captures an important facet of reality. But this simplification may be
an issue if, for instance, decision-makers have access to some set of features X̃ not
observed in our data that are predictive of default and correlated with race. A
decision-maker that was implementing No Disparate Treatment on the augmented
feature set (X, X̃) would appear to be discriminating with respect to even CDP, let
alone DP and PPV.
Without experimental variation, the main solution to this problem is attempting
to compare candidates that are all on the margin – that is, candidates essentially
as likely to be denied as accepted. By definition, these candidates are all similar in
14One could imagine, of course, turning all information into a single perfectly predictive score
(the default probability itself would su ce for instance, if it could be known). But such a measure
certainly does not exist in practice, even if it is what FICO scores and related scores aim to be.
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terms of creditworthiness, so we may reasonably take variation in a given fairness
measure as evidence of discrimination. The question, though, is how to identify
“marginal” candidates. In this work,15 we will treat marginal applicants as those
in a particular credit range – 620-660 – based on documented evidence that this
range is explicitly flagged being worthy of special attention, and above and below
are sure bets [23], which we explain further in Section 5.4.1.
5.4 Results
In this section, we focus on our empirical results. Table 5.3 summarizes the results
in a simple table.
5.4.1 Data
We draw data from two sources:
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) HMDA is a dataset of loan ap-
plications, which is collected by law and made available in anonymized form to
the public. Almost all loan applications aside from very rural areas are subject to
HMDA and so included in this dataset. HMDA data, until recently, contains few
and relatively general features, including the outcome of the loan (approved, denied,
and so on), lien status, loan amount, applicant income, property type, geographic
features like zip code, and so on. Crucially for fairness purposes, however, it con-
tains the applicant race and ethnicity, which does not exist in many other datasets
(including Black Knight McDash). Unfortunately, because HMDA did not, until
15In on going work, we are currently using a fuzzy matching approach to identify applications
that plausibly represent borrowers applying to more than one bank for their loan. Those that have
at least one of their applications approved and one denied can be seen as on the margin under
the assumption that banks do a reasonably good job at evaluating risk and tend to agree in their
evaluations.
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very recently16, contain detailed information on mortgage applicants, we can only
observe rich applicant and loan features via other datasets.
Black Knight McDash (McDash) Second, we use a proprietary anonymized
dataset from Black Knight McDash (McDash), which tracks the performance of
loans over time, and also more detailed information about the loan upon origina-
tion (the original FICO score of the applicant, for instance, the initial rate of the
loan, the term, etc.). McDash covers a large fraction of loans as well, but impor-
tantly, loans in McDash are (by definition) originated loans, so we cannot use this
richer data to better understand denied loan applications. We do not use McDash
directly, however - instead, we use a unique matched dataset that joins McDash
with HMDA data, because McDash does not contain race and so cannot be used
alone for fairness purposes. This match is not exact as there is no shared identifier
across the dataset, instead using loan characteristics, time, and geography to iden-
tify candidate matches. We limit our analysis to mortgages where there is a unique
potential match candidate; this does not cover all of the loans in HMDA, but rather
about 60-70 percent of them depending on the year. For computational reasons, we
use a 10% sample of the overall HMDA-McDash match (sampled at the loan level).
Race In this work, we focus on four major groups which we denote by the term
race. These are Asians, Blacks, Hispanics (that is, Hispanic Whites), and Whites
(Non-Hispanic Whites). This is a reasonable choice – over the time period we work
with, HMDA provides for each borrower racial categories that include Black, White,
Asian, Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian, (the latter two of which are
very small as a fraction of the data) and ethnic status of Hispanic/Latino or Not
Hispanic/Latino. The choice we makes allows us to avoid overlapping subgroups
and focus only on groups large enough to be substantive in our 10% sample.
However, we do not mean to posit that these categories are the “right” notion
16See future work.
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of race, or that any notion of “race” is right or correct; certainly, these groupings
are far too coarse to capture the variety of individual identities that we might think
of as race, ethnicity, culture, or other relevant groupings. Instead, we are simply
attempting to use these classifications available to us in HMDA (which are based
on notions of race used in the United States Census) to capture a notion of shared
socioeconomic experience in keeping with the history of discrimination in the United
States. Indeed, the Census itself has shifted possible options for race several times
in history; in more recent iterations it allows for much finer notions of race and
ethnicity. It would certainly be interesting to study fairness among these finer or
overlapping notions, though it is also worth keeping in mind that finer group notions
come at the cost of smaller sample size and precision.
FICO and LTV For most of our empirical work, we will focus on two fea-
tures which are available in McDash: Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV), and FICO score
(FICO). These features are known to be crucial in the determination of creditwor-
thiness according to both lenders and GSES [3]. LTV is simply the size of the
loan relative to the total value of the property (at the time of origination) - so for
instance, an applicant applying for a mortgage with a 20% down payment would
be applying with an LTV of 80%. The FICO score, pioneered by the Fair Isaac
Corporation, combines various pieces of information in individuals’ credit history
to come to a general measure for riskiness.
The FICO score is extremely widely used, and in particular, was adopted by
GSEs, as discussed in Section 5.1.1, as tool for evaluating credit. Indeed, because
of the market power of the GSEs as the largest buyer of mortgages from private
originators [3] to set credit threshold for loans they would or would not buy, their
decisions had a huge impact on the market.
Indeed,[23] provides a description of the thresholds suggested by GSEs:
[23] In 1995 Freddie Mac sent a letter to originators directing them to
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begin using credit scores in underwriting and establishing three tiers of
credit scores (Freddie Mac, 1995). We provide the key part of the letter
in the supplemental appendix. The FICO scores of 620 and 660 were
important cuto↵s. For borrowers with FICO scores above 660, lenders
were to do a “basic” review to “underwrite the file as required to con-
firm the borrower’s willingness to repay as agreed.” For borrowers with
FICO scores between 660 and 620, lenders were to perform a “com-
prehensive” review to “underwrite all aspects of the borrower’s credit
history to establish the borrower’s willingness to repay as agreed.” For
borrowers with FICO scores 9 below 620, lenders were warned to be
“cautious” and to “perform a particularly detailed review of all aspects
of the borrower’s credit history to ensure that you have satisfactorily
established the borrower’s willingness to repay as agreed.” Fannie Mae
(1997, pp. 8–9) established a similar set of cuto↵s, including at both
620 and 660 FICO. Lenders who sold loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac were contractually obligated to follow the GSEs’ guidance letters
establishing credit score cuto↵ rules for screening.
A consequence of these threshold-setting decisions is that the applicants between
620-660 are borderline, while those above 660 are very likely to be accepted and
those below 620 very likely to be rejected. The category of 620-660, then, should
contain those candidates that are most likely to have some positive probability
of being approved and of being denied. We will thus treat these candidates as
“marginal” even if they may not be exclusively marginal in the sense of being as
likely to be denied as approved (and there may be other candidates who are deemed
marginal based on other features).
We can observe the consequences of these thresholds empirically. Figure 5.2a
displays the number of mortgages in our sample at each FICO bucket, while Figure
5.2b breaks it down by loan type. Notice that there are discrete jumps at thresholds
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in buckets of 20 points, and indeed, the largest seems to be at 620.
(a) Counts by FICO (b) Counts by FICO by Loan Type
Figure 5.2: FICO scores of mortgage holders at time of origination . Source:
HMDA-McDash
(a) Count of FICO at origination
among mortgages by race
(b) Fraction of borrowers at each
FICO at origination by race.
Figure 5.3: FICO by race among borrowers . Source: HMDA-McDash.
Table 5.2 provides an estimate of the population-wide FICO distribution ac-
cording to FICO’s own blog [74]) as of October 2012, near the middle of our time
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FICO range 300-499 500-549 550-599 600-649 650-699 700-749 750-799 800-850
Percentage Points:
Population-wide ([74]) 6.0 8.5 9.9 10.1 12.2 16.2 18.8 18.4
Overall Borrower Sample 0.1 0.6 2.4 13.0 24.3 24.7 28.9 6.2
Conventional-Only Sample 0.1 0.4 1.2 5.9 15.4 26.9 40.7 9.3
Table 5.2: Population-wide FICO distributions. Source: HMDA-McDash and [74].
sample, as well as our observed FICO frequency among our sample of borrowers.
These di↵er for several reasons. First, of course, we observe a much higher pro-
portion of borrowers at higher FICO scores and lower proportion at lower scores
relative to the population-wide estimate, which makes sense, since low-FICO po-
tential borrowers are far less likely to receive (or perhaps even apply for) a loan.
Second, we are focusing on 30-year fixed rate mortgages that are owner-occupied,
and di↵erent groups may prefer di↵erent products; this may explain, why, for in-
stance, our sample has a lower share of very high FICO score borrowers than the
population as a whole. Finally, it is instructive to note that conventional loans have
a much higher proportion of higher borrowers relative both to the population as a
whole and to all successful borrowers.
5.4.2 Credit Score Threshold
The first prediction we test is that of a uniform credit score threshold. Recall that
in our simple model, both the unconstrained bank and the bank under No Disparate
Impact will choose di↵erent thresholds17 for each group, while the bank under No
Disparate Treatment will chose the same threshold.
Notice that the discussion in Section 5.4.1 strongly suggests that there ought to
be a (soft) threshold. How would we identify such a threshold in our data? Again,
because we do not have FICO or LTV of denied applicants, we cannot directly
17We can say more about the relationship between the di↵erent thresholds if we make further
assumptions, such as the ⌘g(X) functions being non-crossing, but not in general.
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identify a threshold for approval. However, we can look at the distribution of FICO
and LTV scores among originated mortgages and observe whether the distribution of
FICO scores spans the whole range of possible scores. Figure 5.2a shows borrowers
at each FICO score, and there is a large jump around the purported threshold of
620. This jump might not be as large as expected, but as visible in Figure 5.2b,
there are very few conventional mortgages below a FICO score of 620 - instead,
other loans like FHA loans make up the bulk of low-score loans.
But as noted, FICO is not the only factor – a higher FICO score might be
required at a higher LTV, for instance. Figure 5.4 is a heatmap of originated mort-
gages by FICO at origination (grouped into buckets of 20 points) and LTV (grouped
into buckets of 5 percentage points), while Figure 5.5 shows the same quantities but
limited to each race. Notice that in the overall plot, the shading drops very quickly
below 620, suggesting that this is indeed a threshold. However, breaking this fig-
ure down by race shows a more nuanced picture. For Whites and Asians, these
620 threshold seems to hold, with a few observations below suggesting some wiggle
room. On the other hand, for Blacks and Hispanics, there is a substantial num-
ber of observations below the 620 purported threshold. These observations tend to
be near 95% LTV –i.e. with less downpayment than the more standard 80%18 –
which does not concord with a possible explanation that the threshold is relaxed
for higher down payments. Instead, this may be consistent with attempts to ame-
liorate disparate impact, perhaps consistent with policy goals like the Community
Reinvestment Act.
18An 80% loan-to-value ratio corresponds to a 20% down payment.
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Figure 5.4: Originated Mortgage LTV-FICO heatmap for conventional loans .
Source: HMDA-McDash
Asian Black Hispanic White Overall
Quantity:
Fraction loans with <= 620 score 1.0% 13.4% 6.4% 2.4% 3.2%
Default Probability at Margin 17.2% 27.6% 25.6% 16.7% 19.5%
Overall Default Probability 3.2% 14.4% 11.4% 3.4% 4.5%
Denial Rate 14.4% 28.9% 22.3% 11.6% 15.0%
Table 5.3: Identified quantities by race (Conventional loans only) Source: Source:
HMDA; HMDA-McDash
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(a) Asian (b) Black
(c) Hispanic (d) White
Figure 5.5: Originated Mortgage LTV-FICO heatmap by race Source: HMDA-
McDash.
5.4.3 Risk of Default
The next prediction we turn to is that of the default risk. Recall that an uncon-
strained profit maximizing bank would set di↵ering thresholds, but these thresholds
would have equal default rate risks.19 On the other hand, banks that must avoid
19An objection is that perhaps the loans chosen by some groups are di↵erent than others in a
way that a↵ects their profitability; this could result in di↵ering risk thresholds even by a profit-
maximizing bank. This is an important area for future work and highlights the complexity of
measuring fairness this in setting. Importantly though, some natural straightforward extensions
for realism will not a↵ect this result – for instance, merely di↵ering scale applied equally to rewards
200
disparate impact or disparate treatment would in general have di↵erent default rates
on the margin and overall.
We thus turn to those applicants around the credit score threshold - these
marginal candidates- and examine their default risk. For our purposes, we will
define a loan in default if it becomes 90 days delinquent (according to the Mortgage
Bankers Association method of measuring days since payment due date) within the
first three years. This restriction to the first several years is a practical one, but
is common in the literature (e.g. [60]) as it allows us to evaluate mortgage out-
comes without waiting the full lifetime of the loan, and helps us avoid comparing
apples-to-oranges in the sense of loans of di↵erent lengths.
Note that for this exercise, we would like to make aggregate default predictions
as accurately as possible. To do so, we estimate a histogram-based gradient-boosted
regression tree (constrained to be monotonic) on FICO and LTV of our borrower
dataset. Because we are focusing solely on FICO and LTV, a model is not strictly
necessary; for example, we could use a histogram approach on the empirical data.
But such an approach imposes assumptions – e.g. how fine the appropriate reso-
lution of grid size is, whether that grid should be uniform and if not, how should
it vary, and so on. Instead, we can use a prediction model to implicitly learn what
values should be predicted for each combination of FICO and LTV in service of
some goal, i.e. minimizing square error. We choose a tree-based algorithm for sev-
eral reasons: first, such algorithms can more easily fit the possibly complex and
nonlinear patters that may appear, and have been shown to succeed empirically
in state-of-the-art prediction results [81], [66]. By contrast, algorithms like logistic
regression impose linearity, which makes them interpretable and useful for inference
but poorer for inference [69]. Finally, tree algorithms are generally memory-e cient
and costs will not a↵ect the equal thresholds results. Additionally, we highlight that in perfect
competition, profits ought to be competed away (in our model, that would mean that each group
would have a marginal default rate of r/(r + c)) so the more competitive we are, the more this
equal risk threshold analysis would be expected to hold.
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and can be trained easily on large datasets.
To train our models, we use the histogram-based gradient-boosted regression
tree (HGBRT) from Sci-kit Learn [103]. For each of the following subsets – Asian,
Black, Hispanic, White, and all borrowers – we train separate models, and create
train-test splits with a 20% test size. The outcome is a binary variable representing
defaulting within the first three years or not, and the only variables we use are
FICO and LTV at origination. We also impose a monotonicity constraint in both
dimensions (positive in LTV, negative in FICO) in order to regularize the models
and also impose our prior belief that these variables should be at least somewhat
predictive of risk.
We focus on the separately trained by race models because they allow for better
accuracy. The prediction surfaces we arrive at are given in Figure 5.6. We note
that for each group, the general trend is as expected – high LTV and low FICO
have very high risk of default, while low LTV and high FICO have very low risk of
default – and the e↵ect of FICO appears much stronger than LTV. Moreover, the
steepness of the relationship between default risk and FICO seems to interact with
LTV, with LTVs near and above 100 having much steeper declines than at lower
LTVs. Overall, the shape of the curves are highly non-linear.
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(a) Asian (b) Black
(c) Hispanic (d) White
Figure 5.6: Learned default prediction surfaces. Source: Author calculations using
HMDA-McDash.
So the models are intuitive. But how accurate are they? It is in general not
as easy to score models that predict probabilities rather than classes, since there
is random noise in the outcomes of realizations, and moreover, economic settings
in particular face the likelihood that random shocks or market-wide changes can
greatly a↵ect individual outcomes. So rather than thresholding at a particular
value, we prefer to test whether the models are calibrated20 – that is, of borrowers
for whom our model predicts a default probability of k, does about a k-fraction of
these borrowers default? The results are given in Figure 5.7. We divide our model’s
20Note that this is another fairness metric, but not one we examine in detail here.
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predictions into probability buckets of 1 percentage points – that is, borrowers with
a 1% predicted default chance, a 2% predicted default chance, and so on – and
evaluate the realized default rate in the test dataset. A perfectly calibrated model
would be exactly on the line y = x, which is plotted as a dashed line; we see
that each of the points is very nearly there, with some deviations. By comparison,
training a single HGBRT on all borrowers gives a somewhat noisier fit, in some
cases systematically. We display test set calibration plots for that model in Figure
5.20. On the other hand, training separate logistic regression models to predict
default and following a similar approach results in the calibration plots in Figure
5.21.
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(a) Asian (b) Black
(c) Hispanic (d) White
Figure 5.7: Default model calibration on test set (models trained separately by
race) Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash.
With the HGBRTs we trained, we can now estimate a race-specific default prob-
ability for each race at each FICO score. We limit to borrowers between 80-100 LTV,
since these are likely most representative of the standard setting. We plot these es-
timated default probabilities in Figure 5.8, under two assumptions on LTV: in 5.8a,
we average predictions at a given FICO score uniformly over an LTV of 80-100; in
5.8b, we instead predict over the LTV distribution at each FICO score observed in
the data. (The former, while less natural, holds equal the LTV distribution across
groups, and so is useful for eliminating the composition e↵ects of di↵erent LTV
ratios; on the other hand, the latter better captures observed defaults in practice.)
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This gives the results in the second row of Table 5.3: the overall marginal default
rate is about 15%, with the estimated default probability being 11.9% for Whites,
14.7% for Asians, 20.6% for Hispanics and 25.6% for Blacks.
(a) Uniform LTV. (b) Empirical FICO/LTV.
Figure 5.8: Model-estimated default probability by FICO and race. Left: Cal-
culated over uniform LTV 80-100. Right: calculated according to empirical
FICO/LTV distribution. Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash.
Overall, these default rates are significantly di↵erent at the margin – Hispanics
and Black on the margin default at nearly or more than double the probability of
Whites on the same margin. This di↵erence is again consistent with an attempt to
mitigate disparate impact.
5.4.4 Demographic Parity
Finally, we turn to demographic parity. For this section we again focus on con-
ventional loans. As described in Table 5.3, Blacks are more than twice as likely
to be denied for a loan as Whites – 25.6% vs 11.9% – while Hispanics(20.6%) are
nearly twice as likely to be denied and Asians (14.7%) are 1.25 times as likely to
be denied. Recall that we expect an extreme version of the No Disparate Impact
regime to have equal denial rates, while unconstrained or No Disparate Treatment
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regimes will tend to have disparate denial rates. The fact that these rates are so
disparate suggest that we are certainly not in a full No Disparate Impact regime21.
What about conditional demographic parity? First, Figures 5.9 and 5.10 display
the di↵erence in Black vs. White denial rates in each state and county, respectively.
There appears to be a large amount of variation - some states, such of those of
the upper Midwest and south, seem to have substantial di↵erences, as much as 20
percentage points22, while others, such as in the West, have much less disparate
impact. However, it is di cult to interpret these figures too much – there are a
multitude of historical and incidental factors that may generate these results. There
may also be mundane factors like sample size that limit the interpretability of these
figures – for instance, Hawaii and Montana have some of the lowest di↵erences (just
0.1% and 3.9%, respectively), but these states have very small black populations
(about 2100 and 4000, respectively) as of the 2010 U.S. Census.
Evidently, understanding conditional demographic parity requires a fuller anal-
ysis. But it is instructive to note that two naive regression approaches, with results
detailed in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 (OLS and Logistic regression, respectively), do not
appear to explain away the di↵ering approval rates. These regressions control for
state and year fixed e↵ects, presence of a co-applicant, and loan-to-income ratio,
and retain relatively large coe cients on dummy variables for race. Unfortunately,
because HMDA does not provide FICO or LTV until very recently, we cannot in-
clude the controls that would likely be the most important. However, as HMDA
has added these beginning in 2018, we will engage in future work that can at least
measure CDP with these two features going forward.
21Which is consistent with the fact that even the Disparate Impact legal theories of discrimi-
nation recognize business-necessity.
22In Michigan, the denial rate was 34.3% for Blacks and 13.8% for Whites.
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Figure 5.9: Black-White denial rate di↵erence by state over 2004-2017. Source:
HMDA




Sections 5.4.2 - 5.4.4 evaluate the various fairness metrics described in Section 5.2.1
for which our theoretical models make predictions. Overall, our evidence is mixed.
We do see a threshold-like pattern around a 620 credit score, consistent with stylized
facts about lender incentives, but the threshold appears to be less strictly enforced
for minorities. We do not see equal default rates at among marginal candidates
of di↵erent groups – instead, minorities tend to have higher default rates even at
the margin. And we do not see similar approval rates across groups – instead,
minority applicants are denied significantly more often. Taken together, this mixed
evidence suggests that we are not in either a strict No Disparate Treatment or No
Disparate Impact regime, but somewhere in between. Since the principles behind
both regimes seem to be enshrined in the law, this may not be so surprising, but
we have yet to formalize a notion of an “in-between” or hybrid regime. In the next
section we will do so, and identify the trade-o↵s under such a regime or strict No
Disparate Impact or No Disparate Treatment regimes.
5.5 A Counterfactual Pareto Frontier
Sections 5.4.2-5.4.4 focus on measuring fairness in the world as it is. Now, we want
to consider the space of what could be, so that we can understand what choice
we, as a society, are implicitly making. To do this, we consider possible trade-o↵s
under various policy regimes and construct counterfactual Pareto frontiers. The
three regimes we consider are No Disparate Treatment, No Disparate Impact, and
a “decoupled” regime of separate policies on credit score. Given our data, we will
have to make significant assumptions to do so; so as will become clear, the results in
this section should be considered strictly proof of concept. In future work, we hope
to obtain more detailed data and identify quasi-experimental variation; this will
allow us to estimate similar quantities, but with greater quantitative credibility. In
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particular, an important task we must do (which could be answered with existent,
if proprietary, data) is estimating the group-specific FICO distributions.
Now we briefly introduce some notation for this section to clarify the exposition.
Because we are working in a specific setting, we will shift away from writing X for a
generic feature instead write F to emphasize that it is the FICO score in particular.
We will use ↵⇧(G) to denote that approval rate of group G under policy ⇧ – that
is, Prf⇠DG [`⇧(f, g) = 1|g = G] – but will omit the ⇧ when it is clear. For threshold
policies on credit score, we will again use ⌧ , and write ⌧G if we mean to allow
thresholds to di↵er by race. We will use ✓ for thresholds on percentiles relative to
the population, and to specify relative to the group population we will write ✓G. We
write  G(F ) as the default probability Pr[d = 1|f = F, g = G]. We will generally
use the ·̂ symbol to denote estimated quantities, either empirically or using a model.
For instance, we write  ̂ for our estimate of a default rate. We will denote models,
e.g. for prediction, with ⇥; for instance, ⇥̂HGBRT
G
is the HGBRT we trained for
group G in Section 5.4.
Throughout this section, we will have to make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 3. We assume that Pr[d = 1|F = f, g = G, ` = 1] = Pr[d = 1|F =
f, g = G, ` = 0], where ` is the policy corresponding to the real world. That is,
observed conditional default rates in McDash correspond to default rates for similar
individuals who did not receive a loan. (We will thus write Pr[d = 1|F = f, g = G]).
Assumption 4. All distributions are independent of our chosen threshold. (In
other words, the act of changing our threshold will not invalidate the other assump-
tions.)
Assumption 3 is necessary because we only have default rates for borrowers
who obtained a loan; without this assumption, we cannot say anything about the
default rates of borrowers below the threshold of loans made. Assumption 4, like
Assumption 3, is quite important. Without it, it is in principle possible that the
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act of changing our policy could greatly impact the behavior of consumers and
underlying default rates.
These assumptions, while important caveats to our counterfactual approach,
do not entirely eliminate its utility for several reasons. First, even if we cannot
claim that we know the default rates of borrowers who would not have been made
a loan under the historical policy, we at least have high confidence in the sign
– selection bias will likely be only causing us to underestimate the default risk
under the threshold (since borrowers who are even more likely to default would be
unlikely to receive a loan and thus be in our sample). This allows us to at least
view our results as lower bounds. But more broadly, we can ultimately estimate the
default rates among those not o↵ered a loan if we can either conduct experiments or
identify quasi-exogenous variation (“natural” experiments) in the data. While it is
hard to be systematic about identifying and collating natural experiments, natural
experiments tend to be numerous with enough care and e↵ort. As for Assumption
4 – first, it is almost certainly true that bank policies can create feedback loops and
change incentives that end up changing behavior in the long run. But given how
costly loans are, and how di cult it is to change features of one’s creditworthiness,
it is likely that this assumption will hold approximately, at least in the short tun.
5.5.1 Estimating the credit score distribution
The first task we need to achieve is to estimate the population-wide distribution
of credit score by group. As discussed in Section 5.4.1, we cannot simply use
the distribution of credit scores in our HMDA-McDash sample, because those who
received mortgages (who are the only potential borrowers whose credit scores we
have) are likely to have higher credit scores than those who did not receive or did
not apply for mortgages. Unfortunately, publicly available detailed data on the
credit score distribution by race is exceedingly rare [107].
To mitigate this issue, we will use one of the most detailed estimates of credit
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score distribution by race – which comes from a study conducted by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors and reported to Congress in 2007 [107]. As part of
an examination of possible disparate impact in credit scoring, the authors com-
bined credit data with Social Security Administration data, which includes demo-
graphics, and estimated the fraction of each race that fell into the ten deciles of
overall credit scores (scores were normalized for compatibility). The credit scores
they used were provided by TransUnion, a consumer credit reporting agency; the
scores provided were the Transrisk Account Management Score (Transrisk score)
and the Vantagescore. The Transrisk score was developed by Transrisk, and the
Vantagescore was developed in a joint venture between TransUnion, Equifax, and
Experian in an attempt to harmonize scoring across their separate agencies. Hence,
these scores are not exactly the FICO scores, but they are on the same scale of 300-
85023 and, though exact details are not available publicly, are generally believed24
to be intended to track FICO scores. The report notes that their results across
both scores are nearly identical.
While likely slightly out of date, and not technically based on the same score,
we expect that these race-specific credit distributions will provide a plausible proxy
for the shape of FICO. We will thus use these figures, in combination with the
population-wide FICO distribution reported in Table 5.2, to create an estimated
race-wide FICO distribution. Our approach will be to use the (bucket-level) population-
wide FICO distribution to recover FICO scores for each decile; we then assume that
fraction of each race falling in these buckets correspond to those falling in the rank
buckets in the Fed’s report. The implied decile FICO buckets are somewhat irreg-
ular in size, however, which presents a problem – it is clear that the distribution
of scores is nonlinear, but it is not clear how scores are distributed within buckets.





buckets. Because we still have irregular buckets overall, we maintain a global non-
linearity despite accepting a local linearity that is probably not reflective of the true
distribution.
Now we describe the steps in more detail:
Step 1: Obtain FICO rank distribution. Because the Federal Reserve’s report
intended to compare several credit score models, including their own, the authors of
that report chose to normalize each of the scores into a rank-ordered scale. Table 5.4
reports the Transunion FICO scores in a nationally representative random sample;
unfortunately, the authors only provided these normalized scores, rather than scores
by FICO bucket, and do not provide a mapping from these scores to the actual
FICO scores. We will, however utilize these figures to obtain a plausible estimate
of race-specific FICO score distributions in Steps 2 and 3.
Notice that the distribution over buckets is quite di↵erent across races – for
instance, 30 % of Blacks were in the lowest decile, compared with almost 6% of
Asians, 15% of Hispanics, and almost 8% of Whites. Conversely, the highest decile
contains 9.8% of the Asian population and 12% of the White population.
Decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Share of Race
Asian 5.7 6.6 7.3 10.6 12.0 14.0 12.4 11.1 10.6 9.8
Black 30.1 22.5 15.6 10.1 7.2 4.6 3.2 2.7 2.4 1.7
Hispanic 15.1 15.0 14.9 13.3 10.8 9.5 6.8 5.6 5.0 4.0
White 7.8 8.5 8.7 9.9 10.1 10.0 9.7 10.6 12.7 12.0
Table 5.4: Estimated share over deciles of credit score by race, according to [107]
Source: Federal Reserve Report To Congress
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Step 2: Construct population-wide credit score deciles. Using [74]’s population-
wide FICO distribution as given in Table 5.2, we next construct an estimate of credit
score deciles (which we will need because Table 5.4 only reports shares in terms of
where individuals fall over the deciles). Because these figures are very high-level,
we will need to interpolate them. In particular, we will interpolate linearly within
buckets, and join or split buckets where necessary. For instance, the population
estimate of the proportion of borrowers with FICO between 300 and 499 is given as
6%, and the proportion of borrowers with scores between 500-549 is given as 8.5%.
Assuming that mass is distributed linearly within-buckets, the 10th percentile would
be reached at a score of 499+ 4/8.5 ⇤ 50 ⇡ 523. The next decile would start at 523,
with the remaining 4.5% of the 500-549 bucket forming the beginning of the second
decile, and extend to 549 + 5.5/9.9 ⇤ 50 ⇡ 577. If we continue this procedure, we
obtain the following table:
Population Decile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Upper Boundary of Decile 523 577 626 670 707 737 764 790 817 844
Table 5.5: Estimated share over deciles of credit score by race, obtained by com-
bining [107] and [74]. Source: Author calculation using [107] and [74].
Notice that even in the population as a whole, the size of deciles varies widely –
the first decile stretchs from the minimum theoretical score, 300, all the way to 523,
while the ninth decile spans just 790-817. This global nonlinearity is an important
characteristic of the distribution.
Step 3: Allocate share of race across appropriate deciles. Now, we con-
struct each race-specific FICO distribution by allocating the share of each race in a
given rank decile uniformly across the associated credit score bucket. For instance,
our estimated bucket range for the third decile is 577-626, and the share of each
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race that falls into the third decile for Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites is
7.3%, 15.6%, 14.9%, and 8.7%, respectively; this approach would then posit that
7.3% of Asians are uniformly spread over 577-626, 15.6% of Blacks, and so on. Since
there are about 50 FICO points in this range, we would place roughly 0.37%, 0.78%,
0.75%, 0.44% of Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites on 577, the same number on
578, on 579, and so on. While this decision to spread the borrowers out uniformly
does not add information relative to the mean value (by definition), it does allow
us to consider smaller changes at a time, and the approximation seems reasonable.
Figures 5.11-5.12 display our estimates of the probability mass and cumulative
density functions. There are several key points to note. First, our estimates largely
concord with result in the literature that suggest (in less detail than we need) that
Blacks and Hispanics have a significantly and systematically lower credit score than
Whites and Asians. Second, this di↵erence is not merely a shift in averages, but one
of shape – Asians and Whites tend to have a uniform or slightly increasing prob-
ability mass function (PMF) overall, while Blacks and Hispanics have decreasing
ones, suggesting that significant compositional shift may be observed when shift-
ing thresholds. Finally, the probability distribution estimated di↵ers greatly from
the observed distribution of credit scores in HMDA-McDash (displayed in Figure
5.11b). For instance, the share of borrowers below 620 is far larger than observed
in the empirical distribution among mortgage holders; this is expected, but indi-
cates that we likely would not achieve plausible counterfactuals without a process
of estimating the race-specific credit score distribution such as this one.
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(a) Estimated population-wide
FICO probability mass function
(smoothed) Source: Author calcu-
lation using HMDA-McDash and
results of calculations using [107]
and[74].
(b) Frequency of Credit Scores
among Borrowers. Source HMDA-
McDash.
Figure 5.11: Population-wide estimates and observed frequency of FICO in HMDA-
McDash.
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(a) Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion
Figure 5.12: Estimated population-wide FICO cumulative distribution by race.
Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash and results of calculations using
[107] and[74].
Again, it may be that the true distribution within buckets may be far from
linear (and we do not have enough information to gauge how far this assumption
may be from reality); however, this approach preserves the global nonlinearity of
the distributions, if not local, and spreading probability mass uniformly in the
bucket is preferable to other presumptive approaches like placing all borrowers at
the midpoint (which results in the same mean per bucket, but no variance), trying
to estimate a distribution within buckets from our data (which would su↵er from
selection bias), or choosing some other unjustified distribution. Of course, we can
sidestep all these estimation issues if we can obtain population-wide FICO distribu-
tions from the agencies; however, as they do not collect race by law, we would then
face the alternate and also di cult task of obtaining detailed external data with
demographics that could be matched to credit scores (and convincing the parties
involved to allow the match).
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Estimating Denial and Default Rates Now that we have credit score distri-
butions, we can begin to ask what we can expect in terms of denial rates and default
rates as we vary the threshold, whether expressed in terms of a FICO cuto↵ or a top
percentile. In particular, we can easily read o↵ groupwide denial rates at any given
FICO cuto↵ from these estimates, and construct weighted default rates for each
group using the probabilities above a threshold as weights and normalizing. And
starting with a percentile, we can use the estimates to recover the corresponding
FICO cuto↵.
Thus, we have all the ingredients to estimate counterfactuals in strict No Dis-
parate Treatment and No Disparate Impact regimes. It is worth noting, however,
that the implied acceptance thresholds predicted in our estimates are not consistent
with a strict No Disparate Treatment regime for Blacks and Hispanics. That is,
given the documented evidence of a real-world cuto↵ at 620, we might expect that
the fraction of applicants accepted would approximately match our estimates for
the share of the population above the threshold. Yet for Blacks for instance, our
estimate of the fraction of the population above the 620 cuto↵ is 33.8%, while the
approval rate is 71.1% – a 37 percentage point gap. There are two reason why these
might not match, besides our estimate being inaccurate. One is that the popula-
tion of mortgage applicants is very di↵erent from the overall population in terms of
credit score, so that approximately 71.1% of Black mortgage applicants do have a
credit score above 620. This selection bias may be a large part of the explanation,
since borrowers of very low credit score likely do not even apply for a mortgage
knowing they will be denied. The other is the possibility that the thresholds on
FICO are not being strictly applied for Black and Hispanic borrowers – perhaps
because FICO scores are not as predictive for minority borrowers, or because banks
wish to avoid disparate impact – and this is also consistent with the fact that we
see a nontrivial fraction of minority mortgageholders with scores below 620.
We will thus proceed to estimate three sorts of counterfactuals. We begin with
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Group Asian Black Hispanic White
Approval Rate 85.6% 71.1% 77.7% 88.4%
Share at least 620 81.4% 33.8% 56.8% 76.1%
Implied gap (percentage points) 4.2 37.3 20.9 12.3
Table 5.6: Estimated share of population above 620 and implied approval rate gap.
Source: author calculation and HMDA-McDash.
a No Disparate Treatment counterfactual, interpreted strictly; we will estimate the
observed trade-o↵s between di↵erences in denials and di↵erences in default assuming
that we loan if and only if borrower is above the threshold. The next will be a No
Disparate Impact counterfactual, in which we require the bank loan to the top k% of
borrowers in any group and consider the default rate trade-o↵. Finally we consider
a decoupled regime - when we can set di↵erent strict threshold policies for di↵erent
groups.
5.5.2 No Disparate Treatment
Now, we suppose we are in a strict No Disparate Treatment regime. That is, we must
pick a single cuto↵ on credit scores, and loan to all applicants above this threshold
and no applicants below it. The set of all thresholds represents our possible policy
space under this regime; and so the outcomes we can achieve are constrained by
the relationship between FICO score and default and distribution for each group.
Figure 5.13 illustrates the these relationships. We construct the following estimates:
First, we simply estimate the approval rate for each group at a given FICO
threshold. This is given theoretically by ↵⌧ (G) = Pr[F   ⌧ |g = G], which is




cPr[F = f |G = g], the estimated CDF we obtained in 5.5.1. We also want
to construct an overall weighted approval rate; we do this by simply constructing a
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weighted average of ↵̂(G), with the weights being the share of each group in HMDA.
Next, we estimate the probability that a given member of a given group at a
given FICO score defaults. To do this, we construct:





is the monotonically constrained HGBRT we learned for each group
in Section 5.4, and average over25 l 2 {80, ...99}. We define this average as  ̂(F,G).




cPr[f = F |g = G] ·  ̂(F,G)
P
F :F ⌧
cPr[f = F |g = G]
and similarly construct the overall default rate by weighting the race-specific rates
by their prominence in HMDA. Importantly, our default rate estimates given a
threshold ⌧ only include borrowers who would receive a loan under this policy. No-
tice that the shape of this estimate will depend on the relationship of the threshold
to the default distributions rather than the FICO itself.
The estimated results are plotted in Figure 5.13. As expected, Figure 5.13a is
simply a reflected version of the CDF above, and shows that at any given fixed
FICO threshold besides the trivial thresholds of the minimal and maximal FICO
scores, we should expect Blacks and Hispanics to su↵er significantly lower approval
rates than Whites and Asians. Figure 5.13b displays estimated defaults for loans
above each possible threshold. Qualitatively, the relationship is similar to that of
approval but flipped: for the most part, every given FICO threshold will result in a
higher default rate among Blacks and Hispanics than Whites and Asians. Finally,
it is worth keeping in mind that the “Overall” figures are much closer to the line
for Whites than the lines for Blacks or Hispanics. This is, of course, a trivial
25This is a simplification; a more sophisticated approach would be to, for instance, sample
with replacement observations from the data so that we account for the conditional distribution
of loan-to-value given the FICO score. But since, again, this work is intended to be somewhat
stylized, we ignore this subtlety for now.
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consequence of the fact that Whites are the majority. But what that means is that
from a portfolio-wide (or system-wide) viewpoint, the di↵erence between Blacks
and Whites and Hispanics and Whites is not as costly in terms of total defaults as
implied by looking at each group alone, and so lowering the lending threshold to
expand access to credit may viable.
Now, using those two plots, we can plot the Pareto frontiers that show all the
possibilities we can achieve in terms of both the overall denial and default rate, and
the gap between groups in terms of denials and defaults. Figure 5.14 plots these
frontiers by tracing out possible FICO thresholds and plotting their estimated ↵̂
and  ̂. In Figure 5.13a, we can see that the trade-o↵ is not so surprising – the
curve it self is convex, which suggests that there are diminishing returns in either
direction. Figure 5.14b has an interesting shape - it is concave, and even loops back
on itself (and so is not a function). That is because as we shift the threshold from
low to high (starting from the top left and moving right and down along the curve)
we can achieve similar di↵erences in multiple ways. For instance, approving many
Whites and a moderate number of Blacks can give the same disparity as approve
a Moderate number of Whites and few Blacks; similarly, we can obtain a given
disparity at various points along the absolute spectrum of default probability.
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(a) Approval Source: Author cal-
culation using HMDA-McDash and
results of calculations using [107]
and[74].
(b) Default rate Source: Author cal-
culation using HMDA-McDash and
results of calculations using [107]
and[74].
Figure 5.13: Estimated approval rates and default rates in a (strict) No Disparate
Treatment regime.
Finally, we note that both the di↵erences and systemwide figures we estimate
in Table 5.3 are on the exterior of these Pareto frontiers – that is, they strictly
dominate some models on this frontier. (Again, these are only the Pareto frontiers
for strictly No Disparate Treatment regimes.) This indicates that our real-world
setting may be Pareto-improving over some alternatives.
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(a) Tradeo↵ in default rate among
approved borrowers vs. denial rate
among applicants. Source: Author
calculation using HMDA-McDash
and results of calculations using
[107] and[74].
(b) Trade-o↵ in Black-White de-
fault gap vs Black-White denial
gap. Source: Author calculation us-
ing HMDA-McDash and results of
calculations using [107] and[74].
Figure 5.14: Trade-o↵s in denials vs default using strict FICO thresholds
Figure 5.15 illustrates the tradeo↵ between default rate and denial rate within
each group and overall. Again, each point corresponds to a particular choice of ⌧
and the estimated 1 ↵̂(G),  ̂(G), passing from very low denial rate and high default
to very high denial rates and low defaults. The separation of these curves indicates
that there are no points where the minority groups achieve the same level on both
dimensions as the majority group – and this is what prevents us from achieving
fairness on both metrics at the same time in a strictly disparate treatment regime.
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Figure 5.15: Denials vs Default Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash
and results of calculations using [107] and[74].
5.5.3 No Disparate Impact
Now, we turn to No Disparate Impact regimes. Here, we can choose a fixed ✓
such that for each group, we take the top ✓ fraction of the distribution (which will
correspond to di↵erent ⌧Gs). In a slight abuse and overloading of notation, we can
think of ⌧G as a function mapping ✓ to some threshold t such that Pr[F   t|g =
G] = ✓. Because FICO scores are discrete, we can estimate ⌧G in the following
manner:





cPr[f = F |g = G]
3
5  ✓
We plot these estimates in Figure 5.16. Unsurprisingly, choosing ✓ close to 0
requires a very high credit score, while choosing it close to 100 requires very little
in the way of a credit score at all. But here, too, we see a gap comparable to those
previous – at any given ✓, there is a large credit score gap between e.g. Blacks and
Whites. So there is no place, besides again trivially at the top or bottom of the
FICO scale, where we could set a cuto↵ that satisfies No Disparate Impact but also
keeps a small di↵erence in credit thresholds.
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Figure 5.16: Denials vs Default. Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash
and results of calculations using [107] and[74].
We see a similar result when we turn to defaults: both viewed at the margin,
i.e. the default rate at F = ⌧G, as well as the overall default rates for F   ⌧G, there
is a large gap beyond very high FICO scores. These figures are plotted in Figure
5.17. As before, the default curves of Blacks and Hispanics tend to be significantly
higher at any given percentage point (viewed on both a marginal and averaged
basis), but default rates are very similar among the top few percentage points of
borrowers of each group. But as before, the fact that Whites are a larger fraction of
the population overall means that the overall default rate tracks the White default
curve more closely. Hence, higher fractions of borrower groups could be chosen
while maintaining lower overall default rates than predicted by individual group
default curves.
225
(a) Marginal DefaultSource: Au-
thor calculation using HMDA-
McDash and results of calculations
using [107] and[74].
(b) Average default. Source:
Author calculation using HMDA-
McDash and results of calculations
using [107] and[74].
Figure 5.17: Default when taking top x% of each group.
Figure 5.18 displays the possible di↵erences in White-Black FICO cuto↵ implied
by a given percentile cuto↵ versus the Black-White di↵erence in group default rate.
The color of the points represent the percentile being accepted. The curve is best
conceptualized as starting by accepting 0% and sweeping out the curve as the
percentage increases, moving from near equal default rates with small FICO cuto↵
di↵erences, to higher di↵erences and default rate di↵erences that grow together,
and then eventually decreasing then increasing, then decreasing again in cuto↵
di↵erence.
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Figure 5.18: Denial gap-default gap trade-o↵s under No Disparate Impact. Source:
Author calculation using HMDA-McDash and results of calculations using [107]
and[74].
This figure highlights several features of the distribution. First, when extending
credit to the very top applicants, there is very little di↵erence between Black and
White default rates. Instead, the gap is driven by borrowers nearer to the middle
and beyond of their respective distributions. Second, any given gap in thresholds
can usually be reached via multiple choices of the top-✓ fraction. For instance,
choosing to accept every applicant results in group FICO thresholds for each group
of essentially the minimum FICO score, and similarly, choosing to accept almost no
applicants in each group results in FICO cuto↵s of essentially the maximum FICO
score for each group. Third, as the cuto↵ of fraction increases from the top 1% to
to the top 100%, both the default gap and the threshold di↵erence may increase or
decrease depending on where in the distribution one is.
5.5.4 Hybrid Regime
The trade-o↵s we have seen so far assume that banks are either satisfying a strict
No Disparate Treatment or No Disparate Impact regime. If we instead allow them
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to satisfy neither fully, we can obtain other possible choices in terms of default
rates and denial rates. We consider here a hybrid regime in the following sense:
within any group, there is a strict threshold policy on FICO score – similar to the
strict thresholds of No Disparate Impact - - but we allow di↵erent thresholds for
each group. (Note that if FICO distributions are fixed, we can equivalently think
of these policies as taking a top fraction of each group ✓g, which di↵ers by group.)
Here, we consider the Black-White di↵erences again, so we conceptualize a policy
as a pair (⌧B, ⌧W ). In Figure 5.19, we evaluate the di↵erence between Black-White
default26 rates and approval rates of pairs of policies in the cross product of the set
{450, 455, ...750}⇥ {450, 455, ...750}.
The result is the feather-like pattern in Figure 5.19. In this picture, we have
plotted each possible policy pair as a point, with its x-coordinate corresponding to
the induced Black-White approval di↵erence and its y-coordinate representing the
Black-White default di↵erence, while the color represents di↵erence between the
majority and minority cuto↵s. The blue arrows indicate directions of increasing
fairness along either dimension, and so point towards the origin, which is the point
of total fairness as measured by these metrics. Hence to the left of 0, the arrow
point right, but on the right of 0, the arrow points left, and so on. Finally, the black
dotted lines approximately map the real-world Black-White default and approval
di↵erences, so their intersection is the point of decoupled policies that most closely
matches our aggregate figures.
26We calculate weighted default rates as described in Section 5.4.2, and again average over
uniform LTV between 80-100; repeating the exercise using the empirical LTV distribution gives
very similar results.
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Figure 5.19: The Pareto“Feather” and associated frontier of possible decouple poli-
cies and their fairness measures. Black dotted lines intersect at our observed mea-
sures. Blue arrows point in the direction of more fairness. Source: Author calcu-
lation using HMDA-McDash and results of calculations using [107] and[74].
Interestingly, there are several policy pairs that appear to dominate our setting,
but not very many (12 out of the 3600 in the space of policy pairs, and all of
the same character. They keep the minority cuto↵ essentially fixed at 620 or up
to 635, while raising the majority cuto↵ to 730-750. So such policies would gain
fairness according to both metrics, but decrease the total loans made somewhat to
the minority and significantly to the majority. On the other hand, there are plenty
of policies that sacrifice on a single dimension but improve on another, and these
may be preferable to where we are. Regardless, and perhaps surprisingly, our policy
regime in practice appears to be near the Pareto frontier.
To the the extent we find its assumptions credible, Figure 5.19 appears to show
us what is possible. For instance, there is no policy in the range we searched that
leads to the (0, 0) apparently-perfect fairness point. But in actuality, it shows us
what is possible today – or even, since it is the result of learning on historical data,
what was possible yesterday. As a society, we certainly should want to be on the
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Pareto frontier, and where exactly we should be on that frontier is a question that
deserves careful philosophical and moral debate. But ultimately, the goal should
be to remedy historical injustices and push that Pareto frontier closer towards the
point of perfect fairness – and then perhaps the curve of the frontier will not seem
so cutting.
5.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this Chapter, we have seen that the fairness measurements defined mathemati-
cally in the service of designing fairer algorithms can be used to quantify disparities
in real-world settings, and we used these quantities to evaluate the current dispar-
ities in the mortgage market. But more interestingly, our counterfactual analysis
lets us quantify and visualize the space of policy choices and their impacts, at least
in the short term. Such an analysis can help make clear to policymakers and the
public what choices we are implicitly making, and identify potential alternatives.
There are many limitations to our analysis, however. In particular, the assump-
tions we needed to make to derive some of our counterfactual results may be too
coarse an approximation to reality, such as the case of the group-specific FICO
distributions; in some other cases, such as the assumption that defaults among
borrowers and defaults among the population are similar, we run a real risk of
selection bias impacting our conclusions. To overcome these limitations, we can
obtain exogeneity using experiments and natural experiments, focus on applicants
with multiple applications, and also obtain richer soon-to-be-publicly-available data
(e.g. HMDA 2018 and later data) or partner with credit ratings agencies or gov-
ernment institutions to get finer data. These improvements would strengthen the
credibility of the results in this Chapter.
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5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5
(a) Asian (b) Black
(c) Hispanic (d) White
Figure 5.20: Default model calibration on test set (single model for all borrowers)
Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash.
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(a) Asian (b) Black
(c) Hispanic (d) White
Figure 5.21: Default model calibration in test set (separate logistic regression
models) Source: Author calculation using HMDA-McDash.
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Dep. Variable: denied R-squared: 0.034
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.034
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 2452.
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 02:15:02 Log-Likelihood: -1.7487e+06
No. Observations: 4972008 AIC: 3.498e+06
Df Residuals: 4971936 BIC: 3.499e+06
Df Model: 71
coef std err t P> |t| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 0.4873 0.002 256.949 0.000 0.484 0.491
race[T.black] 0.1016 0.001 122.690 0.000 0.100 0.103
race[T.hisp] 0.0496 0.001 63.326 0.000 0.048 0.051
race[T.white] -0.0262 0.001 -39.596 0.000 -0.028 -0.025
C(has coap)[T.True] -0.0401 0.000 -126.426 0.000 -0.041 -0.039
lti -7.404e-05 8.9e-06 -8.315 0.000 -9.15e-05 -5.66e-05
np.power(lti, 2) -2.024e-09 4.02e-10 -5.037 0.000 -2.81e-09 -1.24e-09
State FE included
Year FE included
Omnibus: 1673166.576 Durbin-Watson: 1.967
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 4102318.803
Skew: 1.956 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 5.120 Cond. No. 4.84e+07
Table 5.7: OLS Regression Results Source: Author calculation using HMDA-
McDash.
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Dep. Variable: denied No. Observations: 4972008
Model: Logit Df Residuals: 4971936
Method: MLE Df Model: 71
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 Pseudo R-squ.: 0.03700
Time: 02:12:21 Log-Likelihood: -1.9637e+06
converged: True LL-Null: -2.0392e+06
coef std err z P> |z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 0.0174 0.012 1.422 0.155 -0.007 0.041
race[T.black] 0.6420 0.006 100.372 0.000 0.629 0.654
race[T.hisp] 0.3388 0.006 54.502 0.000 0.327 0.351
race[T.white] -0.2320 0.006 -41.927 0.000 -0.243 -0.221
C(has coap)[T.True] -0.3529 0.003 -126.804 0.000 -0.358 -0.347
lti -0.0005 7.13e-05 -7.241 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
np.power(lti, 2) -1.497e-08 2.86e-09 -5.244 0.000 -2.06e-08 -9.38e-09
State FE included
Year FE included





This dissertation has explored several topics at the intersection of algorithms, mar-
kets, and society. These subjects are bona fide fields of inquiry in and of themselves,
so we can only scratch the surface. Yet we believe the material covered here pro-
vides some useful insight. Of course, we believe the particular results achieved are
valuable contributions to the problems for which they were derived:
• We have analyzed welfare and revenue in various auction formats relevant to a
huge portion of the digital economy; disentangling allocation and pricing, we
have gone beyond the standard model and mechanisms to analyze strategic
considerations and implications for welfare and revenue.
• We have designed a new form of double auction which mathematically guar-
antees the preservation of privacy for participants’ information; in theory, at
least, this could greatly improve the e ciency of financial markets by allowing
participants to forgo algorithmic strategies to preserve this privacy at a cost.
• We have applied economic and learning theory to show how even in the ab-
sence of technical factors, market forces can lead to unfairness in AI and
machine learning-driven markets, which likely will be among the most soci-
etally impactful markets of the future; we have also shown that competition, a
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canonical market-based panacea may not be such here, and that by contrast,
regulation may be useful.
• We have adapted metrics from the Fair Machine Learning literature to one
of the most societally important markets of the past and present – the U.S.
mortgage market – to describe the empirical disparities in our world; we have
also shown how to estimate the universe of choices and trade-o↵s we face in
the short run.
To paraphrase a quote attributed to Kant: Practice without Theory is blind; Theory
without Practice is lame. We have tried to ensure that our theoretical models do
not stray too far from reality and that our practice be at least guided by theoretical
justification. With this, we hope that our contributions will have real value and
relevance. But beyond our specific contributions, the work here is of a particular
perspective: the application of algorithmic tools and thinking, in conjunction with
rigorous modeling of strategic agents and markets, and cognizance of, if not expertise
in, social science and philosophical thinking, is a powerful combination. Given the
increasing integration of algorithms into our society, we believe that this perspective
will be necessary to understand and improve our rapidly changing world, and we
are glad to promote it here.
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